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Urban Robotics: Achieving Autonomy in Design and
Regulation of Robots and Cities
JESSE WOO, JAN WHITTINGTON & RONALD ARKIN
Cities across the United States are facing a wave of urban robotic products that
combine artificial intelligence with the basic elements of transportation technology.
The firms that deploy these technologies intend to both disrupt and serve many
markets with their products, including but not limited to the transportation of people
and cargo, surveillance, security, entertainment, and the collection and use of vast
troves of data from the sensing capabilities of their products. In the evolution of
technology, however, automated vehicles, delivery robots, security robots, and
follow-me drones or robots are not separate products; they represent one overall
movement to combine basic technologies of mobility with modern sensors, machine
learning, and data science, into robotics intended for use in urban settings. To the
firms, cities are concentrated markets for services, testbeds for imperfect artificial
intelligence, collections of persons to engage in beta-testing of their robotics, and
public spaces to be shaped in their interest to ease access to public rights-of-way
and embed intelligent communication systems in urban space. To the cities, urban
robotics foster technological optimism that is often unrealistic for either the
technology or the economics of the firm, and their design and deployment poses new
hazards for people in public space and private life.
As robots continue to enter the public rights-of-way in cities across the country,
lawmakers need to find ways to regulate these technologies in the public interest.
The old Facebook mantra of “move fast and break things” becomes even more
concerning when the technology in question has a physical presence and can
actually break things or harm people. In addition, the introduction of connected,
mobile, sensing robots into public space on a mass scale accelerates already
shifting norms around privacy and surveillance in public places. Policymakers at
the local, state, and federal levels are taking a variety of approaches to regulate
urban robots with these issues in mind. While some may call the diversity of
approaches an impediment to innovation, we argue that at this stage of
technological development, the laboratory of democracy offers the best possible
path forward to regulate this emerging technology in the public interest. Therefore,
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we argue that broad federal preemption of robotics technologies, like autonomous
vehicles, is premature. Cities are in fact the best suited sites of experimentation for
autonomous vehicles, drones, and other urban robots, and city lawmakers should
be allowed autonomy in their effort to regulate the design and deployment of urban
robotics in public space. States and the federal government should provide technical
and regulatory expertise and a backstop against a race to the bottom, but their
orientation should be to work with cities, not against them.
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Urban Robotics: Achieving Autonomy in Design and
Regulation of Robots and Cities
JESSE WOO, JAN WHITTINGTON & RONALD ARKIN *
INTRODUCTION
Are cities ready for self-driving, artificially intelligent vehicles and
robotics? The urban marketplace is increasingly filled with products
emblematic of “smart” cities, from widely discussed autonomous vehicles
(AVs) to smaller variations on the theme, such as robotics for delivery,
security, and entertainment.1 Altogether, such urban robotics represent a
new wave of technology in which digital sensors, networked devices, and
their associated data stores are given the algorithmic, physical, and legal
means to move in public space.2 As time goes on, the public is increasingly
likely to encounter self-driving vehicles, robots, and drones on city streets,
sidewalks, and in urban airspace. How should cities respond to these new
and impending technologies?
Firms in this sector have technological, market, and financial interest in
testing and deploying their products in public space, but the implications for
cities span a broad array of intended and unintended consequences. Cities
are natural sites of experimentation for firms interested in bringing these
products to market, and the perception of economic opportunity associated
*
Jesse Woo is a Fulbright Fellow and Visiting Scholar on the Faculty of Law at Kyoto University.
Jan Whittington is an Associate Professor in the Department of Urban Design and Planning and the
Director of the Urban Infrastructure Lab at the University of Washington. Ronald Arkin is a Regent’s
Professor and Director of the Mobile Robot Laboratory in the College of Computing at the Georgia
Institute of Technology.
1
Jeffrey Mervis, Are We Going Too Fast on Driverless Cars?, SCIENCE (Dec. 14, 2017, 9:00 AM),
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/12/are-we-going-too-fast-driverless-cars
(“Transportation
experts have developed six levels that describe autonomous vehicles. In general, a higher number means
a more independent vehicle, with less for the human driver to do, thanks to more sophisticated sensors,
cameras, and algorithms. . . . A level-four car . . . will operate autonomously only under certain
conditions, say in good weather during the day, or on a road with controlled access. The technology for
that capability already exists.”); Paul Miller, Taking a Ride on Segway’s Loomo Robot, VERGE (Jan. 11,
2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/11/16874220/segway-loomo-robot-hands-on-ces-2018; Olivia
Solon, Robots Are Invading Malls (and Sidewalks) Near You, MIT TECH. REV. (June 8, 2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601635/robots-are-invading-malls-and-sidewalks-near-you/ (“[A]
small but growing number of human-scale mobile robots . . . are finding employment outside the confines
of industrial settings like factories. They’re invading consumer spaces including retail stores, hotels, and
sidewalks in a quest to deliver services . . . .”).
2
On the theory of the combinatorial evolution of technology, including artificial intelligence, see
W. BRIAN ARTHUR, THE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT EVOLVES 42–43 (2009).
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with tech firms is leading city representatives to reclaim public spaces,
transforming them into testbeds for product development.3 It is worth noting,
however, that experimentation involves trial and error, and there are
limitations to the ability of artificial intelligence to navigate the wide range
of conditions and events that comprise the urban environment.4 Ultimately,
the design of the environment may be as important to the success of urban
robotics as the design of the hardware and software in those products.5 These
are matters that city officials care about; the design, function, and finance of
urban built environments are generally the purview of local government.
Significant new questions in law, such as legal liability for the performance
of artificially intelligent devices, are being addressed as autonomous
vehicles and devices enter public rights-of-way.6 Additionally, artificial
3
A natural site of experimentation is the intended market for the device, analogous to the natural
habitat for a species. On the topic of city representatives accommodating firms, see Emily Badger, Pave
Over the Subway? Cities Face Tough Bets on Driverless Cars, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/20/upshot/driverless-cars-vs-transit-spending-cities.html. Regarding
a partnership with Ford in which Miami becomes a testbed, Mayor Carlos A. Giménez of Miami-Dade,
Florida said, “We want to learn from Ford what it is we need to do to get ready for these vehicles, so that
when AVs become a reality, fully, we’ll be one of the first communities to get them . . . . We want to let
the world know that Miami is ready to be a testbed.” Laura Bliss, Self-Driving Pizza Just Hit Miami,
CITYLAB (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/02/self-driving-pizza-just-hitmiami/554138/.
4
Veronica Rocha, Crime-Fighting Robot Hits, Rolls Over Child at Silicon Valley Mall, L.A. TIMES
(July 14, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-crimefighting-robot-hurts-child-bayarea-20160713-snap-story.html; see also Futuris, Urban Robots: A New Generation of Robots, YOUTUBE
(May 10, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t8cstaDhjjI (discussing the extent to which
roboticists depend on the design of the environment); Jeremy Kahn, An Idea for Making Self-Driving
Cars
Safer:
Reprogram
Humans,
L.A.
TIMES
(Aug.
17,
2018),
http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hy-driverless-car-safety-20180817-story.html (discussing
the safety of self-driving cars). One of the many challenges of designing robots to operate among people
in an urban environment is, “for example, autonomous navigation, that’s to say [the robots would] be
able to move around and find out where they are, those are things that to us seem very routine and very
simple, but for the robots they are very complex.” Futuris, supra.
5
As the National Association of City Transportation Officials says: “Automated vehicle technology
holds many promises for cities, but the potential benefits of automation are not guaranteed. City policies
must proactively guide the technology to prioritize people-centric design.” NACTO, BLUEPRINT FOR
AUTONOMOUS URBANISM 10 (2017), https://nacto.org/publication/bau/blueprint-for-autonomousurbanism/. U.S. Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx notes that vehicle-to-infrastructure
communication is a “critical component of a connected vehicle environment—a system of hardware,
software, firmware and wireless communication that enables the dynamic transfer of data between
vehicles as well as between vehicles and elements of the roadway infrastructure.” U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,
FHWA Announces Vehicle-to-Infrastructure Guidance, TRANSPORTATION.GOV (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/fhwa0317. See also Futuris, supra note 4 (describing one
method to overcome the challenge of designing a robot to navigate the urban environment, “this campus
is equipped with Wi-Fi internet and twenty cameras to allow the robots to navigate around; the same
setup would be needed in any city for [the robots] to be able to work autonomously”).
6
The death of a pedestrian by an autonomous vehicle test driven by Uber in Arizona highlights the
importance of these issues. The city of Tempe, Arizona is facing a lawsuit for inadequate street design
from the relatives of a pedestrian killed by an automated Uber vehicle. Ryan Randazzo & Paulina Pineda,
Tempe Faces $10 Million Claim in Uber Self-Driving Vehicle Fatality, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Feb. 3, 2019),
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intelligence imbues devices with the purpose of replacing as well as
augmenting the roles and responsibilities of persons, and this tension exists
at the local level.7 Lastly, these products generate rich data stores about the
public, bringing market potential along with the coupled moral hazard of
data monetization and loss of privacy, including surveillance.8 Which parties
are positioned to benefit from this experimentation, and which will absorb
the costs? In the face of these potentially widespread and enduring industrial
and technological changes, how might cities act in the public interest?

https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2019/02/03/tempe-faces-10-million-claim-uber-self-drivingvehicle-fatality/2761875002/. Experts in the field on the inevitability of the crash said “it [was] only a
matter of time,” as the technology “is not mature enough to be completely driverless,” and “it is unlikely
that a person would be able to prevent a crash by taking over a self-driving system at the last minute.”
Larry Greenemeier, Uber Self-Driving Car Fatality Reveals the Technology’s Blind Spots, SCI. AM.
(Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/uber-self-driving-car-fatality-reveals-thetechnologys-blind-spots1/. See also Mike Isaac et al., Uber’s Vision of Self-Driving Cars Begins to Blur,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/19/technology/uber-self-drivingcars.html (describing the firm’s choice between continuing or abandoning investment in its autonomous
vehicle unit); Timothy B. Lee, NTSB: Uber’s Sensors Worked; Its Software Utterly Failed in Fatal
Crash, ARS TECHNICA (May 24, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/cars/2018/05/emergency-brakes-weredisabled-by-ubers-self-driving-software-ntsb-says/ (summarizing findings from an investigation by the
National Transportation Safety Board); Ian Wren, Uber Suspends Self-Driving Tests After Pedestrian Is
Killed
in
Arizona,
NPR
(Mar.
19,
2018),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2018/03/19/594950197/uber-suspends-self-driving-tests-after-pedestrian-is-killed-inarizona?sc=tw (describing the firm’s decision to suspend tests of self-driving vehicles in the wake of the
fatal crash).
7
Urban robots and the firms that deploy them are on “a quest to deliver services alongside human
staff members for a fraction of the price of employing people to do a variety of typically unexciting
tasks.” Solon, supra note 1; see Mervis, supra note 1 (“Technologists see AVs as the next step in what’s
called ‘mobility as a service.’ That is what taxi fleets and ride-sharing services such as Uber and Lyft
now offer. What is attracting AV investors is the huge payoff from removing the biggest cost of that
service, namely, the person behind the wheel.”).
8
See, e.g., MCKINSEY & CO., MONETIZING CAR DATA: NEW SERVICE BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES
TO
CREATE
NEW
CUSTOMER
BENEFITS
7–9
(2016),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Automotive%20and%20Assembly/Our%20I
nsights/Monetizing%20car%20data/Monetizing-car-data.ashx (outlining the business opportunity
created by the generation of data from autonomous vehicles); Kayla Matthews, How Anonymous Cars
Will Make Big Data Even Bigger, DATAFLOQ (Jan. 7, 2018), https://datafloq.com/read/howautonomous-cars-will-make-big-data-even-bigger/1795 (“[A]utonomous vehicles, or ‘smart’ cars of the
future, are nothing more than a cog in a much larger data-collection system.”); Matt McFarland, Your
Car’s Data May Be More Valuable Than the Car Itself, CNN
(Feb. 7, 2017),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/02/07/technology/car-data-value/index.html (“A self-driving car can
generate 1 gigabyte of data per second. . . . More data means more potential money. All sorts of creative
business opportunities will arise. . . . ‘By collecting data from vehicles, you effectively digitize the public
space, unlocking potential safety, security, municipal and commercial benefits . . . .’”); Sivaramakirshnan
Somasegar & Daniel Li, Business Models Will Drive the Future of Autonomous Vehicles, TECHCRUNCH
(Aug.
25,
2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/25/business-models-will-drive-the-future-ofautonomous-vehicles/ (“The issues of who owns data, who can access data and who will process the data
will be a critical question [sic] for companies and regulators over the next several years. As vehicles
generate and consume more and more data, it will be critical to watch who controls the data and how
they decide to monetize the data.”).
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The answers to these questions lie as much in the institutional
arrangements designed to govern this new wave of technologies as they do
in the intrinsic capabilities of these products. Anyone evaluating the existing
policy environment for artificially intelligent devices today would find
technological optimism, conflicting perspectives of the public interest, and
preemptive acts at the state and federal levels.9 In particular, preemption in
current policymaking raises issues because the consequences and cost of
product design, including safety and surveillance as well as convenience and
expense, play out at the local level.10 As city officials ask their residents to
coexist with robots and negotiate with firms over the transaction costs that
accompany these products, they need the flexibility and funding necessary
to adapt to market conditions and the authority to act as market makers.11
Preemption cuts short the legal experimentation and regulatory competition
that could provide a race to the top for firms and policymakers in the public
interest. In the best of circumstances, federal agencies provide guidance and
domain expertise, while states provide a supportive framework for cities to
operate in with a backstop against the expansive possibility of harm. In the
most egregious cases, preemption threatens to revoke the rights of the
9

See Ralph Nader, Driverless-Car Legislation Is Unsafe at This Speed, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22,
2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/driverless-car-legislation-is-unsafe-at-this-speed-1534973755
(“Mr. Thune’s bill [the AV START Act (S. 1885)] would eviscerate vehicle regulations by allowing
companies to sell potentially limitless numbers of driverless cars that would be exempt from established
federal safety standards. This bill would also pre-empt states from exercising their own safety duties.”);
Noah Seigel, Will the Feds Handcuff Cities on Automated Vehicles?, PUB. SQUARE (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://www.cnu.org/publicsquare/2017/11/09/will-feds-handcuff-cities-automated-vehicles
(“[AV
START] includes an insidious clause that . . . preempts states and cities from providing any oversight,
public information, or policy direction when AVs hit their streets.”).
10
Susan Crawford, Autonomous Vehicles Might Drive Cities to Financial Ruin, WIRED (June 20,
2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/autonomous-vehicles-might-drive-cities-to-financial-ruin/
(“[M]any cities balance their budgets using money brought in by cars: gas taxes, vehicle registration fees,
traffic tickets, and billions of dollars in parking revenue [charges that autonomous vehicles can avoid]. .
. . [Cities are] beginning to look at fees that could be charged [to autonomous vehicles]. . . . But many
states, urged on by auto manufacturers, won’t let cities take these steps.”); see Seigel, supra note 9
(“There are many potential benefits to AV technology, but the bill includes an insidious clause that is
sure to make everything worse: it preempts states and cities from providing any oversight, public
information, or policy direction when AVs hit their streets.”); see also Lisa Nisenson & Brad Davis, Ten
Steps
Toward
Autonomous
Urbanism,
PUB.
SQUARE
(Dec.
11,
2017),
https://www.cnu.org/publicsquare/2017/12/11/ten-steps-toward-autonomous-urbanism (discussing ten
steps that cities can take to prepare for the proliferation of mobility technology).
11
On the potential for autonomous vehicles to impact local public finance, see Benjamin Y. Clark
et al., The Impacts of Autonomous Vehicles and E-Commerce on Local Government Budgeting and
Finance, URBANISM NEXT (Aug. 2017), https://cpb-us-east-1-juc1ugur1qwqqqo4.stackpathdns.com/
blogs.uoregon.edu/dist/f/13615/files/2017/07/Impacts-of-AV-Ecommerce-on-Local-Govt-Budget-andFinance-SCI-08-2017-2n8wgfg.pdf; Crawford, supra note 10; Jan Whittington et al., Push, Pull, and
Spill: A Transdisciplinary Case Study In Municipal Open Government, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1899,
1964 (2015) (discussing the standardization of public contracts with private technology firms and
explaining that “[m]id to large-size cities such as Seattle with big information needs and access to
considerable resources have the potential to be market-makers, i.e., to drive the market toward best
practices”).
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persons at the local level, who are asked to bear the risk and cost of residing
with robots, and to prevent the resolution of conflicts through local levels of
government.12 Preemption debates in technology law have already arisen
around the regulation of air carriers,13 the taxation of e-commerce, 14 net
neutrality,15 sharing economy platforms,16 and municipal broadband,17 with
important consequences. Some proposed federal and state laws and existing
state statutes already preempt cities on robotics in ways that could impede
local governments’ autonomy with regard to the design, management,
operation, and finance of public rights-of-way. Laws that preempt cities
based on broad or poorly-defined definitions of performance could limit
local control of the infrastructure that constitutes the operational domain of
urban robots, irrespective of the public interest.
The purpose of this Article is to provide a framework through which
public decision-makers can effectively engage with the firms that are
bringing artificially intelligent robotics to market in public space. With an
institutional economic perspective, this Article suggests a means for
evidence-based policymaking by breaking down design and its evaluation
into constituent sequential components, recognizing the private and social
12

See Crawford, supra note 10 (“Cities serve as the front lines of every pressing social problem the
country is battling: homelessness, illiteracy, inadequate health care, you name it. They don’t have any
resources to lose. The rise of autonomous vehicles will put struggling sections of cities at a particular
disadvantage.”); Seigel, supra note 9 (“It is a not a radical idea [sic] to allow cities and local governments
to lead on transportation policy and technological disruption. Before the advent of the automobile, roads
were generally financed by local property taxes. When cars became ubiquitous, state and local
governments adopted vehicle registration fees, fuel and weight mile taxes, and parking meters to help
pay for and regulate automobiles and their externalities. All of this predated the federal gas tax and the
interstate highway system. It is likely that local governments will need to foster a similar kind of
innovation to cope with (and pay for) AVs. These are the kinds of conversations about the public (and
private) good that are in danger of being preempted by the current version of the AV START bill.”).
13
Seigel, supra note 9.
14
Id.
15
See Jon Brodkin, FCC Will Also Order States to Scrap Plans for Their Own Net Neutrality Laws,
ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 21, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/11/fcc-will-also-order-statesto-scrap-plans-for-their-own-net-neutrality-laws/ (describing the FCC’s attempts to preempt state net
neutrality laws); Nicole Flatow, Cities Launch Plan to Protect Net Neutrality, CITYLAB (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/03/net-neutrality-executive-orders-fcc-mayors-bill-de-blasio/
555344/ (describing the efforts of states and localities to counteract FCC preemption measures). As
Seigel explains, preemption clauses in the 1994 FAA Authorization Act were short-sighted in preventing
local governments from enacting law or policy that would affect the “price, route, or service” of any air
carrier “transporting property by air or by motor vehicle,” which was then reinforced in the 1998 Internet
Tax Freedom Act. Seigel, supra note 9. Together, these acts have prevented local governments from
taxing the firms that depend on the public provision of local road infrastructure and thus have disrupted
the long-standing ability of cities and states to ask those who benefit to pay for public improvements. Id.
16
NICOLE DUPOIS ET AL., CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS
2018 UPDATE 12–16 (2018), https://nlc.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/NLC%20Preemption%20Report
%202017.pdf.
17
Jon Brodkin, States Win the Right to Limit Municipal Broadband, Beating FCC in Court, ARS
TECHNICA (Aug. 10, 2016), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/08/in-blow-to-muni-broadbandfcc-loses-bid-to-overturn-state-laws/.
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costs of experimentation in cities, and recommending a limited scope for
state and federal intervention.18 Part I begins by defining the characteristics
of the current wave of robotics entering public space, placing public-facing
robotics within the theory of the nature of technology and elaborating on the
process of product design with algorithmic feedback for machine learning in
complex urban environments. Part II explores the opportunities and hazards
that await cities as sites of experimentation and introduces a comparative
approach to policymaking to forestall negative externalities while permitting
technological change. Part III explores the role of cities in the evolving
policy environment for data privacy in the face of advanced sensing
technologies, including robotics, that undermine existing legal protections.
Part IV analyzes laws governing urban robots at the local, state, and federal
levels and the impact of preemption on cities’ ability to serve as sites of
experimentation. It recommends against broad express preemption or field
preemption at the state and federal levels, particularly the broad language in
proposed federal autonomous vehicle legislation. Part V addresses possible
counterarguments. The Article ends by presenting concluding thoughts.
I. URBAN ROBOTICS AND THE QUEST FOR INTELLIGENT DESIGN
This Part provides an overview of the emerging field of autonomous
machines in public space, including a section that situates these products in
the evolution of technology and brings the process of design to the forefront
of discussion about the benefits and pitfalls of this new wave of technology
for cities and local residents.
A. Robots Are Coming to a City Near You
Companies that make robots are sending their products out into the cities
of the world. Not to be confused with the spectacular humanoid devices of
science fiction, the robots entering our city roadways, sidewalks, parking
lots, and airspace include any machine that can sense, process, and act upon
the physical world.19 The robots being deployed, tested, and marketed in
urban public rights-of-way could be said to fall into several categories:

18
Institutional economics recognizes the polity and judiciary for creating and interpreting the rules
of the game for economic actors. DOUGLASS CECIL NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 4–5 (1990).
19
People working in the field are quick to separate artificial general intelligence, such as the
development of a sentient being, from today’s forms of artificial intelligence: “Artificial intelligence is
not about building a mind; it’s about the improvement of tools to solve problems.” Gideon Lewis-Kraus,
The Great A.I. Awakening, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/
magazine/the-great-ai-awakening.html; see also Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103
CALIF. L. REV. 513, 531 (2015) (“[R]obots are best thought of as systems that sense, process, and act
upon the world to at least some degree.”).
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automated vehicles for transporting persons and cargo, delivery robots,
security robots, and entertainment or companion robots.20
The automation of vehicles currently gives drivers the impression that
they may turn their attention away from the road for periods of time,21 but
the purpose of this technology is to transform human-driven fleets of
vehicles into services provided with self-driving fleets of vehicles.22 Many
tech companies and automobile manufacturers are experimenting with these
capabilities.23 Though most are working on automobiles, recent market
entrants and hopefuls include automated buses, automated semi-trucks for
cargo delivery, and personal drones for air travel.24 At the time of this
writing, thirty-one cities in the United States have active pilot programs for
automated vehicles, nearly half of the cities of the United States are
reportedly preparing for them, and twenty-two states have legislation
encouraging their development.25 It is important to emphasize the rapid pace
of deployment underway for what is still experimental technology. It was
only 2016 when the city of Pittsburgh established a test center and became
an early test site for Uber.26 In the same year, Google rebranded its self20
Technologists are also working on robots that can maintain or repair infrastructure such as roads
or light posts, but we are not aware of any cities in which these systems are currently in use. Jane
Wakefield, Tomorrow’s Cities: Dubai and China Roll Out Urban Robots, BBC (June 10, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-41268996. Cities aside, technologies increasingly include robots
with human operators who monitor and occasionally intervene in the development and operations of
large-scale infrastructure systems, such as instrumented rail inspection systems, automated trucks and
yard cranes for container port operations, and tunnel construction excavating systems. This is similar to
the use of robotics in manufacturing. MIT Tech. Review, China’s Robot Workforce, YOUTUBE (Apr. 26,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wUAM-7jbhIw.
21
Russ Mitchell, Tesla Has a Huge Incentive to Deploy Self-Driving Tech. But Is the World Ready?,
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-08-08/tesla-fullself-driving-fsd-technology.
22
Luke Mellor, The State of Self-Driving Vehicle Fleets, PANTONIUM (June 14, 2019),
https://pantonium.com/the-state-of-self-driving-vehicle-fleets/.
23
Danielle Muoio, RANKED: The 18 Companies Most Likely to Get Self-Driving Cars on the Road
First, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/the-companies-most-likely-toget-driverless-cars-on-the-road-first-2017-4.
24
Alex Davies, Self-Driving Trucks Are Now Delivering Refrigerators, WIRED (Nov. 13, 2017),
https://www.wired.com/story/embark-self-driving-truck-deliveries/; David Katzmaier, In the Future
We’ll All Fly Personal Drones Like This, CNET (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.cnet.com/news/in-thefuture-fly-personal-drones-like-this/; Adele Peters, Automated Buses Are Here, Now We Have to Decide
How They Are Going to Reshape Our Cities, FAST COMPANY (July 17, 2017),
https://www.fastcompany.com/40444021/automated-buses-are-here-now-we-have-to-decide-how-theywill-reshape-our-cities.
25
Aspen Inst., Initiative on Cities and Autonomous Vehicles, BLOOMBERG PHILANTHROPIES,
https://avsincities.bloomberg.org/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2018). Cities may be granted or denied this
authority by the state. At the time of this writing, twenty-two states have enacted legislation authorizing
the operation of autonomous vehicles, and the governors of eleven states have signed executive orders
for this purpose. Autonomous Vehicles: Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Mar. 19, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-selfdriving-vehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx#Enacted%20Autonomous%20Vehicle%20Legislation.
26
Cecilia Kang, No Driver? Bring It On. How Pittsburgh Became Uber’s Testing Ground, N.Y.
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27

driving program as Waymo. Google’s Waymo 2019 Safety Report
identifies twenty-five United States cities in its map of test locations, most
of which are in the San Francisco Bay Area of California or in proximity to
its early test site of Chandler, Arizona.28 Other noteworthy cities with
automated vehicle pilot programs include Atlanta, Denver, Boston, Detroit,
Las Vegas, Reno, San Antonio, Tampa, Miami, and Washington, D.C.29
Testing in cities should be distinguished from test centers, as the former
refers to partial or complete spatial access to the city while the latter refers
to sites designed for testing purposes with limited public access.30 With or
without test sites, the number of participating cities has grown rapidly.31 The
dedication of an area for testing, however, should not imply permanence for
the technologies or the firms. Following the death of a pedestrian in Arizona,
Uber temporarily suspended testing and operations of automated vehicles in
all locations.32 In general, as reports of accidents have accumulated, the tenor
of news about automated vehicles has changed.33 After several years of
hype, people may be realizing how difficult it is to replace human judgment
TIMES (Sept. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/technology/no-driver-bring-it-on-howpittsburgh-became-ubers-testing-ground.html.
27
Our Journey, WAYMO, https://waymo.com/journey/ (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) (providing a
timeline of Google’s self-driving projects, which started in 2009).
28
ON THE ROAD TO FULLY SELF-DRIVING: WAYMO SAFETY REPORT 27 (2019),
https://waymo.com/safety/. Note that state governments are playing roles as well. Press Release, Cal.
Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, Driverless Testing and Public Use Rules for Autonomous Vehicles Approved
(Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/newsrel/2018/2018_17; see, e.g.,
Autonomous Vehicles State Bill Tracking Database, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 24, 2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-legislative-database.aspx (providing
“up to date, real-time information about autonomous vehicle bills that have been introduced in the [fifty]
states and the District of Columbia”).
29
Aspen Inst., supra note 25.
30
See U.S. Department of Transportation Designates 10 Automated Vehicle Proving Grounds to
Encourage Testing of New Technologies, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP. (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/dot1717 (designating the “proving ground” locations with
“different facilities that can be used to gauge safety, manage various roadways and conditions, and handle
various types of vehicles”).
31
Brooks Rainwater & Nicole DuPuis, Cities Have Taken the Lead in Regulating Driverless
Vehicles, CITYLAB (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/perspective/2018/10/cities-leadregulation-driverless-vehicles/573325/.
32
Wren, supra note 6.
33
How Do We Keep Self-Driving Cars from Killing Us?, CNN BUS., https://www.cnn.com/videos/
business/2019/01/22/how-do-we-keep-self-driving-cars-from-killing-us-beme.beme (last visited Aug.
22, 2019) (originally sourced from BEME); Timothy B. Lee, The Hype Around Driverless Cars Came
Crashing
Down
in
2018,
ARS
TECHNICA
(Dec.
30,
2018,
8:00
AM),
https://arstechnica.com/cars/2018/12/uber-tesla-and-waymo-all-struggled-with-self-driving-in-2018/
(“‘I’ve been seeing an increasing recognition from everybody—OEMs down to various startups—that
this is all a lot tougher than anybody anticipated two or three years ago,’ industry analyst Sam
Abuelsamid told Ars. ‘The farther along they get in the process, the more they learn how much they don’t
understand.’”); Brian Merchant, The Deadly Recklessness of the Self-Driving Car Industry, GIZMODO
(Dec. 13, 2018, 12:52 PM), https://gizmodo.com/the-deadly-recklessness-of-the-self-driving-carindustr-1831027948.
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behind the wheel with the algorithmic decision-making of artificial
intelligence.34 One possible outcome could be a shift in attention to devices
that are smaller in stature: devices that are not designed to transport people.
Delivery robots are intended to complete last mile logistics—the most
complex and expensive portion of the shipping system—where products
move to and from distribution centers and homes or offices.35 The wide
variation in the characteristics of these devices has them destined for all
manner of public spaces, including sidewalks, roadways, parking spaces,
and airspace. 36 For example, Starship Technologies’ short, electric,
six-wheeled robots operate autonomously to deliver items up to forty pounds
in weight within a two-mile radius, with the possibility of intervention by
remote operators.37 They have partnered with firms to offer delivery services
in Redwood City, California and Washington, D.C.38 Robots from Marble,
Dispatch, Robby, Eliport, and Kiwi strike a similar profile and occupy a
similar market niche.39 Amazon, a late market entrant, recently unveiled a
34
John McDermid, Self-Driving Cars Will Never Be Moral. Let’s Stop Pretending Otherwise, FAST
COMPANY (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90300056/self-driving-cars-will-never-bemoral-lets-stop-pretending-otherwise; Joann Muller, Wall Street Is Split on Self-Driving Cars, AXIOS
(Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.axios.com/split-views-about-self-driving-cars-on-wall-street-48897a1cc480-4910-8018-65d91e69bbe6.html; Anton Wahlman, Tesla Is Decades Away From Full Self-Driving
Cars, THESTREET (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.thestreet.com/investing/tesla-is-decades-away-from-fullself-driving-cars-14853271 (“‘[F]ull self driving’ . . . remains decades away. Try having a car follow
directions from a cop waving his hands, to get around a stalled truck on a one-lane road, in a snowstorm.
. . . [Self-driving cars] may work at lower speeds in a low-complexity campus environment. But not in
the real world, where they have to mix with all kinds of real traffic, unusual obstacles, and weather. Elon
Musk was right about needing to be at the 99.999% level of better. But by saying that Tesla is now at
98%, he admits that he is decades away from delivering what he is promising for already this year,
2019.”).
35
Elle Hunt, ‘It’s Like a Robot Playground’: The Cities Welcoming Self-Driving Delivery Droids,
GUARDIAN (May 1, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/may/01/what-the-hell-is-that-selfdriving-delivery-robots-hit-london; Lora Kolodny, Postmates and DoorDash Are Testing Delivery by
Robot With Starship Technologies, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 18, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/18/
postmates-and-doordash-are-testing-delivery-by-robot-with-starship-technologies/; Erica E. Phillips,
When Robots Take to City Sidewalks, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/whenrobots-take-to-city-sidewalks-1491970141.
36
Olivia Solon, Robots Are Invading Malls (and Sidewalks) Near You, MIT TECH. REV. (June 8,
2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601635/robots-are-invading-malls-and-sidewalks-nearyou/.
37
Hunt, supra note 35; Kolodny, supra note 35.
38
Kolodny, supra note 35; Kat Lonsdorf, Hungry? Call Your Neighborhood Delivery Robot, NPR
(Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/03/23/520848983/hungry-callyour-neighborhood-delivery-robot.
39
8 Delivery Robot Startups for Last Mile Delivery, NANALYZE (Apr. 27, 2018),
https://www.nanalyze.com/2018/04/8-delivery-robot-startups-last-mile-delivery/; Eliport: Delivering an
Autonomous Future, STARTENGINE, https://www.startengine.com/eliport (last visited Aug. 23, 2019);
Brian Heater, Kiwi’s Robots Deliver Food to Hungry Berkeley Students, TECHCRUNCH (May 26, 2018),
https://techcrunch.com/video/kiwis-robots-deliver-food-to-hungry-berkeley-students/; Lora Kolodny,
Marble and Yelp Eat24 Start Robot Food Delivery in San Francisco, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 12, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/12/marble-and-yelp-eat24-start-robot-food-delivery-in-san-francisco/;
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delivery robot that bears a striking resemblance to Starship’s models, with
the announcement that they are beginning field testing in Snohomish
County, Washington.40 Robots like these operate under a patchwork of legal
rules, sometimes requiring a permit, either because of a lack of regulation or
permissive state laws.41 Starship representatives have suggested that relaxed
rules allow their use in Virginia, Florida, Wisconsin, and Idaho, as well as
Washington, D.C.42 There are also firms competing in this space with larger
vehicles, which may be subject to many of the same regulations as
autonomous vehicles for passengers. Nuro’s delivery vehicles are about half
the size of an automobile, suggesting larger payloads, travel on roadways,
and the need to occupy a parking space while loading, unloading, or
charging.43 Reports suggest that Teleretail’s prototype, similar in size, can
operate within a fifty-mile radius.44 Udelv, whose vehicles may include a
driver, recently announced plans to begin an operation in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma and a test program with Walmart in Surprise, Arizona.45 Notably,
automakers envision a role for themselves in the autonomous vehicle
market.46 Ford has announced that it will test its full-sized automated
TechCrunch, Marble’s Delivery Robot Rolls Through SF, YOUTUBE (Apr. 12, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pNpH4G-hoIY. In addition, there are models from Savioke and
Aetheon that are being marketed for use indoors and in hotels and hospitals, respectively. Paul Miller,
The Relay Hotel Delivery Robot Will Soon Spot Wi-Fi Dead Zones and Mingle with Guests, VERGE (Jan.
11, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/11/16879432/savioke-relay-hotel-delivery-robot-wi-fidead-zones-mingle-ces-2018; Welcome to the One-of-a-Kind World of Aetheon, AETHEON,
https://aethon.com/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2019).
40
Matt Simon & Arielle Pardes, The Prime Challenges for Amazon’s New Delivery Robot, WIRED
(Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-new-delivery-robot-scout/.
41
See Jeremy Hsu, Out of the Way, Human! Delivery Robots Want a Share of Your Sidewalk, SCI.
AM. (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/out-of-the-way-human-deliveryrobots-want-a-share-of-your-sidewalk/ (“San Francisco . . . slapped a ban in 2017 on autonomous
deliveries by sidewalk robots and has only slowly opened the door for companies seeking permits. Other
U.S. communities have regulated where such robots can go and how they must behave.”).
42
Javier Espinoza, Delivery Robots Hit the Streets, but Some Cities Opt Out, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 30,
2018), https://www.ft.com/content/0a2a5a76-e0ea-11e7-a0d4-0944c5f49e46.
43
Alan Ohnsman, Ex-Google Engineers Raise $92 Million To Roll Out Robot Delivery Vehicles
This Year, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alanohnsman/2018/01/30/ex-googleengineers-raise-92-million-to-deploy-robot-delivery-vehicles-this-year/#3c7c739875d1.
44
Lora Kolodny, Teleretail Built a Delivery Robot to Make On-Demand Delivery Easy for Small
Businesses, TECHCRUNCH (May 15, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/05/15/teleretail-built-adelivery-robot-to-make-on-demand-logistics-easy-for-small-businesses/.
45
David Dishman, Autonomous Vehicles to Bring Groceries to Oklahoma City Residents, TRANSP.
TOPICS (Sept. 14, 2018, 10:45 AM), https://www.ttnews.com/articles/autonomous-vehicles-bringgroceries-oklahoma-city-residents; Gregory Magana, Walmart Is Piloting Another Autonomous Grocery
Delivery Program, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/walmart-udelvautonomous-grocery-delivery-2019-1.
46
Daimler has invested in both Starship Technologies and Matternet, and Ford’s recent agreement
suggests the interest of automakers in automated delivery services. Automating the Last Mile: Startups
Chasing Robot Delivery by Land and Air, CB INSIGHTS RES. BRIEFS (Mar. 30, 2017),
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/autonomous-drone-delivery-startups/; Laura Bliss, Self-Driving
Pizza Just Hit Miami, CITYLAB (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/02/self-
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47

vehicles for package delivery services, and Toyota has unveiled a
prototype.48 Ford has opted to pair its automated delivery vehicles with a
more humanoid, bipedal walking robot.49 In addition, at least two firms offer
delivery services via aerial drones: Flirtey and Matternet.50 Flirtey garnered
attention in 2016, with its first delivery sanctioned by the Federal Aviation
Administration of a product from a 7-Eleven to a home via drone.51 Amazon
Prime Air delivery by drone has been undergoing tests in the UK, but not in
the United States.52 Reports suggest that Boeing is also entering the market,
with a drone for payloads of up to 500 pounds.53
Security robots, which could be said to operate like mobile closed circuit
television with the capacity to automatically call authorities, are intended to
reduce the need for human security guards.54 Although such products are
privately owned and operated, some scholars have conceptualized them as a
form of automated law enforcement.55 For the most part, security robots

driving-pizza-just-hit-miami/554138/.
47
Bliss, supra note 46 (discussing Ford’s self-driving pizza delivery vehicle).
48
Margi Murphy, CES 2018: Driverless Pizza Hut Delivery Van Draws Black Mirror Comparisons,
TELEGRAPH (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2018/01/09/ces-2018-driverlesspizza-hut-delivery-van-draws-black-mirror/ (describing Pizza Hut’s plan to team up with Toyota to
design a driverless vehicle to deliver pizza to customers).
49
Isobel Asher Hamilton, Ford Might Have Out-Creeped Boston Dynamics with a 2-Legged
Delivery Robot, BUS. INSIDER (May 22, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/ford-revealsautonomous-delivery-robot-digit-2019-5?fbclid=IwAR0DVDYIxSG4yN6e8sy-PCuWb2sOJqCsKqo
LhK_6SHHAmxXdWSBeQLFuclI.
50
Automating the Last Mile, supra note 46.
51
Id.
52
Kyle Bailey, Why Amazon’s Drone Delivery Service Is Unrealistic, OBSERVER (Nov. 20, 2017),
https://observer.com/2017/11/amazon-prime-air-drone-delivery-service-might-never-happen-in-unitedstatesr/; Jeff Desjardins, Amazon and UPS Are Betting Big on Drone Delivery, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 11,
2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-and-ups-are-betting-big-on-drone-delivery-2018-3.
53
Stephen Trimble, Unmanned Cargo Lifter Deepens Boeing’s Push on Autonomy, FLIGHT
GLOBAL (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/unmanned-cargo-lifter-deepensboeings-push-on-auton-444788/.
54
See K5 Autonomous Data Machine, KNIGHTSCOPE, https://www.knightscope.com/knightscopek5/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2019) (discussing that K5 is “equipped to keep areas such as parking lots,
corporate campuses and hospitals safe autonomously”); Shan Li, Robots Are Becoming Security Guards.
‘Once It Gets Arms . . . It’ll Replace All of Us’, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/
business/la-fi-robots-retail-20160823-snap-story.html (“Already, Knightscope robots are edging into the
private security industry, patrolling parking lots, a shopping center and corporate campuses in
California.”); Matt Simon, The Tricky Ethics of Knightscope’s Crime-Fighting Robots, WIRED (Dec.
21,
2017),
https://www.wired.com/story/the-tricky-ethics-of-knightscopes-crime-fighting-robots/
(“Knightscope wants to keep humans in the loop with its robots, but it’s not hard to imagine a day when
someone else gets the bright idea to give other security machines a lot more autonomy.”).
55
Woodrow Hartzog et al., Inefficiently Automated Law Enforcement, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1763, 1763 (2015) (exploring theories surrounding automated law enforcement). See also Elizabeth E.
Joh, Private Security Robots, Artificial Intelligence, and Deadly Force, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 569, 569
(2017) (“A recent use of a remote-controlled robot equipped with lethal force has raised the question of
how police might use robots to supplement or replace existing police work.”).
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have been deployed without ex ante permission from cities. The company
most prevalent in searches for security robots is Knightscope, although there
are others.57 Robots from Knightscope can be programmed to patrol a
predefined area and are currently being used or contemplated for use in
parking lots, residential neighborhoods, and quasi-public areas such as
corporate campuses, shopping malls, museums, and airports.58 The K5 units
for outdoor use weigh over 400 pounds, are over five feet tall, and come with
an electrical pad for charging.59 They are outfitted for 360 degree video
recording, storage, and streaming, including thermal imaging, reading
license plates, tracking parked cars, playing pre-recorded messages, and a
two-way intercom between a remote operator and people who encounter the
device.60 Also known as “automated data machines,” the devices stream data
to the company’s “security operations center,” and the firm advertises the
ability to stream the same to recipients’ online web portals.61 A report in
October 2017 noted that the firm had already deployed forty-seven of these
devices for clients in ten states, including venues in Boston, Atlanta, Dallas,
Sacramento, Washington, D.C., and Tampa.62 Like Knightscope, Segway
markets the Loomo robot for security use, and the city of York, Pennsylvania
has experimented with it to augment the city police force’s surveillance and
first response capabilities.63 In a curious twist, Boston Dynamics suggests
that security is an appropriate use for their doglike robot, SpotMini.64 Drones
are also in use in numerous police departments, though the extent to which

56
Michael Hamilton, Cities Should Not Design for Autonomous Vehicles, MKT. URBANISM (Nov.
13, 2017), http://marketurbanism.com/2017/11/13/cities-should-not-design-for-autonomous-vehicles/
(“[A] permissionless innovation is the only necessary condition for the adoption of autonomous
vehicles.”).
57
Robbie Gonzalez, I Spent the Night with Yelp’s Robot Security Guard, Cobalt, WIRED (Aug. 4,
2017), https://www.wired.com/story/i-spent-the-night-with-yelps-robot-security-guard-cobalt/.
58
Tim Johnson, Coming Soon: Security Robots That Patrol Streets – Or Guard Your Home,
MCCLATCHY (Oct. 30, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/
article181343981.html; Li, supra note 54.
59
Johnson, supra note 58.
60
Li, supra note 54.
61
Knightscope, Inc., Knightscope Security Robots Available NOW!, YOUTUBE (June 17, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UtuLB2duq2E.
62
Tim Johnson, Can Robots Replace Human Security Guards?, GOV’T TECH. (Oct. 31, 2017),
http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/can-robots-replace-human-security-guards.html; Johnson, supra
note 58.
63
Ty Lohr, Robots on Patrol: Could These Two-Wheeled Robots Help York City Police
Department?, YORK DAILY REC. (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.ydr.com/story/news/2018/11/08/couldrobots-wave-future-law-enforcement-york-city-police/1933263002/.
64
Peter Holley, This Company Is Building a Massive Pack of Robot Dogs for Purchase Starting in
2019, WASH. POST (July 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/07/24/thiscompany-is-building-massive-pack-robot-dogs-purchase-starting/?utm_campaign=d3930868f3UW_Today_Thursday_July_26_2018&utm_medium=email&utm_source=UW%20News%20Subscrib
ers&utm_term=.52cf5207b7b8.
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65

police use automated devices as opposed to remote control is not clear. The
world’s largest drone manufacturer and the largest police body-camera
manufacturer recently partnered to sell drones to police departments, and
critics fear that this partnership will put drones with powerful artificial
intelligence capabilities, such as facial recognition, in the hands of police
with little oversight.66
Entertainment or companion robots represent another wave of
autonomous devices entering urban space.67 For entertainment,
synchronized drones, for example, are in use by Disney and were featured
in the opening and closing ceremonies of the 2018 Winter Olympics.68 The
film industry is using drones to replace expensive rigging with aerial
cinematography.69 And, perhaps more importantly for public space, anyone
can now purchase an aerial drone that follows and video records any
specified person, animal, or moving object, wherever it goes, for an
elaborate form of “selfie.”70 Though they appear to be no different from
remote controlled commercial drones, these devices may be set to
automatically track a signal or follow an individual and may also be
equipped with the software necessary to detect and avoid other objects.71
65

How Law Enforcement Can Harness the Benefits of an Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
Program, U.S. DEP’T JUST. NIJ (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.nij.gov/topics/lawenforcement/operations/aviation/Pages/harnass-benefits-of-unmanned-aircraft-systems.aspx
(“According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, only about 350 law enforcement agencies in the U.S. had
aviation programs in active use.”).
66
See Dave Gershgorn, This Is the Week That the Drone Surveillance State Became Real, QUARTZ
(June 8, 2018), https://qz.com/1299947/this-is-the-week-that-the-drone-surveillance-state-became-real/
(explaining the partnership between DJI and Axon and the surveillance AI’s ability for facial
recognition). The recent case of IBM’s undisclosed use of data from the New York Police Department’s
closed-circuit television systems reads like a precursor for the proprietization of surveillance data from
security robots, including drones. James Vincent, IBM Secretly Used New York’s CCTV Cameras to
Train Its Surveillance Software, VERGE (Sept. 8, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/6/17826446/
ibm-video-surveillance-nypd-cctv-cameras-search-skin-tone.
67
William Grimes, Drones Kill, Yes, But They Also Rescue, Research and Entertain, N.Y. TIMES
(May 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/11/arts/design/drones-kill-yes-but-they-also-rescueresearch-and-entertain.html.
68
Ron Dicker, The Olympics Opening Ceremony Drone Show Is Just So Damn Impressive,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opening-ceremony-droneshow-is-just-so-damn-impressive_us_5a7db877e4b08dfc930363ae; Darren Wihko, The Making of Walt
Disney World’s First Drones Show, YOUTUBE (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=EDhHNN6nfRQ (last visited Aug. 29, 2019).
69
Richard Verrier, Drones Are Providing Film and TV Viewers a New Perspective on the Action,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-droneshollywood-20151008-story.html.
70
Fintan Corrigan, 12 Best Follow Me Drones and Follow You Technology Reviewed, DRONEZON
(July 5, 2019), https://www.dronezon.com/drone-reviews/best-follow-me-gps-mode-drone-technologyreviewed/; Antonio Villas-Boas & Rachel Sandler, This $2,500 ‘Self-flying Camera’ Can Follow You
Around and Snap Photos Without Anyone Controlling It — Here’s How It Works, BUS. INSIDER (Feb.
15, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com.au/skydio-r1-drone-self-flying-camera-explained-photos2018-2.
71
See Corrigan, supra note 70 (“It is good to remember that the vast majority of Follow Me mode
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The same “follow me” features are also emerging in devices on roadways
and sidewalks. Segway’s Loomo robot may be marketed for security, but it
was also intended for entertainment, as it was designed to be able to follow
its user, take pictures, and display simple social computing characteristics
(smiley faces).72 It is a hoverboard that users can ride or load with up to 200
kilograms of packages, and it is capable of traveling up to eleven miles per
hour, with a range of twenty-two miles on a single charge and sensors and
software that includes voice command and facial recognition.73 Seemingly
interested in reaching all possible markets, Segway has also marketed
Loomo for autonomous goods delivery, emphasizing the features of design
for carrying packages. 74 Similarly, the company responsible for Vespa
Scooters is working on Gita, a small cargo “droid” designed to free the user’s
hands as they traverse dense urban environments.75 Several companies, such
as Cowa and Travelmate, now offer robotic suitcases with “follow me”
capabilities, though astute authors question the value of a suitcase that
contains a battery large enough to pose a hazard to airlines.76 While not
strictly meant as entertainment (although one writer described Gita as “more
like having a pet than an artificial intelligence”), these machines are
designed to delight users while contributing to leisure experiences.77
Altogether, the urban robotics profiled in this Section represent a
dizzying array of firms with a rapidly expanding portfolio of products for
use in the public and quasi-public spaces of cities. The diversity of uses
envisioned for these technologies, however, belie the fundamental
characteristics that they share in common: mobility, artificial intelligence,
communications, and a fine-grained ability to sense the world around them.
This confluence is the result of technological evolution, which suggests that
the drivers behind these products have been with us for a long time.

drones do not have object avoidance.”).
72
Paul Miller, Taking a Ride on Segway’s Loomo Robot, VERGE (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/11/16874220/segway-loomo-robot-hands-on-ces-2018.
73
Andrew Tarantola, Segway’s Loomo Is the Robotic Hoverboard Nobody Asked For, ENGADGEI
(Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018/03/06/segways-loomo-robotic-hoverboard-hands-on/.
74
Marrian Zhou, Segway to Introduce Autonomous Delivery Robots at CES 2019, CNET (Jan. 3,
2019), https://www.cnet.com/news/segway-to-introduce-autonomous-delivery-robots-at-ces-2019/.
75
Ian Bogost, The Cute Robot That Follows You Around the City, ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/02/piaggio-gita-jeffrey-schnapp/554222/.
76
Paul Brady, This $800 Robot Suitcase Will Follow You Around the Airport, CONDE NASTE
TRAVELER (May 30, 2018), https://www.cntraveler.com/story/ovis-robot-suitcase-will-follow-youaround-the-airport; Dean Takahashi, Travelmate Robotics’ Robot Suitcase Will Follow You to CES 2018,
VENTURE BEAT (Jan. 3, 2018), https://venturebeat.com/2018/01/03/travelmate-robotics-robot-suitcasewill-follow-you-to-ces-2018/.
77
Entertainment robots like Gita or the robotic suitcase could conceivably constitute a separate
“personal service robot” category, but until such use cases actually develop, we will use the current
classification scheme. Bogost, supra note 75.
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B. Urban Robots and the Evolution of Technology
To understand the magnitude and endurance of urban robotics, it may
be helpful to place these products within the evolutionary theory of
technology.78
According to theory, technologies are designed to apply scientific
knowledge for a purpose, they are in and of themselves assemblies of
technologies, and their evolution occurs through the recombination of newly
incorporated phenomena with existing components.79 Technology is
commonly developed to augment the forces of nature and, as it relies on
basic science about how the world works, modern technology is understood
to advance along with discoveries in basic science.80 As products, however,
technologies are recursive, in that they are made of assemblies of
components, which are themselves technologies, each harnessing scientific
knowledge about physical effects and other natural phenomena.81 Given that
all technologies rely on the understanding and application of natural or
physical effects, the combinatorial evolution of technology accelerates when
a new family of phenomena are discovered and incorporated into
components for further recombination.82
Urban robotics combine the newfound capacity for autonomous
controls, brought about by machine learning and artificial intelligence, with
a multitude of existing sensor, robotic, compute, communication, energy,

78

See ARTHUR, supra note 2, at 23 (presenting a theory of evolution for technology, a theory
constructed from a “coherent group of general propositions” that can be used to “explain technology’s
behavior”).
79
See id. (building an argument about the essence and evolution of technology from “three
fundamental principles,” first that “all technologies are combinations . . . constructed or put together—
combined—from components or assemblies or subsystems at hand,” second, that “each component of
technology is itself in miniature a technology,” and third, that “all technologies harness and exploit some
effect of phenomenon, usually several”).
80
See id. at 46 (“A technology is always based on some phenomenon or truism in nature that can
be exploited and used to a purpose.”); id. at 60 (“Science is necessary for the unearthing of modern
phenomena, the more deeply hidden clusters of effects, and for forming technologies from these.”); id.
at 59 (distinguishing natural phenomena from technology, “[n]ot every phenomenon of course is
harnessable for use, but when a family of phenomena is uncovered, a train of technologies follows”).
81
See id. at 39 (noting that “any technology . . . consists of component building blocks that are also
technologies, and these consist of subparts that are also technologies, in a repeating (or recurring) pattern”
combined for a human purpose); id. at 43 (“Combination must work not just by bringing a purpose with
a concept or principle that matches it. It must provide a main set of assemblies or modules to execute this
central idea. It must support this with further assemblies, and these again with further assemblies to
support these. And all these parts and assemblies must be orchestrated to perform together
harmoniously.”).
82
See id. at 59, 172 (commenting on William Ogburn’s suggestion that the growth of technologies
resembles a “compound interest curve,” growing “exponentially”). Arthur says, “[A]s the number of
technologies increases, the possibilities for combination also increase. . . . [I]f new technologies lead to
further new technologies, then once the numbers of elements in the collective pass through some
threshold, the possibilities of combination begin to explode.” Id. at 174.
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and transportation technologies. Given that machines can now be
programmed to use algorithms that process richly expansive data collected
from the environment and, flipping the process, modify or develop new
algorithms based on feedback from the environment, people can and should
expect products to come to market that attempt to navigate the physical
environment autonomously.84 In the language of the evolutionary theory of
technology, nascent human scientific understanding of how the brain works
is accelerating evolution by providing the opportunity to combine a whole
new family of artificially intelligent controls with existing technologies.
With this perspective, today’s autonomous urban robotics and vehicles
can be understood to represent the beginning of a long arc of technological
exploration, development, and proliferation, which may stretch at least as
long as one can imagine it will take to learn about intelligence.85 If markets
and institutions permit, people should be able to see the development and
emergence of more intelligent designs over time, each competing for
survival. At the moment, entrepreneurship is giving rise to a diversity of
devices; the presumed standard sizes and uses for vehicles, robotics, and
drones are being blurred as devices appear to fill in gaps in continua of size,
shape, and purpose. As technology progresses, new applications should open
up and individual robotics platforms should be able to operate in multiple
task domains. In other words, the technology will converge, as devices are
created to serve multiple or perhaps open-ended purposes across the variety

83
Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 529–30 (2015)
(defining robots). See also Michael Nagenborg, Urban Robotics and Responsible Urban Innovation,
ETHICS & INFO. TECH. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-018-9446-8 (defining “urban
robots” as a term by which to address robots as urban technologies).
84
Machine learning algorithms allow computers to recognize patterns and make connections that
are not pre-program, but instead “learned” based on associations in large data sets. As such, they require
large amounts of data to be effective. See Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI, MIT TECH.
REV. (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/
(“From the outset, there were two schools of thought regarding how understandable, or explainable, AI
ought to be. Many thought it made the most sense to build machines that reasoned according to rules and
logic, making their inner workings transparent to anyone who cared to examine some code. Others felt
that intelligence would more easily emerge if machines took inspiration from biology, and learned by
observing and experiencing. This meant turning computer programming on its head. Instead of a
programmer writing the commands to solve a problem, the program generates its own algorithm based
on example data and a desired output. The machine-learning techniques that would later evolve into
today’s most powerful AI systems followed the latter path: the machine essentially programs itself.”).
For a noted early example, see A. L. Samuel, Some Studies in Machine Learning Using the Game of
Checkers, 3 IBM J. RES. & DEV. 211, 211–29 (1959), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&
arnumber=5392560&isnumber=5392559.
85
See, e.g., M. Mitchell Waldrop, Inside the Moonshot Effort to Finally Figure Out the Brain, MIT
TECH. REV. (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609070/inside-the-moonshot-effortto-finally-figure-out-the-brain/ (explaining the future of technological exploration relating to the brain).
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of public and private spaces. This convergence could lead to the creation
of open robotics platforms, which could drive further innovation.87
The evolution of technology is an endogenous source of economic
development, evidenced as new products emerge and flourish in urban
markets.88 In economics, the notion that technology contributes to growth
dates back to Adam Smith, with the idea that trade in surplus products may
be reinvested in technology and shift the division of labor to result in more
productivity and thus more surplus for trade in a virtuous cycle of economic
growth.89 Technology is appealing to city officials because of the promise
of economic growth that it may bring. The function of economic
development for local government is practically synonymous with attracting
businesses with new or established technologies, in the hope that the firms
will build or expand facilities in the government’s jurisdiction. Competitions
to attract tech firms demonstrate that cities and states will gamble with
significant amounts of tax dollars in the hope that jobs and technological
advancement will expand opportunities for local residents.90
Artificial intelligence assigns, however, a new purpose to technology
because it allows technology to replace as well as augment the forces of
nature.91 While technological change is a source of endogenous economic
development, it brings with it the force in economic theory characterized as

86

See Siddhartha Menon, Policy Initiative Dilemmas Surrounding Media Convergence: A Cross
National Perspective, 24 PROMETHEUS 59, 60 (2007) (defining technological convergence in terms of
the integration or combination and transformation of infrastructures and media, and digitalization).
87
See Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571, 574 (2011) (“Open robotics . . . could lead
to rapid innovation and growth within the personal robotics sector . . . .”).
88
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN INQUIRY INTO
PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 63 (Redvers Opie trans., Harvard
Univ. Press 8th prtg. 1968) (1934) (“By ‘development,’ therefore, we shall understand only such changes
in economic life as are not forced upon it from without but arise by its own initiative, from within.”); id.
at 65 (“It is . . . the producer who as a rule initiates economic change, and consumers are educated by
him if necessary; they are, as it were, taught to want new things, or things which differ in some respect
or other from those which they have been in the habit of using.”); ARTHUR, supra note 2, at 19–20
(“Schumpeter was asking whether an economy could change itself without external factors—purely from
within—and if so how” and “realized that there was ‘a source of energy within the economic system
which would of itself disrupt any [economic market] equilibrium that might be attained’ . . . . The
economy continually created the new by combining the old, and in doing so it disrupted itself constantly
from within.”).
89
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 17,
22–23 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1979) (1799).
90
See, e.g., Kang, supra note 26 (describing Pittsburgh’s “gamble” with attracting Uber’s driverless
cars); Cecilia Kang, Pittsburgh Welcomed Uber’s Driverless Car Experiment. Not Anymore, N.Y. TIMES
(May 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/21/technology/pittsburgh-ubers-driverless-carexperiment.html (explaining the deteriorating relationship between Pittsburgh and Uber).
91
See ARTHUR, supra note 2, at 215 (“If we merely used nature’s phenomena in raw form, to power
water wheels or propel sailing ships, we would feel more at home with technology . . . . But now, with
the coming of genetic engineering, machine intelligence, bionics, climate engineering, we are beginning
to use technology—use nature—to intervene directly within nature.”).

340

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

creative destruction, in which new products disrupt existing markets.92
When technology attempts to replicate the functions of the brain, as in the
autonomous control of an automobile, mobile robot, or drone, this
technology can be designed for the purpose of replacing people.93 Thus the
creation of new technology can result in the development of new markets,
but also the destruction of existing ones, disrupting current pathways for the
creation of wealth in the economy. As the scale of autonomous technology
expands, as it is likely to do, such disruptions have the potential to change
the structure of the economy for whole industries.
Borrowing from Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection,
technologies may be said to compete for survival, but there are limits to this
analogy.94 What theories of natural and technological evolution share is
attention to design over time. Their differences, curiously, are based on
whether one can credibly say that evolution is due to intelligent design.
Evolution in nature occurs by the process of natural selection, in which
design consists of the traits of individuals, passed down to or emergent in
offspring, as may happen over time within the resources and constraints of
the environment.95 Though people have advocated for a theory of evolution
that attributes the origin and abundance of variety in nature to design by an
intelligent being, this concept is not applicable to the natural world.96 Natural
92
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83–84 (3d ed. 1950) (“The
opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational development from the craft shop
and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of industrial mutation—if I may
use that biological term—that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly
destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the
essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got
to live in. . . . Every piece of business strategy acquires its true significance only against the background
of that process and within the situation created by it. It must be seen in its role in the perennial gale of
creative destruction; it cannot be understood irrespective of it . . . .”).
93
See Waldrop, supra note 85 (“AI is only loosely modeled on the brain. So what if you wanted to
do it right? You’d need to do what has been impossible until now: map what actually happens in neurons
and nerve fibers.”).
94
See ARTHUR, supra note 2, at 103 (“The process of problem solving in engineering brings forth
novel solutions—novel combinations—in an abrupt way that does not match Darwin’s slow cumulation
of changes. Then from these, the better ones are selected, and then propagate through engineering
practice, a la Darwin. . . . [T]his . . . does not mean that in technology the best—or fittest—solutions
always survive. . . . [By] [s]mall chance events, [technologies gain prevalence and] technologies (or
solutions) that gain prevalence tend to gain further advantage and to lock in, so there is a positive
feedback process at work in the ‘selection’ of technologies.”).
95
CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 399 (new ed. 1864) (“[T]his whole volume is
one long argument . . . [advancing] the theory of descent with modification through natural selection . . .
.”).
96
DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA 46, 75–76 (1995) (“[A]lthough Darwin
depended on his idea of the mechanism of natural selection to inspire and guide his research on evolution,
the end result reversed the order of dependence: he showed so convincingly that species had to have
evolved that he could then turn around and use this fact to support his more radical idea, natural selection.
. . . For over a century, skeptics have been trying to find a proof that Darwin’s idea just can’t work, at
least not all the way. They have been hoping for, hunting for, praying for . . . a ‘mind first’ force or power
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selection is a process which begets design, but has no designer. It has
resulted in intelligence, but it is not intelligent. Intelligent design is,
however, a useful concept for understanding the theory of the evolution of
technology.98 Technology requires designers, and intelligent design, while
in the eye of the beholder, is a description that becomes apt as a product
competes in an economic market and survives.
C. The Intelligent Design of Urban Robotics
The following paragraphs provide an overview of the factors that lead
firms to seek out testbeds within cities and the basic stages of design. If cities
are to be urban testbeds for robots, city officials and their residents should
become familiar with the process of design because, whether they realize it
or not, they are participating in it.
The design of an autonomous system is a complex process, and one that
cannot be optimized in the abstract. Designing an autonomous system
requires an understanding of the task for the device and the environment in
which it must reside. Design is a process of making trade-offs: between
mobility, sensing, intelligence, cost, and much more. A roboticist must first
understand the design specifications and parameters in which the system will
operate. Further, robots operate within an ecology; a complex system where
changes to one part may impact the whole in unintended ways.
Cities are not the easiest of environments for roboticists to contemplate
in design. The simplest environments for robots are factory floors, which are
typically engineered in ways that reduce the scope of the task the robot must
undertake. The most complex environment for an autonomous system to
or process, an exception to the principle that all design, and apparent design, is ultimately the result of a
mindless, motiveless mechanicity.”). For a current account of empirical evidence of evolution by natural
selection, see JONATHAN WEINER, THE BEAK OF THE FINCH: A STORY OF EVOLUTION IN OUR TIME
(1994).
97
DENNETT, supra note 96, at 59, 65 (“Darwin’s dangerous idea: the algorithmic level is the level
that best accounts for the speed of the antelope, the wing of the eagle, the shape of the orchid, the diversity
of species, and all the other occasions for wonder in the world of nature. . . . Can [the actual biosphere]
be the outcome of nothing but a cascade of algorithmic processes feeding on chance? And if so, who
designed that cascade? Nobody. It is itself the product of a blind, algorithmic process. . . . Darwin
suggests a division: Give me Order, he says, and time, and I will give you Design. Let me start with
regularity—the mere purposeless, mindless, pointless regularity of physics—and I will show you a
process that eventually will yield products that exhibit not just regularity but purposive design.”).
98
ARTHUR, supra note 2, at 129. Consider the role of the designer in answering “the key question
[in evolution] of how novel technologies arise.” Arthur notes that “[t]he mechanism is certainly not
Darwinian; novel species do not arise from the accumulation of small changes. They arise from a process,
a human and often lengthy one, of linking a need with a principle (some generic use of an effect) that
will satisfy it.” Id. “[D]evelopers borrow freely from that many available solutions and select some for
their designs. This is where Darwinian variation and selection really come in, in technology. The many
versions of a technology improve in small steps by the selection of better solutions to their internal design
problems.” Id. at 132. “In technology, combinatorial evolution is foremost, and routine. Darwinian
variation and selection are by no means absent, but they follow behind, working on structures already
formed.” Id. at 188.
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operate in is the natural environment, which is characterized by uncertainty
and lack of structure. The urban environment falls somewhere in between,
where considerable structure has been put in place already for humans to
navigate. Urban roadways in the United States are already highly engineered
for human use, with design standards for pavement, curb cuts, sidewalks,
crosswalks, auto lanes, parking, bike lanes, street signs, and so on, which
have either shaped or been shaped by existing cultural conventions of
behavior in public space, such as passing on the left and signaling a turn. To
follow in the path already established by existing modes of transport in
public rights-of-way is a fairly obvious economical approach to urban
robotic design.
The notion of robots operating in an ecology manifests in an inverse
relationship between the intelligence of the robot and investments made in
the environment to assist the robot in carrying out its intended tasks. As
autonomous systems perceive the world quite differently than humans do,
forcing robots to rely entirely on cues that are embedded in the environment
for people makes the task for the designer more difficult. Cities simplify the
design process when they create controlled spaces or stable task
environments where autonomous systems can operate freely and safely. In
some domains, such as supermarkets, barcodes, radio-frequency
identification (RFID) tags, and the like have been embedded in the
environment to simplify navigation and identification tasks for autonomous
agents. Ultimately, though, these products are not operating in their intended
markets until they are active in public space. Thus, one pressing question
autonomous system designers have for city decision-makers is how much
information will be embedded in the urban infrastructure and not simply the
autonomous agent.99
As a practical matter, this means that efforts to embed signals for use by
robots in urban infrastructure or modify the allocation or design of urban
space to accommodate autonomous systems will simplify the effort required
by the roboticist.100 Some policy commentators, mainly stakeholders in
automated vehicles, have advocated that cities update or change their
infrastructure to speed the adoption and testing of robots. The installation of
advanced sensors to create smart streets or smart intersections, characterized
99
See TECH POLICY LAB UNIV. OF WASH., DRIVERLESS SEATTLE: HOW CITIES CAN PLAN FOR
AUTOMATED VEHICLES 12–13 (2017), http://techpolicylab.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/TPL_
Driverless-Seattle_2017.pdf (explaining the importance of infrastructure itself to AV use).
100
See Nagenborg, supra note 83 (“Humanoid robots with a similar size and weight to human
beings may have the advantage of being able to use structures designed for humans. However, any
deviation from the culturally and materially embedded body norms may result in a disabling environment
for such machines in much the same way that similar differences would be disabling for humans. Thus,
a question arises whether we should build cities for robots or robots for cities. The answer to this question
is likely to be found in a mixed approach, where the built environment will be adopted to enable new
robotic applications while safeguarding the quality of city life.”).
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as vehicle-to-infrastructure communication, is one idea. The idea is that
city infrastructure can be updated to communicate with automated vehicles
to collect and send the data that helps them drive safely.102 The city of
Atlanta has already begun to implement this, touting the sensors on its
“smart corridor” for their ability to promote automated vehicles.103
Similarly, engineering firm Eng proposed a dedicated lane for automated
vehicles in New York that would allow a fleet of automated vehicles to move
quickly around the city.104 Graduate students at UC Berkeley have designed
a similar system for automated vehicles dubbed a Hyperlane.105 From the
point of view of the roboticist, such investments raise concomitant tradeoffs
in mobility and sensing, which have impacts on cost and energy efficiency
for the robot.
What the inverse relationship between the design of an autonomous
system and its environment suggests, however, is that simple environments
and smart infrastructure for designers will not bring about the safest or most
viable outcomes for urban robots or automated vehicles. The greater the
complexity of the task environment in which the robot can navigate
unassisted, the greater the likelihood that the same robotic design will
perform successfully in the variety of conditions that occur in urban settings.
In other words, unaltered, chaotic urban environments can give rise to
smarter autonomous systems. Also, any reliance on embedded technology
in urban infrastructure will limit the spatial extent of the market for that robot
and its associated firm.
In truth, firms may seek out cities regardless of embedded technology in
infrastructure. Cities provide unique conditions, which firms and their
roboticists take up as challenges in the process of design.106 New York City
is considered a particularly attractive automated vehicle testing location
because of its narrow streets and dense pedestrian population.107 San
101
See Adam Theier & Ryan Hagemann, Removing Roadblocks to Intelligent Vehicles and
Driverless Cars, MERCATUS CTR. (Sept. 2014), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/ThiererIntelligent-Vehicles.pdf (describing smart infrastructure).
102
Michael Hamilton, Cities Should Not Design for Autonomous Vehicles, MKT. URBANISM (Nov.
13, 2017), http://marketurbanism.com/2017/11/13/cities-should-not-design-for-autonomous-vehicles/.
103
Holly Beilin, Atlanta Is Betting on a Smart Corridor to Reduce Traffic Jams, VENTURE BEAT
(Oct. 11, 2017), https://venturebeat.com/2017/10/11/atlanta-is-betting-on-a-smart-corridor-to-reducetraffic-jams/.
104
Benjamin Schneider, Do Driverless Cars Need Their Own Roads Around Manhattan?, CITYLAB
(July 26, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2017/07/will-autonomous-vehicles-lead-to-aresurgence-of-auto-centric-infrastructure/534804/.
105
Benjamin Preston, Berkeley Duo’s Plan to Solve Traffic Jams: Hyper-Fast Lanes for SelfDriving Cars, GUARDIAN (June 3, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/03/selfdriving-cars-high-speed-lane-berkeley-california.
106
John Markoff, A Guide To Challenges Facing Self-Driving Car Technologists, N.Y. TIMES (June
7,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/technology/autonomous-car-technologychallenges.html.
107
Andrew J. Hawkins, GM Will Be the First Company to Test Self-Driving Cars in New York City,
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Francisco also attracts firms with its complex and dense urban environments.
This density means more interactions between robots and humans, and these
interactions generate more data with which to train the algorithms that
control the robots. The population density in cities also provides a greater
marketplace for services like autonomous vehicle taxis or food delivery, and
the ability to earn revenue while testing is appealing to firms.
In order to effectively proceed in the design of an urban robot, corporate
developers, consumers, and city managers should all be engaged to better
understand and characterize the available trade space prior to design.108
Trade space may be described as “the range of possible implementation
options,” and early evaluation involves brainstorming to identify the full
range of options.109 The expertise involved includes those with knowledge
of the various subsystems and existing technological concepts relevant to
the design of the new autonomous system, plus those with knowledge of the
environment and the intended users of the system. Just identifying the trade
space in the fast-paced industry of urban robotics poses challenges because
the technology is itself a moving target. Designing for today may mean you
are superseded by those designing for tomorrow, so there is inherent risk in
the overall enterprise. At this early stage, the purpose of gathering
information is to understand the risks that the various options bring in terms
of cost, the need for new development of software or hardware, the ability
of the system to reliably perform its intended tasks, and the time it may take
to move to market. This information becomes valuable to designers, who
then must down-select, or reduce the pool of available options and make
trade-offs across the subsystems of robotic design, to result in a prototype.
To ease the integration of consumers and city managers with robotic
designers, it may be helpful to borrow vocabulary from the video game
industry, which is known for its reliance on participants from outside the
firm as designs are given shape, tested, and prepared for commercial release.
In video game development, the first meaningful milestone for bringing a
product to market is “alpha.” Alpha is reached when designers have
VERGE (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/17/16488330/gm-cruise-nyc-self-drivingcar-test-cuomo.
108
The idea that the design of urban technologies should involve societal actors and innovators
working together is captured in the general idea of “Value-Sensitive Design” by Batya Friedman. Batya
Friedman, Value-Sensitive Design Interactions, INTERACTIONS, Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 16–23. This idea is
incorporated by reference into Urban Robotics by Michael Nagenborg. Nagenborg, supra note 83.
109
CONTEMPORARY PLANETARY ROBOTICS: AN APPROACH TOWARD AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS §
2.5.2.4 (Yang Gao ed., 2016). Explanations of the concept of trade space are perhaps easier to find for
areas of robotics supported by public funds, such as robotics for space exploration. Zachary James Bailey,
A Trade Space Model for Robotic Lunar Exploration 19 (May 21, 2010) (unpublished M.S. thesis,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology), https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/59552. See also Jessica
Knizhni et al., Robotic Satellite Servicing Trade Space Down-Selection, U. MD. (July 2017),
https://user.eng.umd.edu/~austin/reports.d/INCOSE2017-JK-MA-CC-Paper.pdf
(describing
the
developments of robotic space satellite technologies).
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completed one of each of the objects, features, and environments to be
developed in the game with basic functionality (a.k.a. “vertical slice”) and
can thus demonstrate the game to others, begin testing the play of the game
with a few trusted people outside the firm, and continue making
modifications, adding features, and building out the remaining copies or
versions of objects and environments. For urban robots, alpha could be the
milestone that is reached when a prototype that is designed to carry out predetermined tasks is ready for testing in one or more closed or controlled
environments of the physical world (as opposed to simulated, virtual tests,
which may also be productive).110
Once a prototype is developed, the next major milestone is reached when
all of the features and environmental interactions have been completed and
are ready for large-scale user feedback, but contain bugs or glitches that have
to be discovered and fixed. Testing at this phase, known as “closed beta,” is
often by invitation to a wider audience of persons interested in playing the
game, but progress for these players in the game is reset or discarded prior
to commercial release.111 Until recently, firms did not charge players for
closed beta invitations, but market interest sometimes allows them to do so.
During closed beta, milestones are set up as hurdles to meet before the game
can proceed to “open beta,” a form of commercial release in which anyone
can play and all of the features of monetization are activated. For urban
robotics, closed beta milestones could involve increasing the complexity of
the task environments and user testing amongst a wide array of groups, in a
wide variety of settings. For city managers, closed beta could be a useful
period in development for gradual expansions of geofenced areas for testing,
for neighborhoods to opt-in to requests to join the testing environment for a
given product, and for heightened calls for feedback from residents.
Commercial release, or launch, finishes the process and allows marketing to
begin.
Roboticists have an interest in communicating with governmental
decision-makers during the beta testing phase because legislation passed
after a system has been designed can invalidate the initial design
110

Selected individuals for alpha game testing may be asked to sign non-disclosure agreements to
protect the interest of the firm, and waivers of liability may also be appropriate for tests in a physical
environment.
111
Importantly, reports about Waymo’s recent launch of driverless taxi services, “Waymo One” in
Pheonix, Arizona, note that beta-testers were contractually prohibited from sharing their experiences,
and that the same early adopters were retained for the recent launch. See Andrew J. Hawkins, We Spoke
to a Waymo One Customer About How Robot Taxis Get Confused by Rainstorms, VERGE (Jan. 20, 2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/20/18175563/waymo-one-customer-interview-self-driving-arizona.
Non-disclosure agreements during closed beta testing would have the effect of eliminating any
communication between consumers and government and limiting the extent of communication by the
firm to the government to either information the firm wanted to share or information the government
required the firm to share. Such limitations, while tempting for the firm, can ultimately slow or restrict
the potential for a product to serve the public interest. Id.

346

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

112

assumptions. Participation also creates opportunities for public agencies
to research the potential effects of rules to govern robots in the public
interest. For example, should there be a speed limit for robots operating on
the sidewalk? Should robots or autonomous vehicles ever legally be allowed
to bump into people? When technology progresses faster than regulatory
systems, designers build systems for the unknown, which can have the effect
of raising costs and risks for both the firm and the communities in which its
products operate.
Still, many robotic system designers have assumed that they know what
people want and have moved through the design process without prior
consultation. This historically has led to the bankruptcy (e.g., Denning
Mobile Robotics,113 Lily Robotics114) or abandonment of product by
numerous companies that have created security robots, entertainment
(iRobot’s “My Real Baby”115), research platforms, and the like. This is also
what happens when firms adopt strategies that involve asking forgiveness
rather than permission and purposefully move to market before legal issues
are settled. This aggressive stance is risky because it may result in harm to
consumers and local action to ban the product.116 Yet the prospect of being
a first-mover in a new market, or competing for market share in the early
years of development, has been known to motivate firms to take this risk.117
Perhaps it is for this reason that machine learning pioneer Andrew Ng has
suggested that “[r]ather than building AI to solve the pogo stick problem [of
unknown edge cases causing problems for AI], we should partner with the
government to ask people to be lawful and considerate. . . . Safety isn’t just
about the quality of the AI technology.”118

112
One noteworthy example of this is the FAA restriction on drones that limits their operation to
the area within the line of sight of the operator and the limits this places on air package delivery for firms
such as Amazon.
113
Hans Moravec, Re: The Company Status of Denning Mobile Robotics, Inc., CARNEGIE MELLON
U.
(1999), https://www.frc.ri.cmu.edu/~hpm/project.archive/robot.papers/2000/Denning.Mobile.
Robotics.bankruptcy.
114
Jessica Pishko, The Drone Company that Fell to Earth, WIRED (July 26, 2017),
https://www.wired.com/story/the-drone-company-that-fell-to-earth/.
115
Danny Allen, Creepy: iRobot’s “My Real Baby”, GIZMODO (Aug. 8, 2009),
https://www.gizmodo.com.au/2009/08/creepy-irobots-my-real-baby/.
116
Julia Carrie Wong, San Francisco Sours on Rampant Delivery Robots: ‘Not Every Innovation is
Great’, GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/10/san-franciscodelivery-robots-laws.
117
Matt Simon, San Francisco Just Put the Brakes On Delivery Robots, WIRED (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.wired.com/story/san-francisco-just-put-the-brakes-on-delivery-robots/.
118
Russell Brandom, Self-Driving Cars Are Headed Toward an AI Roadblock, VERGE (July 3,
2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/7/3/17530232/self-driving-ai-winter-full-autonomy-waymotesla-uber.
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II. CITIES AS TESTBEDS FOR AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES AND ROBOTICS
This Part of the Article explores the enthusiasm that city decisionmakers and managers have for autonomous vehicles and robotics, and the
hazards that await cities as sites of experimentation. This Section begins
with the arguments city officials make in favor of automated systems,
followed by an overview of the hazards for cities that pertain to the uses and
physicality of autonomous products and the hazards involved in the
collection and use of data from these systems. Lastly, an evidence-based,
comparative institutional economic approach to policymaking is
recommended, to forestall negative externalities while permitting
technological change.
A. The Interest of Cities in Firms and Their Autonomous Products
City decision-makers that welcome autonomous vehicles and devices
perceive their efforts through the lens of economic development, job
creation, and the need to position for a wave of economically beneficial
technological change and as part of visionary plans for the future in the
transportation sector. Through the formation of partnerships, the adoption of
tech-friendly policy, and changes to city information systems and physical
environments, city decision-makers are extending invitations to firms and
their products. As the intended markets for these products, cities and their
decision-makers will be vital to any effort to shape these products and their
uses in the public interest.
As cities have formed partnerships with the firms that want to mobilize
autonomous products, their decision-makers have raised the hope or
expectation of reciprocal efforts on the part of firms to deliver civic benefits.
Public reports of Alphabet’s Waymo use in Austin highlight the ability of a
blind person to achieve mobility by hailing a driverless automobile.119
Pittsburgh assisted Uber in acquiring a large plot of land and the Mayor and
Governor fended off state legislation that would have banned autonomous
vehicles with the expectation that the firm would provide jobs, free rides,
and further commitments in an application for a high-profile U.S. DOT
“smart city challenge” grant.120 Boston’s approach, which has included
testing by nuTonomy, Optimus Ride, and Aptiv, has been framed by the
119

See, e.g., Ashley Halsey III & Michael Laris, Blind Man Sets Out Alone in Google’s Driverless
Car, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/blindman-sets-out-alone-in-googles-driverless-car/2016/12/13/f523ef42-c13d-11e6-8422-eac61c0ef74d
_story.html?noredirect=on (detailing how a blind person successfully drove around Austin, Texas).
120
See Ashley Gold, How Uber Lost Its Way in the Steel City, POLITICO (May 1, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/01/uber-pittsburgh-city-mayors-237772 (discussing how Uber
lost its relationship with Pittsburgh); Kang, supra note 26 (describing the anticipated future of the pilot
project for Uber); Kang, supra note 90 (describing Pittsburgh’s disdain with Uber’s driverless car
experiment).
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city’s action plan for transportation, with goals for equity, economic
opportunity, and climate responsiveness.121 The recipient of the U.S. DOT
challenge grant, Columbus, Ohio, set the target of reducing infant mortality
by forty percent by 2020, through the automation of transit in low-income
neighborhoods.122
While some benefits can be expected from investments in transportation
services, the scale of claims associated with autonomous systems has been
beyond the imaginable. Free rides, expanded employment opportunities,
services for the disabled, reduced traffic congestion, equities in transit, and
climate responsiveness are goals of critical importance to cities, but they are
only likely to be of passing interest to firms in the transportation sector. The
idea that firms would offer free rides is inimical to the definition of the firm
as a profit-making entity. The goal of automation is the elimination of jobs:
obtaining a profit margin from automated transport by eliminating the
driver.123 Transportation for the disabled is already proving to be a challenge
for ride-sharing firms, as it will for automated vehicles.124 The promise of
improved safety is made by firms with a strong incentive to make such
claims, and it is a promise that has not yet been realized.125 Proposals to use
121

Autonomous
Vehicles:
Boston’s
Approach,
BOSTON.GOV,
https://www.boston.gov/departments/new-urban-mechanics/autonomous-vehicles-bostons-approach
(last visited Oct. 25, 2019); Go Boston 2030, BOSTON.GOV, https://www.boston.gov/departments/
transportation/go-boston-2030 (last visited Aug. 28, 2018); Vision Framework, BOSTON.GOV (Mar.
2017),
https://www.boston.gov/sites/default/files/document-file-03-2017/go_boston_2030_-_plan_
highlights_to_download.pdf (outlining the goals and targets of Boston in 2030).
122
Laura Bliss, Who Wins When a City Gets Smart?, CITYLAB (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2017/11/when-a-smart-city-doesnt-have-all-theanswers/542976/.
123
See Muller, supra note 34 (“The business model for AVs assumes that by removing the driver,
the cost per mile falls dramatically, from today’s $2.50 or $3 per mile, to less than $1, unlocking a much
larger market opportunity.”); Anton Wahlman, Driverless Cars Will Be the Biggest Investment Write-Off
Ever, THESTREET (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.thestreet.com/opinion/driverless-cars-will-be-thebiggest-investment-write-off-ever-14818507.
124
Charlie Sorrel, Ride-Hailing Services Like Uber Are Terrible for Disabled People, FAST
COMPANY (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.fastcompany.com/3052721/ride-hailing-services-like-uber-areterrible-for-disabled-people; Joanne Tang, Without Accommodations, Uber and Lyft are Leaving
Customers with Disabilities at the Curb, G REATER GREATER WASH. (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://ggwash.org/view/68138/without-accommodations-uber-and-lyft-are-leaving-customers-withdisabilities-at-the-curb.
125
Jack Stewart, Why Tesla’s Autopilot Can’t See a Stopped Firetruck, WIRED (Aug. 27, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/tesla-autopilot-why-crash-radar/. From the Tesla car manual,
Traffic-Aware Cruise Control cannot detect all objects and may not brake/decelerate
for stationary vehicles, especially in situations when you are driving over 50 mph (80
km/h) and a vehicle you are following moves out of your driving path and a stationary
vehicle or object is in front of you instead.
Similarly, the author explains, based on language in the car manual, a Volvo “won’t brake to avoid hitting
a stopped car that suddenly appears up ahead. It might even accelerate towards it.” Aarian Marshall, The
Maddening Struggle to Make Robo-Cars Safe—and Prove It, WIRED (Dec. 15, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/zoox-self-driving-cars-safety/ (“‘Most of what I’d heard in press and at
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automated vehicles to address equity issues may also be the product of
wishful thinking: cities of the United States have underinvested in transit
and related transportation infrastructure for decades, with noticeable impacts
to equity.126 The widely touted notion that artificially intelligent vehicles and
devices can eliminate traffic congestion, while freeing up the vast acreage
of asphalt and concrete currently devoted to parking, is ludicrous. The
simple math of public space allocation and single occupancy vehicles does
not add up in favor of these claims.127 Instead, current economic incentives
motivate firms to send empty vehicles to cruise in search of free parking.128
In regard to climate change, the transportation sector is responsible for about
one third of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, giving the U.S. government the
burden of investing in or overseeing the electrification of the transportation
system, with concurrent investments in carbon neutral energy sources.129
How could people possibly believe that automated vehicles will reduce
emissions, when the fleets licensed for automated driving continue to use
fossil fuels? The public good and current designs, composition, or
envisioned uses of automated vehicles and robotics are not aligned, and the
effects of their deployment, for better or worse, are going to be experienced
locally. In the face of unrealistic claims of benefits from firms, cities must
become critical forces in the effort to shape these products and their uses for
public good.
Perhaps the strongest rationale for recognizing the role of cities in
shaping urban robotic markets is the fact that the built environment, and its
associated economic conditions, are subject to local control. The choice of
whether to allow and financially support changes to urban physical
infrastructure to accommodate autonomous systems is almost entirely local,
events with autonomous vehicle people was political rhetoric: “We won’t hurt anybody; this will be safer
than a person.” But there is no engineering to back that up,’ says Stefan Seltz-Axmacher, CEO and
cofounder of robotic truck startup Starsky Robotics.”).
126
Junfeng Jiao & Chris Bischak, People Are Stranded in ‘Transit Deserts’ in Dozens of U.S. Cities,
CONVERSATION (Mar. 13, 2018), http://theconversation.com/people-are-stranded-in-transit-deserts-indozens-of-us-cities-92722.
127
See NACTO, supra note 5, at 11 (“This future is not guaranteed—and history shows we could
easily end up with the opposite. Traffic and emissions could skyrocket, ‘roboroutes’—walls of
autonomous vehicles with few gaps—could divide communities, people could be relegated to
inconvenient and unpleasant pedestrian bridges, and high-priced, inequitable mobility could supplant
transit.”). See also Allison Arieff, Automated Vehicles Can’t Save Cities, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/27/opinion/automated-vehicles-cant-save-cities.html
(debunking the common promises that proponents of autonomous vehicles make regarding how these
vehicles will improve city life).
128
Adam Millard-Ball, “The Autonomous Vehicle Parking Problem”, 75 TRANSP. POL’Y 105, 99–
108 (2019), available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tranpol.2019.01.003.
129
See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last visited Sept. 26, 2019) (“In
2017, greenhouse gas emissions from transportation accounted for about 28.9 percent of total U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions, making it the largest contributor of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.”).
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in that state departments of transportation tend to have responsibility only
for state and national highways. Even for drones, the Federal Aviation
Administration regulates airspace, but changes to the local urban
infrastructure to accommodate delivery or “follow me” drones will be
almost entirely up to local governments and the physical environments that
they own or regulate. This means that city managers and decision-makers
are likely to experience pressure from firms to modify the allocation of
public space, environmental design, pricing, and associated local public
revenues and expenditures, regardless of state and federal legislation. For
example, online magazine Quartz reported that in negotiations with the city
of Pittsburgh, Uber wanted the city to grant non-exclusive access to bus
lanes and municipal parking lots to use as staging areas.130 These demands
contributed to the breakdown in the working relationship between Uber and
the city.131 Relatedly, other groups have advocated that cities reduce parking
space to promote automated vehicles, though the economics of the situation
simply look like increased demand for curbside use, and parking is often an
important source of municipal revenue.132 Accidents can also take their toll
on cities: even though an Uber automated vehicle failed to brake, killing a
pedestrian, and the relatives settled with Uber, the relatives have also filed a
$10 million claim against the city of Tempe, Arizona, saying that the city
was in part responsible for the accident because of a faulty street design.133
City officials may capitulate, designing streets in favor of the interests of
firms and dedicating rights-of-way to automated vehicles, resulting in a loss
of public rights to the street in favor of automated fleets of vehicles and
robots.134 Cities are, however, comprised of people who vote, and as
130
See Alison Griswold, Uber Asked a Lot of Pittsburgh for Its Self-Driving Cars, and Offered Back
Very Little, QUARTZ (Dec. 29, 2016), https://qz.com/874548/uber-asked-a-lot-of-pittsburgh-for-its-selfdriving-cars-and-offered-back-very-little/ (describing a list of “smart infrastructure upgrade” proposals
suggested by Uber).
131
See id. (“Pittsburgh didn’t win the Smart City Challenge but neither did Austin; the prize went
to Columbus, Ohio, in June. The city did not reach any agreements with Uber on infrastructure upgrades
or routes, a spokesman for the mayor’s office told Quartz.”).
132
See
SHARED
MOBILITY
PRINCIPLES
FOR
LIVABLE
CITIES,
https://www.sharedmobilityprinciples.org/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2019) (“Transportation and land use
planning and policies should minimize the street and parking space used per person and maximize the
use of each vehicle. We discourage overbuilding and oversized vehicles and infrastructure, as well as the
oversupply of parking.”).
133
See Bernie Woodall, Uber Avoids Legal Battle With Family of Autonomous Vehicle Victim,
REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-selfdriving-uber-settlement/uberavoids-legal-battle-with-family-of-autonomous-vehicle-victim-idUSKBN1H5092
(explaining
the
circumstances surrounding the settlement between the family of a woman killed by a self-driving vehicle
and Uber). See also Associated Press, Relatives of Woman Killed in Self-Driving Uber Crash File $10M
Claim, NBC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/relatives-woman-killedself-driving-uber-crash-file-10m-claim-n966971 (stating that the previously undisclosed claim filed last
fall against the City of Tempe sought five million dollars each for the husband and daughter of the woman
killed by Uber’s autonomous vehicle).
134
See Ian Bogost, Will Robocars Kick Humans Off of City Streets?, ATLANTIC (June 23, 2016),
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enthusiastic as city decision-makers and managers may be for firms with
autonomous products, they still need to represent the interest of local
residents and taxpayers, and this places them in a position to negotiate with
firms on behalf of the general public.
As stewards of the public good, city managers and decision-makers care
about efficiency, effectiveness, and equity in the provision of essential goods
and services, as well as the effects of the choices they make on jobs and the
economy. Publications from the National Association of City Transportation
Officials (with membership from fifty-two cities across the United States)
and the Regional Plan Association (serving the New York metropolitan area)
urge city managers to brace against the potentially disruptive effects of
automated vehicles, for example, by engaging in proactive policymaking to
ensure that “public benefit guides private action,” to “shape how [automated
vehicles] interact with transit,” and to “prioritize street space for public
transit, pedestrians, bikes, and freight.”135 Several of these choices are
exhibited today in the attempts of ride-sharing firms to partner with local
governments and transit agencies, for example, for subsidized first and last
mile passenger delivery to remote transit stations.136 Guidelines for city
officials break down the components and possible effects of autonomous
vehicles into modules and provide schema for the gradual, sequential
alteration of the design and allocation of public space.137 Highlighting the
disruptive effects of artificially intelligent transportation, the Regional Plan
Association also suggests that plans get underway to determine how to
transition the 220,000 or so persons in vulnerable positions in the region to
new forms of employment.138
For the public good, cities are also interested in the information that
firms collect through these technologies. City officials have a general need
to govern the flow of information for accountability, transparency, and
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/06/robocars-only/488129/ (“It’s not hard to
imagine a near future in which municipalities like Altamonte Springs might use the cost savings (or direct
investment) of companies like Uber, Lyft, or Google to invest in much-needed maintenance and updates.
Once cars become autonomous, the benefit of investments like these will increase even further, since the
cost and liability of human drivers can be averted. Better roads mean lower maintenance costs.”).
135
See NACTO, supra note 5, at 13–14 (listing “public benefit guides private action” as one of six
principles for autonomous urbanism).
136
See Mobility on Demand (MOD) Sandbox Program, FED. TRANSIT ADMIN.,
https://www.transit.dot.gov/research-innovation/mobility-demand-mod-sandbox-program.html
(last
visited Sept. 18, 2018) (describing the Mobility on Demand Sandbox Program).
137
See NACTO, supra note 5, at 16–17 (detailing critical steps that NACTO cities have already
adopted and are implementing to prepare for the autonomous future).
138
See New Mobility: Autonomous Vehicles and the Region, REG’L PLAN ASS’N (Oct. 2017),
http://library.rpa.org/pdf/RPA-New-Mobility-Autonomous-Vehicles-and-the-Region.pdf (“There are
about 220,000 motor vehicle operators in the RPA region. These occupations, which span the trucking,
taxi, black car and bus sectors, are among the shrinking number of well-paying jobs that generally do not
require a college degree. It will be essential that there be pathways into different careers for those workers
whose jobs are replaced by AVs.”).
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privacy; a need which may be heightened by local or state regulations
regarding privacy and surveillance.139 At the same time, city managers see
value in gaining access to this data for direct use in balancing demand and
supply of services and built environments. Historically, transportation
agencies have had to rely on relatively expensive and time-consuming
methods to collect data on travel behavior and the use of transport facilities
because of the lack of integration of information technology in vehicles and
the fact that autos and trucks are predominantly owned and operated by
individuals.140 The information technology of transport is already
undergoing dramatic changes: rideshare, car-share, and bike-share services
concentrate travel information into the hands of a comparatively small
number of firms.141 With the adoption of autonomous systems, the industrial
organization of the entire transport sector is headed for upheaval:
autonomous controls are likely to result in the concentration of the
ownership of vehicles as well as information about their uses and users.142
The ability of public agencies to make smart decisions about the allocation
and governance of public space will depend on their ability to access and
merge this information with data on public services and investments.143 If
disputes between the firms of the sharing economy and cities over access to
data are indicators of what is to come, there will have to be neutral third
139
See Saad Bashar, About the Surveillance Ordinance, SEATTLE INFO. TECH.,
https://www.seattle.gov/tech/initiatives/privacy/surveillance-technologies/about-surveillance-ordinance
(last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (describing the effect Seattle Surveillance Ordinance 125376 has on cityowned surveillance technology).
140
The World Bank Launches New Open Transport Partnership to Improve Transportation
Through Open Data, WORLD BANK (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/pressrelease/2016/12/19/the-world-bank-launches-new-open-transport-partnership-to-improvetransportation-through-open-data (“[T]raditional methods for collecting traffic data needed to address
congestion are costly and rely either on labor-intensive field work or capital-intensive sensor data
networks that far exceed available resources.”). In U.S. cities, labor-intensive traffic counts and travel
diary surveys as information sources for transportation system decisions have recently been augmented
by license plate readers, cell phone tracking data, data feeds from Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi sniffers, as cities
have contracted with private vendors and university researchers to serve this need. Id.
141
Prominent firms in U.S. markets include Uber and Lyft in rideshare, Reachnow and Car2Go in
car-share, and Lime, Jump, Spin, and Mobike in dockless bike-share markets, plus numerous firms in
scooter markets, all of which collect information on travelers from a combination of their mobile apps
and the GPS and related technologies installed in the cars, bikes, and scooters.
142
See Self-Driving Cars Will Require New Business Models, ECONOMIST (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/03/01/self-driving-cars-will-require-new-businessmodels (“It is likely to be many years before AVs are cheap enough for individuals to buy them, and
capable enough to operate outside predefined, geofenced areas. Meanwhile, the roll-out of cheap
robotaxis in urban areas might encourage many young urbanites, who are already going off car ownership
anyway, to abandon it altogether. The combination of ride-hailing and autonomous-driving technology
confronts carmakers with ‘the most profound challenge to their business models in a century,’ declares
a recent report from BCG.”).
143
See NACTO, supra note 5, at 20 (“Billions of detailed street-level data points are collected in
real time daily on everything from traffic speeds and volumes to travel patterns and transit use. This data
is vital to the operations and management of streets, regardless of the entity generating them.”).
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parties to operate trusted data platforms and broker these exchanges.144
Travel patterns are remarkably unique and sensitive for what they reveal
about individuals and the actions of the firm, making the data valuable to
firms inside and outside of the transport market and of great concern to
officials tasked with protecting the privacy of city residents.145 At the same
time, government agencies need to use the same data sources to hold firms
accountable, and the public deserves transparency in the actions of
government agencies for the same.146
Cities are critical to the rollout of autonomous systems because, in
contrast to federal and state governments, the diversity of approaches taken
by city decision-makers in the adoption of new technologies makes cities
laboratories for policy, governance, and implementation of enforcement
mechanisms. Governments are in the business of institutional change;
institutions are the “formal rules, informal norms, and enforcement
characteristics” developed and used by the polity and judiciary to govern in
the public interest.147 In the face of rapid change in technology, it is
remarkably difficult to determine ex ante the structure and content of
policies most beneficial to the public. The public interest is, in and of itself,
a complex phenomenon. Institutional change has historically been led by
cities and related local and state governments in the bottom-up fashion of a
federalist system to take advantage of experimentation with a diversity of
144

See Kevin Schofield, The City – and Public – Get a Win in Court, SCC INSIGHT (June 1, 2018),
https://sccinsight.com/2018/06/01/the-city-and-the-public-get-a-win-in-court/ (summarizing a recent
ruling in Washington State Supreme Court in favor of public disclosure of Uber and Lyft data by the City
of Seattle). See also NACTO, supra note 5, at 21 (“In order to protect user data, an independent thirdparty company can sort and anonymize data collected before it is used for analysis, ensuring individual
users are not identified. Once analyzed, this data can be used to direct city policy and prioritize
projects.”);
Transportation
Data
Collaborative,
URBANALYTICS,
https://urbanalytics.uw.edu/projects/transportationdatacollab/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2020) (“The
Transportation Data Collaborative (TDC) is an initiative at the UW to create a protected and linked data
repository of sensitive information from public and private transportation providers. . . . The TDC allows
partnering agencies to create data-driven policy, support research uses, and provide individuals with
authenticated access to their own transportation records.”).
145
See Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Crowd: The Privacy Bounds of Human
Mobility, 3 SCI. REP. 1376, 1376 (2013) (“We study fifteen months of human mobility data for one and
a half million individuals and find that human mobility traces are highly unique. In fact, in a dataset
where the location of an individual is specified hourly, and with a spatial resolution equal to that given
by the carrier’s antennas, four spatio-temporal points are enough to uniquely identify 95% of the
individuals.”). See also NACTO, supra note 5, at 20 (“[I]ntricate information on people movement is
laden with personally identifiable information that neither government nor private companies should
have access to.”).
146
See Muller, supra note 34 (“Investors are betting the real value of AV companies will come
from the estimated 4 terabytes of data each car will generate per day. And based on the way they’re
valuing the major AV players, Wall Street seems to think tech companies have a better shot than Detroit
at capitalizing on that data.”).
147
Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 97–98 (1991); Douglass C. North, Prize
Lecture: Economic Performance Through Time, NOBEL PRIZE (Dec. 9, 1993),
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1993/north/lecture/.
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policies and evaluations of related outcomes before forming more lasting
federal regulations. At the local level, pilot programs, sunset clauses with
requirements for audit and program evaluation, and geofencing are
mainstays of governance—when testing new concepts, technologies, and
environmental designs in public space—that have the practical purpose of
supporting evidence-based changes to policy over time. Irrespective of
technology, the authority city decision-makers have to draw boundaries that
limit the spatial extent of the market, affix rules to public and private space
that limit allowed activities, determine required and allowed uses and flows
of information, develop and enforce pricing schemes, issue or revoke
operating permits, and tax, audit, charge fees, levy fines, and ban goods
constitutes critical leverage in the negotiations between firms and city
governments for the public good.
In sum, as enthusiastic as they may be, city decision-makers should be
strategic in their evaluation, adoption, and regulation of autonomous vehicle
and robotic technologies.148 The benefits of utilizing cities as laboratories
for policymaking depends on the ability of city managers and
decision-makers to shape these new markets for the public good and to enter
these relationships with eyes wide open, on the lookout for unintended as
well as intended consequences.
B. The Hazards in Store for Cities as Testbeds of Autonomous Systems
Cities are appropriate centers of autonomous robotic innovation, but
they should proceed carefully to avoid treating the associated risks of these
technologies and partnerships as afterthoughts. The problems that
accompany autonomous systems in cities could be understood in the same
terms as the promises associated with these technologies—for safety,
convenience, equity, emissions, and the economy. Though less prominent in
the literature, the hazards of these systems also derive from their use of
sensing and communication technologies, in the form of surveillance and
associated losses to privacy.
Safety is the risk that has risen to the forefront of governmental offices
as they have witnessed the early adoption of autonomous vehicles and
robotics. The bulk of activities at the federal, state, and local levels, from
reports and model legislation to the development of testbeds outside as well
as within public rights-of-way, highlights the importance of safety in the
design and use of these products.149 Similarly, accounts of accidents in the
148
New Mobility: Autonomous Vehicles and the Region, REG’ L PLAN ASS’N (Oct. 9, 2017),
http://www.rpa.org/publication/new-mobility-autonomous-vehicles-and-region; Driverless Seattle, U.
WASH. TECH POL’Y LAB, http://techpolicylab.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/TPL_DriverlessSeattle_2017.pdf.
149
The main issues addressed at the federal and state levels have been enabling legislation and
safety. See, e.g., Autonomous Vehicles: Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST.
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news have raised public and private concern over the continuing role of the
human behind the wheel or with hands on the controls and the impacts to
people and property from collisions with autonomous vehicles, robots, and
drones.150 The first accident involving the death of a pedestrian from an
automated vehicle shocked many advocates of the technology.151 Such
anecdotes appear to have temporarily pierced the popular notion that
autonomous systems will eliminate death and injury. The idea that
autonomous controls will eliminate injury is unrealistic because, like all
complex technological systems, artificially intelligent autonomous controls
are never completely understood, even by those that design the system.152
The complexity and processing power of autonomous controls are expected
to increase over time as the systems are trained to operate within complex
environments.153 But, because of the tendency designers have to add
responsibilities to these systems as quickly as possible, there are some in the
field who caution that it may be impossible to create a truly safe autonomous
system.154
Public pronouncements that autonomous systems will usher in an
unprecedented era of convenience contrast with early evaluations of
autonomous vehicles that show, in the context of the holistic use of urban
public space, that the vehicles are not as cost-effective as existing
alternatives. Most of the firms engaged in trials of autonomous vehicles are
using cars that would carry three or fewer occupants.155 Recent studies of the
LEGISLATURES (Mar. 19, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-selfdriving-vehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx (listing enabling legislation at the state level); USDOT
Automated Vehicles Activities, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov/AV (last updated
Feb. 27, 2019) (discussing prominent reports and model legislation).
150
See Megan Geuss, Drone Crashes in Arizona National Forest, Starts a Wildfire, ARS TECHNICA
(Mar. 9, 2018), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/03/drone-crashes-in-arizona-national-foreststarts-a-wildfire/ (discussing drone crash in Arizona which caused a wildfire); Will Knight, The Dark
Secret
at
the
Heart
of
AI,
MIT
TECH.
REV.
(Apr.
11,
2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/ (discussing concerns
related to AI); Swapna Krishna, San Francisco Restricts the Use of Delivery Robots on Its Sidewalks,
ENGADGET (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017/12/07/san-francisco-restricts-deliveryrobots/ (discussing challenges to legislation in San Francisco regarding drone delivery service).
151
See Wren, supra note 6 (discussing first incident of pedestrian struck and killed by self-driving
car in Arizona and how the government investigators linked an “overreliance on vehicle automation” to
the crash).
152
Arend Hintze, I Am an AI Researcher. This Is What Keeps Me Up at Night, POPULAR
MECHANICS (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/security/a14537028/i-aman-ai-researcher-this-is-what-keeps-me-up-at-night/.
153
See Wilko Schwarting et al., Planning and Decision-Making for Autonomous Vehicles, 1 ANN.
REV. CONTROL, ROBOTICS, & AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS 187, 203 (2018) (“Autonomous systems still need
to reach human-level reliability in decision-making, planning, and perception, and current detection and
segmentation accuracies do not yet suffice in difficult conditions . . . .”).
154
E.g., Hintze, supra note 152 (discussing fears regarding AI technology from the perspective of
an AI developer).
155
Economy cars, sedans, and SUVs are the norm for Waymo, Uber, and most automobile
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impact of autonomous vehicles on traffic in downtown Boston, with
associated simulations to model preferences for mode choice, show a fifteen
percent reduction of vehicles on the road, coupled with a sixteen percent
increase in vehicle miles traveled, resulting in only a four percent
improvement in travel time in general and a five percent increase in travel
time and associated congestion in the downtown area.156 As improvements,
these impacts fall short of traditional investments in bus and rail transit
services and underscore the importance of transitioning from single
occupancy vehicles to pooled ridership and renewed investment in transit.157
Otherwise, the influx of autonomous services, in the form of vehicles and
robots, would be predicted to increase congestion and cause more of a
nuisance than a convenience.
Autonomous vehicles and robotics can only be expected to make cities
more equitable if they are accessible to all at affordable rates. The firms
participating in these markets are like any other firms in that they will reach
a point in time when the profitability of autonomous services matters.158 As
they strive for profitability, firms can be expected to care about pricing,
market share, participation in two-sided markets, their ability to influence
the adoption of rules and regulations that stave off competition, and
safeguarding their financial self-interest. The moves of firms in these areas
can also be expected to be regressive—having a disproportionate impact on
those who have relatively little ability to pay for transportation services, such
as those who are in vulnerable, low-wage jobs.159 These economic
conditions are not going to change with autonomous systems. Reading the
media today, it would be easy to assume that the free or low-priced services
companies in this sector. See Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber’s Self-Driving Cars Return to Public Roads for
the First Time Since Fatal Crash, VERGE (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/
12/20/18148946/uber-self-driving-car-return-public-road-pittsburgh-crash (discussing Uber’s selfdriving tests with Volvo SUVs).
156
Bos. Consulting Grp., How Autonomous Vehicles Affect City Traffic, YOUTUBE (Jan. 25, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zMZIEBoR49U [hereinafter BCG Study].
157
See Patrick Sisson, Sick of Traffic? Get Cities to Invest in Bikes and Mass Transit, Says Report,
CURBED
(June
11,
2019),
https://www.curbed.com/2019/6/11/18661586/bike-train-traffictransportation-congestion (citing reports indicating that congestion adds, on average, forty-one percent
more time to the average commute and recommending solutions such as investment in optimized traffic
lights, bike infrastructure, and mass transit).
158
Tech firms benefit in early development and market expansion from venture capital and other
types of investment for revenue. See Kate Conger, Uber’s Self-Driving Cars Are Valued at $7.25 Billion
by Investors, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/18/technology/uber-atgautonomous-cars-investment.html (discussing Uber’s profitability and its business model surrounding its
self-driving car technology).
159
See Hana Creger et al., Autonomous Vehicle Heaven or Hell? Creating a Transportation
Revolution that Benefits All, GREENLINING INST. (Jan. 2019), http://greenlining.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01/R4_AutonomousVehiclesReportSingle_2019_2.pdf (discussing the “hell”
created by personal autonomous vehicles, including environmental concerns, increased economic
inequality, outpacing regulations, and congestion, and providing recommendations to make the
autonomous vehicle revolution beneficial for all, not just higher-income individuals).
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that accompany the initial rollout of products to market would continue into
the future because it is tempting to think that firms will pass on the cost
savings that come from automated fleet services to customers. To assume so
would be naive. The need for free and reduced-price services and the
requirements of service-area coverage enforced today by transit and
transportation agencies will not disappear with new technologies. The
equitable pricing of and access to transportation services will continue to be
of critical importance for policymakers in the era of autonomous systems.
Emissions will only be reduced by autonomous vehicles and robotic
systems if the sources of energy used to power them are less carbon intensive
than the current fuel mix. Environmental and political pressure to convert
from fossil fuel sources to electricity are transforming the auto industry at
the same time that automakers are partnering en masse with information
technology firms to adopt autonomous control systems.160 The conversion
to electric energy is also leading automakers to search for opportunities to
lock in new sources of revenue, such as long-term concession agreements
that would place firms in the position of controlling the access price of public
parking spaces in exchange for capital investment in electric charging
stations.161 Altogether, the combined forces of automation and electrification
may upend the industrial organization of the transportation industry,
transforming what has been a highly disaggregated ownership structure
based on private, personally-held assets into a highly concentrated
ownership of fleets and firms with ownership in search of preferential or
exclusive rights to currently public rights-of-way.
Amongst policymakers, the most pressing concern about urban robotics
is likely to be the question of whether they will bring about economic and
associated financial improvements to the cities responsible for the
infrastructure that these systems rely on. Early reports already suggest that
public parking, which is one of the most important sources of revenue for
cities in the transportation sector, may be under threat by autonomous
160

See, e.g., Reese Counts, Toyota, VW and GM Partner on Autonomous Vehicle Education,
AUTOBLOG (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.autoblog.com/2019/01/09/pave-autonomous-vehicle-education/
(discussing recent partnerships between GM, Volkswagen, Toyota, and more with various AV firms);
Alex Davies, General Motors Is Going All Electric, WIRED (Oct. 2, 2017),
https://www.wired.com/story/general-motors-electric-cars-plan-gm/ (discussing recent announcements
from automakers, including GM, converting market offerings to all electric); Alanna Petroff, These
Countries Want to Ban Gas and Diesel Cars, CNNMONEY (Sept. 11, 2017),
https://money.cnn.com/2017/09/11/autos/countries-banning-diesel-gas-cars/index.html
(discussing
recent announcements from France, China, and other nations to ban the sale of vehicles that rely on fossil
fuels).
161
See BMW, Volkswagen and ChargePoint Announce Initiative to Create Electric Vehicle Express
Charging Corridors on the East and West Coasts, CHARGEPOINT, https://www.chargepoint.com/
about/news/bmw-volkswagen-and-chargepoint-announce-initiative-create-electric-vehicle-express/ (last
visited Oct. 25, 2019) (discussing an initiative between the electronic charging network ChargePoint and
BMW and Volkswagen to create a large span of charging stations on the East and West coasts).
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systems. Results from last year’s simulation of the effect of autonomous
vehicles on Boston’s parking system show a reduction in demand for parking
by forty-eight percent.162 At the same time, cities can expect pressure from
firms to invest more in public rights-of-way, by either embedding
technologies in infrastructure or redesigning and constructing built
environments to favor their products, and to provide preferential or exclusive
allocations of public space for their private use.163 In general, such efforts
should be recognized as attempts to pass on the private cost of adopting these
technologies to the public taxpayer and, with that, to society.
That said, perhaps the least appreciated of the hazards from urban
robotics are the acute risks they bring to city residents of increased
surveillance and loss of privacy. Urban robots have sensing and computing
capabilities that enable them to collect and process information in public
spaces on a potentially massive scale, challenging existing information
privacy governance frameworks.164 Furthermore, they may combine
mobility with capacity to identify individuals or group members, raising the
prospect of their use within and across spaces to target and pursue persons—
an invasion of privacy that is without parallel in smart city technology. And,
as in other data rich sectors, firms can be expected to take advantage of every
opportunity to collect and monetize data about people, whether those people
opted in to said collection and uses. Market analysts in the automated vehicle
sector are already anticipating the opportunity for firms to add value by
monetizing data on secondary markets, as evidenced in the differential
valuations given to the information technology firms in comparison to the
automotive firms.165 Whether firms should be allowed to do so or not is
something that should matter to city officials because of the long-term
impact this choice creates for public life.
By combining the basic functionality of Internet of Things (IoT) devices
with mobility for urban robots, including autonomous vehicles, the
evolution of technology is bringing about an unprecedented risk to privacy
in the public environment of city streets. A robot is essentially a mobile
computing platform that senses and operates in the physical world and can
therefore be conceptualized as a type of IoT application.166 IoT devices can
162

BCG Study, supra note 156.
See Gold, supra note 120 (discussing Pittsburgh lawmakers’ frustrations with Uber’s
relationship with the city, especially Uber’s failure to help the city obtain a Smart Cities grant).
164
M. RYAN CALO, Robots and Privacy, in ROBOT ETHICS: THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF ROBOTICS 187, 187–88 (Patrick Lin et al. eds., 2012).
165
See Muller, supra note 34 (“Investors are betting the real value of AV companies will come
from the estimated 4 terabytes of data each car will generate per day. And based on the way they’re
valuing the major AV players, Wall Street seems to think tech companies have a better shot than Detroit
at capitalizing on that data.”).
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See Pieter Simoens et al., The Internet of Robotic Things: A Review of Concept, Added Value
and Applications, 15 INT’L J. ADVANCED ROBOTIC SYSTEMS 1, 1 (2018) (discussing a survey of how
“Internet of Things” technology will impact robotic systems).
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be deployed to surveil locations and situations with near perfect recall. For
example, many cities have or plan to install cameras on streetlights that can
observe and record the public space under its purview.167 Unlike a human
observer, it will never tire and can record for as long as it has storage
capacity and a power source. These recording capabilities can be combined
with facial recognition and other AI-powered processing tools that could, for
instance, query police databases in real time.168 They may be employed by
governments or private companies, often in cooperation with one another.
Furthermore, traditional privacy controls like notice and choice become
more difficult to execute with respect to IoT devices; this is because IoT
devices often lack an interface through which to communicate information
about privacy practices to the subjects of data collection.169 Even where
devices or their operators can provide notice to data subjects, those
individuals may lack meaningful choice about being recorded.170 A person
can choose not to use Facebook if they do not agree with the company’s data
practices, but they cannot opt out of being recorded by IoT devices on city
streets without effectively retreating from public life.171
C. How Cities Can Prepare to Be Sites of Experimentation
This Paper argues that cities should be given the authority and flexibility
to experiment with autonomous vehicles and robotics and that city managers
and decision-makers should prepare to participate in the testing process with
the designers of artificially intelligent systems. This Section provides an
overview of the task that lies ahead for cities, and it highlights perspectives
and methods useful for evaluating the effects of policy choices in the public
interest.
From an institutional economic perspective, cities as sites of
experimentation need to recognize and harness their ability to act as market
makers. Governments create the rules of the game for private firms. In times
of institutional change, governments can act in the public interest by
orienting policymaking toward the purposes of minimizing social harm,
167
See Sarah Holder, The Shadowy Side of LED Street Lights, CITYLAB (Mar. 8, 2018),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/03/their-lights-were-watching-odd/554696/ (discussing concerns
about surveillance related to cities’ use of “smart city service[s]” including LED lighting grids).
168
Clare Garvie et al., The Perpetual Lineup: Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America,
CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH. GEO. L. (Oct. 18, 2016), http://www.perpetuallineup.org/.
169
Peter Swire & Jesse Woo, Privacy and Cybersecurity Lessons at the Intersection of the Internet
of Things and Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1475, 1511 (2018).
170
Kelsey Finch & Omer Tene, Welcome to the Metropticon: Protecting Privacy in a
Hyperconnected Town, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1581, 1606–07 (2014).
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Some have argued that large social media companies like Facebook have become the “digital
public square” and should therefore be treated like public spaces or regulated like utilities. For a
discussion of such proposals, see Peter Swire, Should the Leading Online Tech Companies Be Regulated
as Public Utilities?, LAWFARE (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/should-leading-onlinetech-companies-be-regulated-public-utilities.
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internalizing externalities, and preventing the transfer of private costs to
society.172 When considering the many facets of change accompanying
autonomous vehicles and technologies, focus should move to
evidence-based policy and evaluations that compare the costs to firms and
the public of existing and new technologies as they occur under various
institutional arrangements.
City managers and decision-makers will need support for sophisticated
negotiations in the domain of automated vehicles and robotics. Policies,
procedures, regulations, and enforcement implicated in governing these
technologies span the boundaries of the transportation and information
technology sectors as we understand them today. It is perhaps for these
reasons that several cities have formed interdisciplinary working groups to
focus on becoming testbeds for autonomous vehicles. These include
partnerships with outside organizations, some of which appear to be unique
in the history of the sector. One of these is Boston’s multi-year partnership
with Boston Consulting Group and the World Economic Forum, which—in
the first of several reports—affirms that cities should work cooperatively
with state and federal agencies but argues that cities should be in “the lead
in establishing a governance structure and testing policy and parameters to
foster innovative solutions to their most pressing transportation
challenges.”173
Support can be especially helpful if it can be interdisciplinary because it
provides a clearer picture of the implications of various policy options. At
times like this—when the adoption of policy can actually reshape the entire
industrial organization of a sector of critical infrastructure—it pays to place
policy debates in economic and social terms. When political arguments have
economic motivations, it is particularly important to know the economic
implications of their adoption in law and policy. Arguments for the freedom
to innovate may have ideological merit, but the practical implications for
policy change are usually about the reallocation of property rights across the
public and private sectors for economic or financial gain. These reallocations
have the effect of determining, inter alia, the factors and associated costs
that will be internal to markets and therefore borne by firms and established
in the pricing of goods and services on the market and the factors and
associated costs that will be externalized and thus borne by public agencies,
the taxpayers that fund them, and society in general.
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NORTH, supra note 18, at 3.
Boston Test of Self-Driving Cars Reveals Five Key Lessons for Cities Worldwide, BOS.
CONSULTING GROUP (Oct. 17, 2017), https://globenewswire.com/news-release/2017/10/17/11484
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BOS. CONSULTING GROUP (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.bcg.com/publications/2017/automotive-makingautonomous-vehicles-a-reality.aspx.
173

2020]

URBAN ROBOTICS

361

Furthermore, the methodologies used to reveal these relationships
matter. Simple cost-benefit analyses, commonly recommended in the
analysis of public expenditures, are not appropriate when the alternatives to
be evaluated serve differing policy goals. More promising analyses are
possible if—borrowing somewhat from research methodologies in
institutional and transaction cost economics—the economic effects of policy
options are examined holistically: by examining the trade-offs experienced
by the various public and private parties involved in delivering and receiving
services, while keeping in mind current and potential future industrial
organizations of the sector.174 In all cases, it is important to understand the
comparative effects of current and proposed policy options with respect to
the distribution of both production and transaction costs across the parties
involved in delivering, governing, and consuming the products and services.
The methodologies for examining comparative institutional arrangements
from transaction cost economics—which break down the delivery of
services by task, noting which party bears costs, which receives benefits, and
in what amounts—may be adapted to this purpose.175
It is also important that research consider the effects that policies may
have on competition and the resulting impacts if competition in the transport
sector were to be replaced by concentrated ownership of assets. Competition
is still the most important force in delivering economic benefits from
markets, but the extent to which society reaps these benefits and maintains
competition also depends on the institutions that govern the sector.
Historically, the private ownership of mobile assets and public investment
in networks—operated as a non-excludable asset—have assisted this sector
in avoiding several market failures that are more visibly acute in, for
example, the communication sector’s struggle over net neutrality or
rent-seeking behavior on the part of organizations that own the transmission
systems needed to wheel water from one community to another. Policies that
preserve equal access to essential infrastructure (such as the underlying
network of roads, parking, conduit, utility poles, curbs, and gutters) and
resist the urge to privatize public space on transportation and related
communication networks have the economic effects of keeping this space in
play for all parties and keeping barriers low for competitors seeking entry to
174
Jan Whittington, When to Partner for Public Infrastructure? Transaction Cost Evaluation of
Design-Build Delivery, 78 J. AM . PLAN. ASS’N 269, 282–83 (2012) (discussing a transaction cost
methodology for comparing costs and trade-offs, shown as the amount of funding allocated to and from
the parties involved in the various tasks involved in delivering infrastructure projects, according to
alternative policies); Jan Whittington & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Unpacking Privacy’s Price, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1327, 1352 (2012) (explaining the consequences of small numbers of competitors for consumers in
information-intensive industries, such as social network services, with demand and supply side
economies of scale).
175
See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 174, at 270 (explaining that the principles of transaction costs
economics can be applied to evaluate infrastructure projects).
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the market with mobile assets. Privatization of public space and policies that
offer preferred or exclusive access have the opposite effect: they lock public
entities into monopoly or oligopoly relations in the provision of services and
thus carry the potential for multiple downstream hazards, such as disputes
over pricing, quality of service, and a host of opportunity costs that
accompany the privatization of public assets.176
Guidance from the National Association of City Transportation
Officials and the Regional Plan Association of New York suggests that cities
create public-facing, proactive strategies for exploring, testing, permitting,
and supporting autonomous vehicles.177 The same guidance should be
extended to include urban robotics and drones. City strategies should be
designed to assist decision-makers in understanding the strengths and
limitations of artificially intelligent products, as well as the prevailing
business models that firms are relying on as they enter the market. It would
be important to know, for example, the interests of firms as they seek access
to the public rights-of-way, the models for pricing goods and services, any
plans for market and service-area expansion, and the disposition of the data
the firm collects about the public. These factors are central to the operation
of firms and happen to coincide with the interests that cities have in crafting
policies in the public interest. Each city should be prepared to evaluate these
products and their providers on the merits and the costs to city government
and city residents. Existing guidance attempts to summarize the values that
city decision-makers and managers consider important, and, as noted above,
these considerations are not necessarily aligned with the interests of firms.
Firms may seek to externalize costs and use data about local residents on
secondary markets, and cities should avoid this trap. The capacity to evaluate
policy will matter, as noted in this Section, as will the capacity to evaluate
the various forms of agreements and contracts that will be instrumental in
preserving public values while adopting these new technologies.
In their efforts, city managers should perhaps make a point of explaining
to the various parties in these new industries that environmental design is
local, expensive, and extremely consequential. Guidance from the National
Association of City Transportation Officials and the Regional Plan
Association makes this point in subtle ways, by emphasizing efficient
options for intersection design, for example, and laying out a timeline for
the gradual redesign of urban arterials that surely appears to be slow in
176
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NATCO, supra note 5, at 8–11; REG’L PLAN ASS’N, NEW MOBILITY: AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
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comparison to the business plans of firms and their investors. From the
point of view of city management, this slow pace of environmental design
may be realistic under the most ambitious of timeframes, given how changes
to the built environment actually proceed. Earthwork, concrete, utility posts,
and the relocation of utilities—these are the types of modifications that
people take for granted but are highly significant for their expense and
opportunity cost in the budget cycle of public agencies. One new sensor or
communication device on a utility pole will not cost very much, but when
contemplated at the scale of the transportation system, the cost quickly
becomes prohibitive for all but the wealthiest of jurisdictions. The
consequences of alterations to the built environment are of course physical,
but they are also financial—their financial impact depends on the contractual
arrangements that made them possible, and they matter to the extent that
they give rise to new flows of information, impacts to privacy, and
monetization of data about local residents. Lastly, many legal requirements
extend from local environmental design, from local speed limits to liabilities
for safety, nuisance, security, and privacy.
III. THE EVOLVING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PRIVACY AND URBAN
ROBOTS
As discussed above, the potential for urban robots to serve as data
gathering and surveillance tools will challenge existing societal expectations
of what is “private,” as well as the laws that protect privacy. Urban robots
will contribute to a trend, already underway, of digital technologies forcing
changes to the legal frameworks governing personal data. Currently, the law
gives individuals very little control over their data once it has been disclosed
to a third party.179 Once an individual’s information has been disclosed to a
company—for instance, on a social media platform like Facebook—the
company can analyze, aggregate, and sell that data with very few restrictions
as long as it gave notice and obtained consent. The underlying theory is that
information that has been made public (i.e., is no longer secret) is not private
and therefore is not protected. The same reasoning has applied to
government and law enforcement access to data. The third-party doctrine
holds that the Fourth Amendment does not protect information shared with
178
NATCO, supra note 5, at 18–19 (showing a timeline of how cities are preparing and can prepare
for automated vehicles); id. at 26–27 (laying out a new design for city streets and intersections); id. at
38–41 (diagramming the gradual redesign of urban arterials).
179
See, e.g., United States v. Weast, 811 F.3d 743, 747 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting that other federal
courts have uniformly concluded that the Fourth Amendment’s privacy expectation does not protect
subscriber information provided to an internet provider, including IP addresses, because that information
is voluntarily conveyed to third parties); Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1016–17, 1022–
24 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (dismissing class action suit claiming that defendant—a social media company—
violated the Stored Communications Act by disclosing users’ personal information to advertisers,
marketing companies, data brokers, and other third parties).

364

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1
180

a third party because that information is no longer private. This is why the
Supreme Court struck down a constitutional warrant requirement for law
enforcement to access the telephone numbers a person dials; when people
share those numbers with the phone company, they “assume[] the risk that
the information [will] be divulged to the police,”181 even though many
people might consider that information sensitive. However, these legal rules
were developed in an analog world without widespread digital recording.
They become problematic when an individual will be subject to extensive
recording by robotic sensors by virtue of the mere act of existing in an urban
public space. If recording in public spaces is ubiquitous, as it will be with
urban robotics, there will be no meaningful way to opt out of recording
without withdrawing from public spaces altogether. The same is true of the
third-party doctrine. If robots record nearly everything that happens in
public, the very act of moving in public spaces will expose personal
information to collection by third parties. This shift is already under way
through the widespread use of technologies like vehicle license plate readers,
and it is changing the way police and private security forces conduct their
business.182
There is no federal regulation that addresses this problem; in fact, there
is no single, comprehensive federal privacy law at all.183 State laws have also
struggled to fill this gap. Still, some regulators and lawmakers have been
innovating, which has led to some noteworthy legal developments.184 There
are at least four approaches to coping with the erosion of privacy in public
spaces by ubiquitous computing: (1) adapting existing doctrine and U.S.
law; (2) regulating the design and deployment of information systems with
limits on collection and use of data; (3) allowing data collection but giving
consumers more control over their data; and (4) rethinking the third-party
doctrine. Privacy law is in a state of flux, and its future shape is unknown.
But as policymakers at all levels experiment with new regulatory
approaches, cities will feel the impacts and serve as the testbeds for new
rules.
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A. Adapting Existing Laws to New Technologies
The efforts of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC,” or the
“Commission”) at regulating IoT are emblematic of the first approach:
adapting existing laws to cover the uses of new technologies in public
spaces. The FTC is the principal privacy regulator in the United States.
Absent an industry-specific law, most firms’ privacy practices fall under the
FTC’s authority to regulate “unfair and deceptive acts and practices in or
affecting commerce.”185 The scope of this authority allows the FTC to target
companies that break public promises about their privacy practices—for
instance, through companies’ publicly available privacy policies—but
imposes few substantive requirements beyond what companies themselves
promise. The Commission has not yet brought an enforcement action against
any commercial robotics company for privacy violations, but its work with
IoT device makers suggests how it might handle similar technology.186
The Commission is aware of the privacy challenges posed by IoT, and
its approach is best captured by the Nomi consent decree. Nomi is a company
that partners with retailers to track shoppers’ locations within stores using
sensors that track cell phone MAC addresses.187 This information can tell
retailers who visits their stores, how long they spend inside, and even what
they might want to buy.188 The FTC enforcement action alleged that Nomi
promised in its privacy policy to inform individuals when they were being
tracked and to offer an opt-out mechanism but ultimately did neither.189
Because it broke these promises, the FTC was able to bring a complaint
against Nomi for deceptive acts.
The Nomi action highlights both the FTC’s willingness to enforce
privacy rules in public spaces and the limits of its authority. Had Nomi
simply tracked individuals without making promises about notice and choice
and thereby avoided committing any deceptive acts, the FTC would have
been largely powerless to stop it.190 This is the big gap in U.S. federal privacy
law: absent a sector-specific law or regulation, companies can largely do as
they please so long as they do not commit a deceptive act.191 While the FTC
185
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has worked hard to adapt to new technologies, it can only do so much with
its existing legal tools. Robotics companies operate under this same regime.
They can and do deploy sophisticated sensors in public spaces, gathering
personal data (such as video footage of people) governed only by the public
promises of the company. There is no law stopping companies from reselling
this data or using it for a secondary purpose.
The SELF DRIVE Act follows this adaptive approach, requiring AV
companies to develop a privacy plan that addresses data collection, use,
sharing, storage of information, and other common privacy practices.192 The
law does not mandate any particular privacy practices or create a minimum
level of protections however. For this reason, the SELF DRIVE Act’s
requirement for AV companies to have a privacy policy may not be adequate
to protect privacy. Without more substantive rules to set a floor of protection
in company data practices, companies will largely get to set their own rules
of the road.
B. Comprehensive Privacy Regulation and the Design and Deployment of
Technology
Recent changes to European data protection law exemplify the second
approach of comprehensive regulation that seeks to influence the design and
deployment of technologies. The General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) is a comprehensive overhaul of European privacy law that, among
other things, requires that organizations only collect information when they
have a legal basis to do so, and only as much as necessary.193 The legal bases
to collect data are narrowly defined categories like consent or a “legitimate
interest” (where the company’s interests are carefully weighed against the
individual’s privacy rights).194 This requirement applies even where data is
collected in public spaces, such as by a CCTV camera. Organizations must
conduct a data privacy impact assessment when handling large volumes of
sensitive data195 and have data retention limits, meaning they can only keep
the data as long as necessary.196 Where companies rely on consent, it must
be granular, meaning that companies that “seek[] consent for various
different purposes should provide a separate opt-in for each purpose.”197
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These provisions offer much more privacy protection than laws in the United
States.
The GDPR seeks to constrain companies by creating guidelines on how
they design and deploy technology. Stiff penalties of up to four percent of
global revenue create strong incentives for firms to comply.198 Firms must
now justify the data they collect and apply strict safeguards. They must
respect principles of fairness and transparency in their data processing
activities. The effect of the law is that firms have afforded new rights to users
and revamped their privacy practices to comply with the law. Many have
lauded the strong privacy protections, though some worry that the law will
stifle the development of AI.199
A recent proposal in Washington State called the Washington Privacy
Act (WPA) takes a similar approach, borrowing several of the concepts and
rules from the GDPR. These include, for example, rights of access and data
portability, requirements for contracts between controllers and processors,
and opt-in consent.200 However, its penalties are capped at $2500 per
violation or $7500 per intentional violation.201 It also preempts local
governments “regarding the processing of personal data by controllers and
processors.”202
The WPA also puts Washington at the forefront of the debate over facial
recognition. It would require private facial recognition firms to place a
human in the loop by “employ[ing] meaningful human review prior to
making final decisions” that “produce legal effects concerning
consumers.”203 Facial recognition companies must also obtain consent from
consumers, post conspicuous warnings where they employ the
technology,204 and in many cases make their services available for audit for
“accuracy and unfair bias” through an application programmer interface.205
These provisions would impact any urban robots that implemented facial
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recognition for navigational, social, or any other purposes. Any data an
urban robot collected would also be subject to the WPA.206
The WPA also addresses state and local government use of facial
recognition. It bans governments from using facial recognition for “ongoing
surveillance of specified individuals in public spaces,” except with a court
order or in an emergency involving imminent danger or risk of death.207 One
concern is that because this provision only applies to ongoing surveillance,
it leaves the door open to using facial recognition in other situations, such as
to match still pictures against drivers’ license pictures, without a court order.
The lack of a probable cause warrant requirement is also troubling. But the
greatest concern for this Paper is the potentially onerous preemption of local
governments. Cities are pioneering privacy regulation for both the private
and public sectors, but the WPA could cut off that fertile area of policy
innovation prematurely. It is possible, for instance, that the WPA would
invalidate Seattle’s police surveillance ordinance, which has been heralded
as a model for cities across the country.208 Further, if a city wanted to protect
the privacy of its residents by controlling how urban robots used facial
recognition, the WPA’s private sector facial recognition sections could
interfere. The WPA would certainly be an important tool in any litigation
over the matter. A separate Washington proposal, SB 5528, would impose a
moratorium on state and local government use of the technology until the
State Attorney General can certify that it has been independently audited and
is accurate and free of bias.209 SB 5528 also requires a warrant to use facial
recognition to monitor public spaces and prohibits using it on any
police-worn body camera footage.210 As of writing, neither proposal has
cleared the legislature.
C. Strengthening Consumer Control
Some state privacy laws seek to strengthen consumers’ rights and
control over their data instead of targeting digital technology with
comprehensive reforms. However, these proposals would still impact the
robotics market as long as robots are collecting information on consumers.
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The recently passed California Consumer Privacy Act
places fewer
restrictions on data collection and minimization than the GDPR and instead
seeks to offer consumers more control over the data they share with
companies. It creates several rights for individuals, such as the right to
request deletion of data212 and the right to opt out of sharing with third
parties.213 However, the law exempts “publicly available information” from
its definition of personal information.214 This definition will likely limit its
protections in public spaces. For example, whether a video recording of a
public space captures “publicly available information” is an open question.
Though the law seeks to offer consumers more control over their data with
strong opt-out and consent requirements, it does not strictly limit what
information companies collect or what they can do with it. It remains to be
seen whether this approach addresses problems of ubiquitous recording in
public. The law is also likely to change, given the unique circumstances
under which it was passed.215 With an effective date of January 1, 2020, there
will be much time before the impacts of the law are felt or fully understood.
California is not alone in pushing to expand consumer privacy
protections at the state level. New York State has proposed its own privacy
law, the Right to Know Act of 2019,216 which focuses on transparency for
when companies share personal data with third parties. It would require
companies to identify third parties with whom they share information and
the categories of information that they share.217 Vermont recently passed a
law that would require data brokers to register with the State and disclose
certain information such as the number of data breaches each year,218 and
Washington has its own proposal that mirrors Vermont’s.219
D. Doctrinal Reassessment of Privacy in Public
The Supreme Court has been at the forefront of reshaping privacy
doctrines that have previously offered very few protections in public spaces.
Recent Supreme Court cases have begun to reconsider the third-party
doctrine in light of large amounts of personal data that are subject to
211
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recording by modern digital technology. The first hint of change came with
United States v. Jones, a case about whether the police needed a warrant to
surreptitiously track a suspect’s vehicle by attaching a GPS device to the
undercarriage.220 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion held that the use of the
GPS tracker without a warrant constituted a search because by attaching the
device to the defendant’s car, police had trespassed against his property.221
Justices Sotomayor and Alito wrote separate concurrences, with Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan joining Alito, supporting a different rationale
than Justice Scalia’s property-based trespass theory. They reasoned that
even though the GPS tracked information that could be observed in public
and not normally considered private (the location of the defendant’s vehicle
on public roads), using technology to collect large amounts of this
information could trigger the privacy protections of the Fourth
Amendment.222 Thus, in Jones five Justices on the Court expressed support
for the “Mosaic Theory” that recording and compiling large amounts of
public information could violate a person’s privacy even if the individual
data points were not especially revealing on their own.223
The Court again recognized the sensitive nature of digital stores of
information in Riley v. California, when it held unanimously that examining
the digital contents of a cell phone was a Fourth Amendment search
requiring a warrant.224 Chief Justice Roberts wrote that a cell phone is not
simply another piece of property to be searched incident to arrest, but rather
a modern tool to store large quantities of potentially sensitive data.225 He
reasoned that the breadth of different types of data, collected in large
amounts in one place, could be especially revealing.226 He concluded by
writing that “[m]odern cell phones are not just another technological
convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for
many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”227 Thus, in Riley the Court
recognized that the cell phones contain personal information that requires
protection by the Fourth Amendment and that digital technologies that
collect large amounts of revealing data can present an acute threat to privacy.
Chief Justice Roberts built on the foundation laid in the previous two
cases to reshape the third-party doctrine for the digital age in Carpenter v.
220
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228

United States.
In Carpenter, the Court decided whether the Fourth
Amendment required a warrant for an individual’s cell phone location
records.229 Investigators in the Carpenter case used the Stored
Communications Act to request the history of which cell phone towers the
defendant’s phone had connected with around the same time as a string of
robberies in Detroit.230 The phone’s connections to the cell towers revealed
the defendant’s location around the time of the robberies, which prosecutors
used to convict him.231 Law enforcement was able to acquire the information
using the Stored Communications Act (which has a lower standard) instead
of a warrant because of the Court’s ruling in Smith v. Maryland that
individuals have no privacy rights in information they share with third
parties like telephone companies.232
However, Roberts’ opinion declined to extend Smith v. Maryland and
United States v. Miller and held that the Fourth Amendment required a
warrant to access a suspect’s cell tower location history.233 Although it did
not overturn Smith or Miller, by declining to extend those cases to cell tower
location history, Carpenter marks a significant reversal of the third-party
doctrine. Roberts’ reasoning relied heavily on the impact of digital
technology. Americans share digital data with third parties in quantities and
kinds that would have been unfathomable to the framers, and so the new
digital reality warrants a change in legal doctrine. Roberts also noted that in
the time between Carpenter’s conviction and when the Court heard the case,
the number of cell towers had greatly increased, which made cell tower
location information much more precise and revealing.234 The proliferation
of cell phone towers is analogous to advances in IoT generally and robotics
specifically; sensors become more capable and more numerous and gather
even more personal information in public. Professor Orin Kerr sees
Carpenter as a form of “equilibrium-adjustment,” where the Court adjusts
privacy protections to preserve privacy in light of encroachments from new
technologies.235 Roberts’ opinion was controversial, however, with four
Justices dissenting.
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent was perhaps the most intriguing, as it proposed
an alternate, property-based theory to protect private information shared
with third parties. In his lone dissent, he reasoned that positive law may have
indicated an intent to treat cell phone location data as private by enacting
228
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protections against unauthorized dissemination.
Therefore, the
information concerning Carpenter’s location could be considered his
property for Fourth Amendment purposes.237 If that information was
Carpenter’s property, then investigators seized it without a warrant in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Gorsuch argued that the property-based
theory of the Fourth Amendment was in line with other property-based
decisions such as Jones and Florida v. Jardines.238 He would have preferred
to overturn Katz and do away with the reasonable expectation of privacy test
in favor of this theory, but lamented that the property theory of the Fourth
Amendment had not been briefed or developed by the parties.239
The Court is in the middle of a debate about the theoretical
underpinnings of Fourth Amendment privacy that will have significant
implications for the relationship between technology and privacy in public
spaces. More cases addressing new technologies will come before the Court
in time, and this debate is likely to intensify as robots are increasingly
deployed in public spaces.
E. Proposed Comprehensive Federal Privacy Legislation
2018 and 2019 have seen multiple proposals for new federal privacy
legislation that vary greatly in their approaches to privacy protection, likely
in response to a series of privacy scandals in 2018 involving Facebook and
other large tech firms. Some proposals rely on existing concepts in privacy
law, especially consent and transparency through privacy notices.240 While
this is an important part of the conversation, as we discuss above the nature
of robots and IoT in public spaces may require protections beyond traditional
notions of notice and consent. Here, we focus on proposals that go further
toward addressing this reality.
Instead of relying on notice and consent, the Data Care Act would
impose certain fiduciary duties on online service providers similar to those
required of attorneys and corporate board members. The Act creates duties
of care, loyalty, and confidentiality and expands the duty to inform in the
event of a data breach.241 It also gives the FTC rulemaking authority and
allows for separate enforcement by state attorneys general, although pending
FTC actions would preempt states for their duration.242
236
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The idea of data fiduciaries could have potential as an alternative to
notice and consent regimes that struggle to address robots and the IoT.
However, in its current form, the Data Care Act is limited to online service
providers,243 so it would not apply to robots, where physicality is a major
feature. Even so, it is an important start to a broader debate.
The most ambitious proposal is likely Senator Ron Wyden’s Consumer
Data Protection Act. The Consumer Data Protection Act is not limited to
online service providers, but rather applies to any “person, partnership, or
corporation over which the Commission has jurisdiction under section
5(a)(2) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(2)[)],” with
an exception for small businesses.244 The bill’s many provisions include
recognition of “noneconomic” injuries in FTC jurisprudence,245
implementation of a national Do-Not-Track system,246 and impact
assessments for automated decision systems.247 It would not only give the
FTC rulemaking authority but also increase its funding and establish a
Bureau of Technology within the Commission.248
Two other proposals take divergent approaches but share one important
feature: federal preemption of state (and by implication local) privacy rules.
First, the American Data Dissemination Act of 2019 takes the protections of
the Privacy Act of 1974, which currently only applies to federal agencies,
and applies them to online service providers.249 The Act and resulting
regulations would preempt any state laws as far as they relate to internet
service providers.250 Alternatively, the Center for Democracy and
Technology (CDT), a prominent think tank and advocacy group, has also
proposed model baseline federal privacy legislation. The CDT bill would
apply to any “person or business entity that as part of its activities processes
personal information in or affecting interstate commerce,” but excludes
government actors and natural persons.251 It proposes individual rights that
appear to be inspired by the GDPR: rights to access and correct, data
portability, and deletion.252 In a novel innovation, it defines certain acts as
243
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per se deceptive or unfair, effectively strengthening and broadening the
FTC’s enforcement authority.253 However, it only gives the FTC rulemaking
authority in certain narrow subjects, such as for security, health information,
and unfair targeted advertising.254 As with the American Data Dissemination
Act, the CDT’s proposed bill would preempt privacy laws by state and local
governments.255 Because the proposal applies to all companies, not just
online service providers, the scope of this preemption is much broader and
would include many if not all of the local privacy laws we discuss in this
Paper.
As of writing, the most recent new proposal is the Consumer Online
Privacy Rights Act (COPRA). COPRA would apply to any entity already
covered by the FTC Act that transfers data that identifies or is reasonably
linkable to an individual.256 It would create a duty of loyalty for such entities
as well as individual rights, such as rights of access, deletion, data
minimization, and data security.257 Notably, it would preempt state laws that
conflict with its provisions, but not those that create stronger protections.258
One common thread is that many of these proposals are specific to
online service providers. This is likely because one of the principle catalysts
for this legislative activity is the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal.259
Lawmakers are reacting to the problem in front of them, which is privacy
abuse by online platforms and service providers. This is important and
necessary work, but it ignores the looming privacy issues that are around the
corner with robotics, IoT, and the third-party doctrine.
F. Cities as Testbeds of Data Privacy
It is difficult to predict precisely what impact these changes in privacy
law will have on cities, but those impacts will certainly be felt strongly at
the local level. Cities are the places where robots, and their accompanying
sensors, will be tested and deployed. The physical infrastructure of cities is
also likely to be embedded with sensors and computers to allow the robots
to interact more smoothly with the built environment. Further, the density of
people in cities means that the scale of data collection will be at its greatest
in urban areas. Cities have an interest in using the data robotics companies
collect and in protecting the privacy rights of their residents. Do
253
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comprehensive privacy protections prevent firms from developing cutting
edge technologies? What balance of market power and control between
firms and individuals allows for innovation and privacy protection? Will a
change in the third-party doctrine impact policing practices at the local
level? These questions will play out at the local level.260 As privacy law
continues to evolve, cities can serve as testbeds for governance not just of
the robots but the data those robots collect.
Ira Rubinstein has begun an important exploration of the role of cities in
privacy policymaking through “privacy localism.”261 He documents the rise
of local privacy laws and surveillance oversight bodies in the cities of Seattle
and New York. He argues the federal and state privacy laws leave significant
gaps by failing to protect against surveillance in public spaces (the “public
surveillance gap”) and failing to protect local government records (the “Fair
Information Practices gap”).262 Because privacy localism fills these gaps and
fulfills the democratic values inherent in federalism, cities should be allowed
to develop their own privacy localist programs within the framework of
federalism.263
Cities will continue to fill the privacy gap for urban robotics because
federal legislative attempts to address privacy issues with robotics are
inadequate. As discussed, the SELF DRIVE Act’s privacy rules are based
on existing, inadequate privacy frameworks that rely on self-regulation
through corporate privacy policies.264 The AV START Act establishes an
AV “Data Access Advisory Committee” to consider the issue of privacy and
AVs and issue a report to Congress within 180 days.265 However, federal
regulators are prohibited from issuing new rules on AV privacy until the
committee submits its report.266 So the SELF DRIVE Act establishes no
baseline protections for this highly sensitive technology, and the public will
not even know what privacy protections result from AV START for 180
days. Federal rules for drone privacy have also been lacking. The FAA has
explicitly declined to issue rules on drone privacy. Meanwhile, these
technologies are being deployed and tested in urban public spaces and
collecting large amounts of data. It is up to cities to set their own rules of the
road as the sites of this experimentation.
260
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Cities continue to innovate with respect to privacy protections. Professor
Rubinstein documents many salient examples, in particular local ordinances
that place restrictions on police use and procurement of new surveillance
technologies like drones.267 Cities, however, have additional tools available
to them. For instance, the city attorney of Los Angeles recently sued The
Weather Channel app for unfair and fraudulent business practices, alleging
that it failed to properly disclose the extent of its tracking and data sharing
with third parties to consumers.268
We agree that cities should be empowered to develop local privacy
regimes. Not only does privacy localism comport with the values of
federalism, it reflects the fact that impacts of privacy regulations will be felt
most keenly at the local level. Any federal action related to data use by
robots in public spaces or to creating nationwide baseline privacy
protections should be aware of the unique and evolving role of cities in
developing privacy policy. Such federal action should respect the autonomy
of cities, especially when it comes to preemption. Overly broad or aggressive
preemption will only serve to stifle policy innovation. Further work is
required to explore the implications of robotics on privacy localism and the
role of privacy localism to shape privacy policymaking more broadly.
IV. PREEMPTION, CITIES, AND THE REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS
SYSTEMS
This Part is an account of the law of urban robotics. It begins with an
overview of federal and state preemption and city police powers, noting that
federal and state governments can greatly restrict local authority, although
there are some spheres where cities typically exercise their authority. Next,
it surveys existing or proposed federal and state robotics laws, with
particular attention to preemption issues. We then provide an account of how
cities are regulating urban robots and serving as testbeds for innovation.
A. An Overview of Federal Preemption and Home Rule Doctrines
Two types of preemption are important for this account of urban
robotics: federal preemption of states and localities and state preemption of
localities. Federal preemption is where federal law supersedes and
invalidates a state or local government law. It is based on the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that federal law and the
Constitution are “the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
267

See Rubinstein, supra note 208, pt. II (documenting Seattle and New York City case studies).
Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Civil Penalties for Violations of Unfair Competition Law
(California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.) at 3, California v. TWC Prod. & Tech., LLC
(Cal. Super. Ct. 2019).
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269

to the Contrary notwithstanding.” The dispositive question for a court in
finding federal preemption is whether Congress intended to preempt the
states on the matter.270 If Congress expresses its preemptive intent in the text
of the law, it has created express preemption.271 If a court finds express
preemption, it must then determine “the substance and scope of Congress’
displacement of state law.”272 The Supreme Court has said that when
statutory preemption language has more than one plausible reading, courts
should “accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.”273
If a court finds no language that expressly preempts state law, it may
still find implied preemption in the legislation’s structure and purpose.274
Implied preemption takes two forms: conflict preemption and field
preemption. With conflict preemption, state or local laws either conflict with
federal law or present an obstacle to the congressional purpose.275 With field
preemption, Congress has expressed an intent to occupy the field on that
issue, leaving no room for states to supplement the law or otherwise
regulate.276 For example, the Supreme Court has held Illinois licensing and
training requirements for hazardous waste handling to be invalided by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s regulations.277
While federal law may be supreme, the constitutional system of
federalism provides only certain enumerated powers to the federal
government, while reserving all others to the states.278 The Tenth
Amendment prevents the federal government from “commandeering” state
governments by imposing affirmative duties to do things that they would not
otherwise do.279 For example, Congress may not force states to assume
liability for radioactive waste280 or use state police resources to conduct
federal background checks for firearm purchases.281 Congress may condition
federal grant money on certain state actions, such as raising the drinking age
269

U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 326–27 (1819)
(“The constitution, therefore, declares that the constitution itself . . . shall be the supreme law of the
land.”).
270
Altria Grp. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76–77 (2008).
271
Id.
272
Id. at 76.
273
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005).
274
Altria Grp., 555 U.S. at 76.
275
Id. at 70.
276
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
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Id. at 98–99.
278
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
279
See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997) (“[T]he Federal Government may
not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs.”);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (holding that the Act was effectively
commandeering the state governments because “[a] choice between two unconstitutionally coercive
regulatory techniques is no choice at all”).
280
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378

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

282

to twenty-one. However, the conditions of the grant may not be so onerous
that they coerce the states into action.283
State preemption of local governments does not operate under the same
constitutional framework as federal preemption. While the U.S. Constitution
reserves broad power for states through the Tenth Amendment,284 cities are
not even mentioned in the document. Broadly speaking, there are two views
of local power in relation to states: Dillon’s Rule and home rule. Under the
traditional view described in Dillon’s Rule, cities are simply
administratively convenient organizations that derive their power from
states, so they only have the limited powers granted by the state.285 They are
not themselves sovereign. Discontent with Dillon’s Rule eventually led
states to grant more powers to cities, first on matters of “local” concern, and
later, broader “police powers.”286 Police powers encompass the public’s
health, safety, welfare, and morals.287 However, they are still “subject to
denial of power in a particular substantive field by specific act of the state
legislature.”288 That is, local governments typically do not have unfettered
police powers even under home rule. States enact home rule either in their
constitutions or legislatively.289 Home rule powers come in two forms: (1)
empowerment/initiative—the ability to enact substantive policy; and (2)
immunity—“the ability to resist encroachment from another governmental
entity or from a private party.”290
Though state preemption of cities exists under a different constitutional
framework than federal preemption, it often operates in similar ways. As
with the federal level, state preemption can be either express or implied.291
Implied preemption in turn can be either field or conflict, although most
282
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entrusted to them. . . . The number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon
these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the
absolute discretion of the State.
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
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states do not use these exact terms. However, the nuances of home rule
versus Dillon’s Rule and the exact wording of state grants of authority to
cities can impact the outcome of state preemption cases.293 For example,
Oregon’s state constitution has been read to create a presumption for
preemption in criminal law matters but against preemption in civil
matters.294
A group of legal experts convened by the American Constitution Society
(citing the National League of Cities) identifies five categories of municipal
power. Structural authority is the power to choose or modify the form of
city government.295 Personnel authority is the power to set employment
policies, compensation, and collective bargaining.296 Fiscal authority is the
power to “raise revenue, borrow money, and spend.”297 Proprietary
authority is the power to set policy through the procurement and contracting
process, what we call market making.298 Regulatory or “functional”
authority encompasses the “police power” to set substantive policy and
regulate health, safety, welfare, and morals.299 Cities often rely on regulatory
power when setting rules for firms, so it is often at issue in state preemption
fights.300
Home rule schemes vary a great deal from state to state. In states where
the home rule grant is purely legislative, the state can preempt any city
action, and cities have no immunity.301 On the other extreme is the Colorado
state constitution, which expressly protects local authority.302
Cities and state legislatures have engaged in high profile preemption
conflicts on a variety of issues. These issues run the gamut from
anti-discrimination rules for transgender individuals, to sanctuary city and
minimum wage laws, to municipal broadband and ride-sharing apps.303
Cities feel that they have an interest in the impact of technological change
on the health or safety of their residents or the provision of city services.
Where firms operate new technological platforms in cities, namely ride and

292
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room sharing, several states have preempted city regulation. Cities have
also sought to impose regulation or alter street design to keep traffic
algorithms like Waze from redirecting freeway traffic onto urban and
suburban side streets.305 These recurring debates highlight the fact that cities
occupy a legally difficult space when it comes to the source and scope of
their power to regulate.
Even with the variety that exists among states, cities tend to have a great
deal of authority in certain areas related to environmental design. They
typically have broad powers in zoning to determine the nature and character
of city neighborhoods.306 Cities usually control the maintenance of public
streets within their territory, although the lines of which government body is
responsible for which street can blur.307 Cities also regulate the design of
public and private spaces by placing restrictions on building height or space
between the building and the street (called the “setback”).308 Cities exercise
broad taxing authority to raise funds for improvements to public space,
manage those improvements, and maintain the condition of the space, either
in house or in contract with the private sector. Many utility services, such as
parking, electricity, water, communications, wastewater, storm water, and
solid waste, occupy the same rights-of-way and may be publicly owned.
The preemption debate is already beginning to play out with urban
robots. Proposed federal autonomous vehicle legislation has quite broad
preemption language. One libertarian think tank has raised the alarm that
ride-sharing firms will lobby cities to ban individual ownership of
autonomous vehicles and urged states to preempt cities on that issue.309
Several state laws currently preempt city regulation of autonomous
304

Id. at 12, 15.
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310

vehicles. On the other hand, the states with delivery robot laws on the
books explicitly allow cities to regulate such machines.311
B. Federal and State Robotics Laws
The following section reviews local, state, and federal laws and policies
pertaining to autonomously controlled vehicles, delivery robots, security and
entertainment robots, and drones.312
For each category of robot, we examine the interaction between different
levels of government and the likely sources of conflict or preemption. We
also discuss the impact that preemption might have on the urban built
environment or the design of the robots themselves.
1. Autonomous Vehicles
AV regulation in many cities is in danger of preemption by both state
and federal laws. Cities have been at the forefront of AV testing and
employed sundry regulatory approaches based on local needs and political
realities. However, some state laws already preempt city regulation of AVs,
and proposed federal legislation would go even further, cutting off this
period of technological and regulatory experimentation prematurely.
The diversity of local AV regulations reflects the varied needs of cities
to control their public rights-of-way as well as the current experimental state
of this technology. Many cities have pilot programs to implement automated
vehicles into their own transportation systems, such as with autonomous
buses.313 For instance, the city of Atlanta has created a “smart corridor” that
310
Autonomous Vehicles: Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Mar. 19, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-selfdriving-vehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx (listing Tennessee, Texas, Illinois, and North Carolina as states
that have enacted legislation preempting local regulation on autonomous vehicles).
311
H.B. 1325, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wash. 2019) (recently enacted bill on delivery robots in
Washington that respects local control provided the robots operate in a jurisdiction and operate within
local governments’ rules and regulations).
312
Autonomous flying cars present a separate set of challenges and do not fit neatly into these
categories. The FAA has issued exemptions to some of its regulations on general aviation aircraft to some
companies, but the process is reported to be quite complicated and time consuming. This process could,
for example, complicate Uber’s promise to deliver flying car service by 2020. See Jacob Bogage, Flying
Cars Just Took a Big Step Closer to Being Legal, WASH. POST (June 20, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/06/20/flying-cars-just-took-a-big-stepcloser-to-being-legal/?utm_term=.a42f4cdc9a84; Jim Moore, Uber Promises Flying Cars by 2020,
AOPA (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-news/2017/april/27/uber-promisesflying-cars-by-2020; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Larry Page’s Flying Taxis, Now Exiting Stealth Mode, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/12/business/dealbook/flying-taxis-larrypage.html; Joe Stumpe, FAA Excites Nascent Flying-Car Industry, AEROSPACE AM. (Jan. 3, 2017),
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pairs a driverless bus with smart infrastructure like traffic lights that will
communicate with the AV. Cities experimenting with autonomous buses
have made infrastructure upgrades that incorporate computers that can
communicate with AVs.314 In many cases, these pilot programs appear to be
implemented through public-private partnerships between cities and
firms.315 With the exception of Boston, we have not been able to find
publicly available copies of these agreements.316 Boston requires
compliance with federal AV safety guidelines and strictly controls the
driving conditions under which companies can test their AVs.317 This
includes weather conditions, time of day, and presence of safety drivers who
can take control of the vehicle in an emergency. Cities such as Ann Arbor
and San Jose have also created dedicated physical spaces for automated
vehicle testing.318 They have already begun planning the necessary
infrastructure upgrades to accommodate and prepare for widespread
automated vehicle deployment.319 Chandler, Arizona has become the first
city to modify its zoning laws to accommodate AV passenger pick-up and
drop-off.320 Private companies have proposed dedicated lanes of traffic for
AVs both on highways and city streets, although to our knowledge no city
has taken steps to implement such lanes yet.321 And consultants and firms
are promoting the necessity of infrastructure upgrades to promote AVs.322
ATCMTD REPORT]; Skip Descant, Atlanta’s Second Smart Transportation Corridor Takes Shape,
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In sum, in regulating automated vehicles, most cities have relied on
their proprietary authority to form public-private partnerships with firms or
their regulatory authority to shape the physical space in which the
technologies operate. A notable exception is the ordinance proposed in
Chicago, which would limit automated vehicles to permitted firms for test
purposes.323 The law’s sponsors cited cybersecurity concerns and potential
job losses to automation as motivations.324 They had considered an outright
ban but withdrew that proposal in light of Illinois’ preemption of local AV
regulations.325
As with cities, state lawmakers differ significantly in their approach to
AVs. Although Professor Bryant Walker Smith has argued that AVs are
generally legal on public roads,326 many states have passed legislation or
issued executive orders regulating them in some way. According to the
National Conference of State Legislatures, at the time of writing twenty-one
states have enacted some form of autonomous vehicle legislation, and six
more have relevant executive orders.327 A large majority of states (forty-one)
have considered legislation since 2012.328
Five of these states, Illinois, Nevada, North Carolina, Tennessee, and
Texas, have preempted municipal regulation of autonomous vehicles in their
legislation.329 Illinois’ law is the narrowest. It states that a city may not
“enact an ordinance prohibiting the use of Automated Driving System
equipped vehicles on its roadways.”330 However, cities may still regulate
AVs for “traffic control purposes.”331 Nevada prohibits cities from singling
out AVs for taxes, permits, or other requirements, but preserves the state’s
323
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officially introduced. Alderman Ed Burke argued in favor of a ban on driverless cars with a movie clip
from Back to the Future. Brendan Bakala, Burke to the Future: Chicago Alderman Wants to Ban
Self-Driving Cars, I LL. POL’Y (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/burke-to-the-futurechicago-alderman-wants-to-ban-self-driving-cars/.
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ability to collect a generally applicable business license fee. Presumably
other generally applicable laws are permitted as well. North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Texas have much broader preemption, prohibiting any
“regulation” of AVs by cities altogether.333 In addition, cities in Dillon’s
Rule states would not have the authority to regulate AVs unless state
legislatures expressly grant it. However, even Dillon’s Rule cities would
likely have authority over certain local concerns that impact AVs, such as
zoning, lane placement, and other infrastructure management issues (such
as whether to deploy smart infrastructure that can communicate with AVs).
Other state laws such as California’s have not expressly preempted cities
but vested regulatory authority in an administrative agency such as the
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV).334 This regulatory scheme could
have the effect of creating implied preemption, with the DMV taking
regulatory power out of the hands of cities. Mayors in San Francisco and
Pittsburgh have expressed that this is likely the case, at least as far as being
able to ban AVs completely.335 However, the scope of city authority in this
regard has not been tested in court.
Massachusetts represents a more collaborative model by creating
partnerships with the Massachusetts Department of Transportation
(MassDOT), companies, and local governments. Executive Order 572
requires companies to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
with the Agency and the cities where they will operate.336 MassDOT and
participating cities in Massachusetts signed a separate MOU to establish a
common application for AV companies, approve testing locations in the
cities, and periodically review technical and policy advances in the AV
space.337 Now, in order to put AVs on the road in one of the urban testbeds
in Massachusetts (like Boston), a company must sign an MOU with the city
and then complete a permit application with MassDOT.338 This process
involves numerous commitments from companies, including standards for
332
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N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-401(i) (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-30-105 (2017); TEX. TRANSP.
CODE § 545.452(b) (2017).
334
CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (2012).
335
Joe Fitzgerald Rodriguez, Mayor Calls on Self-Driving Car Companies to Agree to Voluntary
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safety drivers, compliance with vehicle safety standards, data sharing, and
more.339 Although Massachusetts’ approach is standardized across different
cities, it appears to be the result of collaboration between the state and local
levels rather than dictated from the top. Further, at this stage, cities with no
wish to allow AV testing on their roads have no obligation to enter into the
MOU.
Existing federal guidance and proposed laws envision a dominant and
preemptive role for federal regulation of AVs. The National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA) guidance contemplates a
dominant role for federal regulators as compared to states.340 The U.S.
Department of Transportation has convened a series of meetings aimed at
reducing regulatory barriers and promoting autonomous vehicle
technology.341 NHTSA solicited comments from the public “to identify any
regulatory barriers in the existing [Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards]
to the testing, compliance certification, and compliance verification” of
autonomous vehicles.342 Fatal and non-fatal accidents involving AVs have
spurred investigations by the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB).343
In Autonomous Driving Systems 2.0: A Vision for Safety, NHTSA
“strongly encourages States to allow [the U.S. Department of
Transportation] alone to regulate the safety design and performance aspects
of [AV] technology. If a State does pursue [AV] performance-related
regulations, that State should consult with NHTSA.”344 The Agency lists
state responsibilities as: (1) “[l]icensing human drivers and registering motor
vehicles in their jurisdictions”; (2) “[e]nacting and enforcing traffic laws and
regulations”; (3) “[c]onducting safety inspections, where States choose to do
so”; and (4) “[r]egulating motor vehicle insurance and liability.”345
Federal legislation that has passed in the House contains broad
preemption language that would prevent states and cities from regulating
339
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It was a federal agency that kickstarted the development of AVs. The Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Grand Challenge is considered to have set off the current boom in
AV research and development. Alex Davies, Inside the Races that Jump-Started the Self-Driving Car,
WIRED (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/darpa-grand-urban-challenge-self-driving-car/.
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U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS: A VISION FOR SAFETY 2.0, at i–ii,
https://www.transportation.gov/AV (last updated Feb. 27, 2019).
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Removing Regulatory Barriers for Vehicles With Automated Driving Systems, 83 Fed. Reg.
2607 (Jan. 18, 2018) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 571).
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Ryan Beene & Alan Levin, U.S. NTSB Opens Probe of Second Tesla Autopilot Crash,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23 2018, 4:49 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-23/u-ssafety-board-opens-probe-of-second-tesla-autopilot-crash; Megan Rose Dickey, Uber’s Fatal SelfDriving Car Crash Prompts NTSB Investigation, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://techcrunch.com/2018/03/19/ubers-fatal-self-driving-car-crash-prompts-ntsb-investigation/.
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autonomous vehicles. The SELF DRIVE Act contains the following
preemption language:
No State or political subdivision of a State may maintain,
enforce, prescribe, or continue in effect any law or regulation
regarding the design, construction, or performance of highly
automated vehicles, automated driving systems, or
components of automated driving systems unless such law or
regulation is identical to a standard prescribed under this
chapter.346
A “political subdivision of a State” refers to cities and local governments, as
cities typically derive their police power from the state.347 The bill allows
cities and states to maintain laws related to “registration, licensing, driving
education and training, insurance, law enforcement, crash investigations,
safety and emissions inspections, congestion management of vehicles on
[state or city streets], or traffic unless the law or regulation is an
unreasonable restriction on the design, construction, or performance” of
autonomous vehicles.348 Companies say that this preemption language is
necessary to avoid a patchwork of regulation that will hinder innovation, but
it has drawn criticism from safety and consumer advocacy groups and state
governments.349
The Senate AV START Act, which is still pending as of writing,
originally had the same language as the House version. However, it has been
amended to read: “No State or political subdivision of a State may adopt,
maintain, or enforce any law, rule, or standard regulating the design,
construction, or performance of a highly automated vehicle or automated
driving system with respect to any of the safety evaluation report subject
areas described in section 30107(b).”350 This language is less broad than the
House bill and preserves some powers specifically for state and local
governments:
Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to prohibit a State
or political subdivision of a State from maintaining, enforcing,
346

SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. § 3(b) (2017) (emphasis added).
Id. § 13.
348
Id. § 3(b).
349
David Alpert, Have Senators? Ask Them to Let Cities and States Shape How Autonomous
Vehicles Affect Us All, GREATER GREATER WASH. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://ggwash.org/view/65027/havesenators-let-cities-and-states-shape-autonomous-vehicles-avs-affect-us-preemption-congress;
Tina
Bellon, U.S. Push for Self-Driving Law Exposes Regulatory Divide, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-selfdriving-analysis/u-s-push-for-self-driving-law-exposesregulatory-divide-idUSKCN1BQ24J; Andrew J. Hawkins, Congress Is About to Hand Over the Keys to
the Big Self-Driving Car Companies—And That’s a Problem, VERGE (July 19, 2017),
https://www.theverge.com/2017/7/19/15998356/self-driving-car-congress-legislation-lobbying-safety.
350
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prescribing, or continuing in effect any law or regulation
regarding the sale, distribution, repair, or service of highly
automated vehicles, automated driving systems, or
components of automated driving systems by a dealer,
manufacturer, or distributor.351
However, one of the preempted subjected areas in section 30107(b) is the
“expected operational design domain” of AVs.352 This means that the AV
START Act preempts cities and states with respect to “any roadway and
infrastructure assets required for the operation of the highly automated
vehicle or automated driving system, such as roadside equipment, pavement
markings, signage, and traffic signals, and how it will respond if that
operational design domain unexpectedly changes.”353 By extending the
meaning of “design, construction, or performance” to the AV’s operational
domain, the ambit of the AV START Act’s preemption is potentially very
broad.
Both state and federal preemption of cities in the area of AV regulation
are likely to be significant constraints of city authority. An exhaustive
analysis of every state’s constitutional scheme regarding home rule versus
Dillon’s Rule is beyond the scope of this Paper, but state laws that expressly
preempt city AV laws will face few if any limitations. As noted above,
several states expressly prohibit cities from regulating AVs in any form.
Even without express language, cities may still be limited by implied
preemption by state AV statutes. California’s approach is an example of
implied preemption effectively limiting cities. Because California DMV
regulations allow AVs on the state’s public roads, cities there are powerless
to ban AV access on their streets.354 Such a ban would likely conflict with
state law and, therefore, be preempted. However, there are many forms of
regulation that fall short of an outright ban. Suppose cities wanted to create
certain AV-free zones near public parks or impose lower AV speed limits.
Or, perhaps the cities wanted to pass a rule requiring AVs to always yield to
pedestrians. If courts apply broad field preemption or its functional state law
equivalent, then cities will be foreclosed from doing so. If courts instead
construe statutes narrowly and apply conflict preemption, then cities will
have more control over their public rights-of-way. Imagine if a legislature
mandated the creation of AV hyperlanes, as some in Washington State have
advocated. Such a mandate could take important local decisions about street
and sidewalk allocation and design out of the hands of the places that are
most impacted.
351

Id. § 3(a)(3)(C).
Id. § 9(a).
353
Id.
354
California regulations do require firms to submit law enforcement interaction plans to cities, so
there is some coordination built into the law. CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, ORDER TO ADOPT
§ 227.38(e) (2017).
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State preemption could also deprive cities of important sources of
revenue that may be lost as AVs transform the tax base of cities. If
widespread AV fleets eliminate urban parking, as some have predicted, then
cities will lose a significant source of revenue. Cities wishing to levy a tax
on AVs to make up for this loss in Nevada, North Carolina, Tennessee, or
Texas would be barred from doing so.
Proposed federal AV legislation would also create a great deal of
uncertainty for cities. The SELF DRIVE Act’s prohibition against
“unreasonable” restrictions on AV “design, construction, or performance”
could be read quite broadly, especially because it applies to congestion
management and traffic laws.355 If constantly roaming AV fleets lead to an
increase in miles traveled, traffic congestion, and urban sprawl as some
predict,356 then cities would naturally want to enact policies to combat these
problems. Is surge or congestion pricing aimed at AVs an “unreasonable
restriction”? An AV company looking for a sword to wield against cities
certainly might think so. As discussed above, the AV START Act is
narrower than SELF DRIVE,357 but the meaning of the term “performance”
presents a possible problem for cities. Some AVs can communicate with
smart infrastructure and may even rely on these vehicle-to-infrastructure
(V2I) capabilities to some extent.358 However, installing smart infrastructure
can be expensive and time consuming. It is at least arguable that a city that
refuses to install the “I” of V2I capabilities is hindering the performance of
an AV. This interpretation is bolstered by the bill’s definition of the
“expected operational design domain,” which includes infrastructure. Even
“dumb” infrastructure impacts AV capabilities. For instance, many AVs
have difficulty navigating traffic lanes that are faded or signs that are
obscured.359 The locally built environment can be a significant factor in AV
safety and performance, yet it is unclear whether and how AV START
would constrain cities in this regard. Both laws may encroach on the
traditional sphere of authority of cities if they are construed too broadly.
It is also unclear how state privacy rules might fare under federal
preemption language in the AV START and SELF DRIVE Acts. The House
bill currently requires companies to formulate a privacy policy for
355

SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. § 3(1) (2017).
Sarah J. Fox, Planning for Density in a Driverless World, 9 NE. U. L. REV. 151, 166–68 (2017);
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See supra note 350 and surrounding discussion (explaining that the AV START Act is narrower
than SELF DRIVE).
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360

automated vehicles. Having a policy will open companies to enforcement
action by the FTC if they break the promises contained therein.361 State
attorneys general may bring similar actions under state law. However, some
states have substantively stricter privacy rules that may create an
“unreasonable restriction” on automated vehicles. For example, laws against
collection of biometric data in Texas, Illinois, and Washington could
interfere with facial recognition capabilities in automated vehicles.362
In December of 2018, The Verge reported that the Senate was working
to pass an updated version of AV START.363 The outlet reported that the
proposed amendments, which were not made public, would have addressed
some privacy, safety, and consumer protection issues, but made no mention
of the preemption issues discussed above.364 As of this writing, the bill has
not passed in the Senate, but advocates continue to lobby Congress for
national AV legislation.365
2. Delivery Robots
Cities have also been at the forefront of experimenting with delivery
robots. Several cities, including Washington, D.C., Austin, Texas, and a few
cities in the San Francisco Bay Area, have created pilot programs either
through partnerships with firms or by passing ordinances to allow delivery
360
See SELF DRIVE Act, H.R. 3388, 115th Cong. § 12 (2017) (requiring manufacturers of highly
automated vehicles to, among other things, develop and notify vehicle occupants of privacy plans and
commissioning a Federal Trade Commission study on privacy issues in the highly automated vehicle
marketplace).
361
Id.
362
Texas’ and Illinois’ laws have already prevented a Google facial recognition app from running
in both states. Melissa Locker, Google’s Art Selfie App Not Working in Texas or Illinois? Thank Tricky
Biometric Laws, FAST COMPANY (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40518224/googles-artselfie-app-not-working-in-texas-or-illinois-thank-tricky-biometric-laws. However, Google prevailed in
one lawsuit about whether using photos to train its facial recognition algorithm violated the Illinois law.
Rivera v. Google Inc., 366 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1001 (N.D. Ill. 2018). The judge found that the plaintiffs
suffered no injury and so he had to dismiss the case. Id. Other cases based on the Illinois law are pending.
Shannon Liao, Google Wins Dismissal of Facial Recognition Lawsuit Over Biometric Privacy Act,
VERGE (Dec. 29, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/29/18160432/google-facial-recognitionlawsuit-dismissal-illinois-privacy-act-snapchat-facebook. Both a federal district court in San Francisco
and the Illinois Supreme Court have recently ruled that plaintiffs do not need to show monetary damages
to succeed in a lawsuit based on the Illinois statute: the violation of substantive privacy rights represented
in the statute are enough to proceed with a lawsuit. In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., No.
3:15-cv-03747-JD, 2018 WL 2197546, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2018); Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t
Corp., 2019 IL 123186, at *10 (Ill. Jan. 25, 2019). Washington’s law was recently enacted in 2017. H.B.
1493, 65th Leg., 2017 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017).
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VERGE (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/12/3/18124750/av-start-act-congress-us-firstself-driving-car-bill-tesla-gm.
364
Id.
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Maggie Miller, Advocates Rally on Capitol Hill for Self-Driving Car Legislation, HILL (Dec. 3,
2019, 5:48 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/472889-advocates-rally-on-capitol-hill-forself-driving-car-legislation.
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robots. The Austin ordinance is public, and Redwood City has published
its partnership agreement along with reports on the pilot.367 These laws and
agreements tend to follow the same pattern. They define where the robots
may operate (on sidewalks, not on highways) and create a permitting system
for firms to gain permission to test the robots.368 They also define certain
parameters for the robot, such as the maximum weight and speed, and
impose certain safety requirements, such as not to interfere with pedestrians
or bicycles.369 Not every city is so welcoming, however. San Francisco
passed an ordinance that heavily regulates personal delivery devices
(PDDs).370 The law requires a permit for each robot being tested and limits
the total number of permits to nine at any given time.371 It also requires a
human operator be present at all times and limits testing to industrially zoned
areas away from high traffic.372 The law was said to be motivated by safety
concerns, although media reports say the legislator who introduced the
ordinance originally considered an outright ban.373
State and federal regulation of delivery vehicles is more nascent than
laws for autonomous vehicles and more permissive for cities. As of writing,
eight states have enacted laws to specifically allow and regulate delivery
robots: Florida, Idaho, Ohio, Virginia, Wisconsin, Arizona, Utah, and

366

Austin, Tex., Resolution 20170810-12 (Aug. 10, 2017); Redwood City, Cal., Conditions of
Approval for Personal Delivery Device “PDD” Use Permit (Nov. 13, 2017); Lonsdorf, supra note 38.
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Austin, Tex., Resolution 20170810-12 (Aug. 10, 2017); Redwood City, Cal., Conditions of
Approval for Personal Delivery Device “PDD” Use Permit (Nov. 13, 2017).
368
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Delivery Device “PDD” Use Permit (Nov. 13, 2017) (establishing a permit system for Personal Delivery
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369
Austin, Tex., Resolution 20170810-12, at *2–3 (Aug. 10, 2017); Redwood City, Cal., Conditions
of Approval for Personal Delivery Device “PDD” Use Permit (Nov. 13, 2017).
370
S.F., CAL., PUB. WORKS CODE § 794 (Jan. 21, 2018). For a general discussion of the San
Francisco permit system, see Autonomous Delivery Devices, S.F. PUB. WORKS,
https://sfpublicworks.org/services/permits/autonomous-delivery-devices.
371
S.F., CAL., PUB. WORKS CODE § 794(b), (d)(3) (2018).
372
Id. § 794(i).
373
See Adam Brinklow, San Francisco Bans Robots From Most Sidewalks, CURBED S.F. (Dec. 6,
2017), https://sf.curbed.com/2017/12/6/16743326/san-francisco-delivery-robot-ban (explaining that
Board of Supervisors member Norman Yee previously wanted to ban delivery robots altogether “to
protect public space from encroachment by private companies”); Brian Heater, San Francisco Made
Things Much Tougher for Robotic Delivery Startups This Week, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/12/07/san-francisco-made-things-much-tougher-for-robotic-deliverystartups-this-week/ (explaining that Board of Supervisors member Norman Yee’s initial language “was
more akin to an outright ban” on delivery robots).
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374

Washington. Each state allows cities to pass their own PDD regulations
or safety requirements, a marked difference from state AV laws.375
There is currently no federal law directly addressing PDDs. It is possible
that the SELF DRIVE and AV START Acts could apply to PDDs, though
that is far from clear. Both laws refer to section 30102 of chapter 49 of the
U.S. Code, which defines a motor vehicle as “a vehicle driven or drawn by
mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public streets,
roads, and highways, but does not include a vehicle operated only on a rail
line.”376 While this definition arguably does not apply to PDDs that operate
primarily on sidewalks, it could apply to larger delivery robots that operate
on city streets.
At least for the moment, cities can regulate PDDs as they wish, free from
preemption at the state or federal level. One interesting phenomenon is that
we have not found any active PDD pilot programs in cities where the state
has passed a PDD enabling law, even though the laws in each state explicitly
allow cities to regulate PDDs for safety or, in some cases, ban them outright.
It could be that pilot programs are simply not necessary where state law has
already cleared the way for PDDs to operate on city streets. However, it is
curious that no cities in states with PDD laws have created their own
institutional arrangements for this technology on their streets. It is possible
that state laws have inhibited cities’ independent regulation of PDDs by
signaling the priorities of state legislatures.
3. Security and Entertainment
Security robots have thus far escaped the attention of state and federal
regulators. This is probably due to the fact that they are mostly operated on
private property by private actors. Or perhaps they are simply less
widespread or seen as disrupting a less vital industry than transportation or
last-mile delivery. Should they evolve into government-controlled police
robots, they will warrant greater regulation by state and federal actors.
Professor Elizabeth Joh has predicted such a development and called for
“uniform national policies” for police robots, such as the use of conditions

374
C.S./H.B. 1027, 2017 Leg. § 2 (Fla. 2017); H.B. 204, 64th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 3 (Idaho 2017);
H.B. 49, 132d Gen. Assemb. § 4511.513(B) (Ohio 2017); S. 1207, 2017 Sess. § 46.2-908.1:1 (Va. 2017);
S.B. 148, 2017 Wis. Act 13 § 30 (Wis. 2017); H.B. 2422, 53d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 3 (Ariz. 2018); H.B.
217, 2018 Gen. Sess. § 2(2) (Utah 2018); H.B. 1325, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Wash. 2019).
375
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or strings attached to federal procurement grants to require that police
departments enact policies governing the use of robotic force.377
As with the state and federal levels, security robots are largely
unregulated at the city level as well. San Francisco is again a notable
exception. In a widely publicized incident, residents complained about a
Knightscope robot being used to chase off homeless people in the frontage
space and parking area of a local Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals (SPCA) animal shelter in the Mission district.378 The city’s
Department of Public Works demanded the SPCA cease using the robot
because it was traversing public sidewalks.379 The source of the
Department’s authority is unclear and has not been publicly disclosed.
There has also been local action that would impact police use of robots.
A member of the Board of Supervisors of San Mateo County drafted a
resolution calling on Congress and the United Nations to ban killer robots,
although he later withdrew it and the Board agreed to study the issue
further.380 More substantively, Santa Clara County and the cities of Oakland,
Berkeley, and Seattle have passed surveillance ordinances requiring citizen
approval before police departments acquire new surveillance equipment.381
Cities could easily use their proprietary power over municipal police
departments to regulate vendor agreements with the makers of any future
police robots, even in the absence of a surveillance ordinance.382
As with security robots, entertainment robots are currently unregulated
at all levels. This may be just as well, as most have not even been deployed
in commerce yet. In some cases, the regulations for PDDs may apply, such
as with Gita, the droid designed to “carry a case of wine.”383 Segway has
377

Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing Police Robots, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 516, 541 (2016).
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also marketed package delivery as a possible use case for Loomo.384
Loomo’s ability to carry people may qualify it to operate on city sidewalks
as a type of personal mobility device under state law. Officials in the city of
Austin speculated this would be true under Texas law.385 It is possible that
as these types of urban robots proliferate, new laws may be proposed, but it
is a little premature to speculate now.
4. Drones
Drones are a unique case for this Paper because they fly, and are
therefore regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration, and because
they have applications that cut across the categories of urban robots we have
explored thus far. Autonomous drones that are large enough to fit a person
could serve as a type of flying robotic taxi, while last-mile drone delivery
has been a goal of companies (especially Amazon) for some time.386 Startup
companies are working on security drones to monitor property, an aerial
version of Knightscope,387 and the recreational drone was the “hot holiday
gift” of 2016 and 2017.388 One research project even proposes to use drones
to repair urban infrastructure.389 Drone use cases extend to several other
fields such as construction and surveying, agriculture, and the military, but
the four categories of urban robotics are what interest us here.
Of all of these technologies, drones have seen the most local legislative
action. This may be because domestic drones hit the market earlier than other
forms of robotics or because drones incited a more visceral reaction in the
public (serving as a “privacy catalyst”).390 The National League of Cities
cites Chicago’s drone ordinance, passed in November 2015, as one of the
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first comprehensive drone laws in a major city. The ordinance places a
number of prohibitions on drone flights, such as: flying directly over a
person or private property without consent; flying over a school, hospital,
place of worship, prison, or police station; flying outside visual line of sight;
flying between dusk and dawn; and flying for the purpose of surveillance.392
A 2017 study by the Center for the Study of the Drone found 133 local drone
ordinances in 31 different states.393 The author found the most common rules
to be restrictions against flying over public property or private property
without the owner’s consent.394
Cities may also enforce general regulations already on the books that
can be applied to drones. Simple criminal matters involving a drone are
within the scope of city power to regulate. An assault committed with a
drone is still an assault. For instance, the city of Seattle successfully
prosecuted a reckless endangerment case against a man who lost control of
his drone and crashed it into a woman during the 2015 Pride Parade.395
Seattle has no law specific to drone endangerment; it simply prosecuted the
man under Washington’s reckless endangerment statute.396
Though there is a great deal of variety among state drone laws, many
states have barred cities from regulating drones. According to the National
Conference of State Legislatures, forty-one states have enacted laws relating
to drones in some form and three more have adopted resolutions.397 State
drone laws range from anti-peeping Tom or voyeurism laws (California), to
designations of “critical” infrastructure that define the permissible airspace
for drones (Nevada), to prohibitions on weaponizing drones (Oregon), to
criminal sanctions on harming people or livestock (Utah).398 Several states
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have some kind of express preemption for local drone regulation. For
instance, Florida prohibits a city from regulating the “design, manufacture,
testing, maintenance, licensing, registration, certification, or operation” of a
UAV,400 though cities may still enforce generally applicable laws that are
not targeted at drones, such as nuisance, voyeurism, and reckless
endangerment.401 Connecticut enumerates similar categories where cities are
forbidden to regulate.402 By our count, ten other states preempt more
broadly, prohibiting cities from enacting any regulation relating to drones
except in very limited circumstances.403 Wyoming, however, takes a more
collaborative approach, establishing a commission to promulgate rules in
cooperation with the drone industry and local governments.404
Even with all the activity by cities and states, the federal government
remains the principal regulator of drones, setting the rules that govern
commercial drone operation. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is
the federal body charged by Congress to write rules to “safely accelerate the
integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace
system.”405 The result is the “small unmanned aircraft systems [UAS] rule”
codified in section 107 of chapter 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations.406
Section 107 applies to drones under fifty-five pounds and requires that
recreational and commercial drone (also called UAS for Unmanned Aerial
System) operators obtain a drone pilot certificate and register their drone
with the FAA.407 The rules for safe operation also prohibit flying over 400
feet, flying over people, and flying outside visual line of sight of the
operator.408 However, these safe operation rules can be waived with a “107
399
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waiver” from the FAA. Legislation introduced in the Senate in 2017
directs the FAA to create an “air carrier certificate” for companies to conduct
package delivery via drone.410 Congress’ drone mandate made no mention
of preemption, nor do the FAA regulations.
On January 14, 2019, the FAA announced new proposed rules that
would allow some drone flights over people (especially important for flights
over cities) and at night without the need for a waiver.411 Drones that could
demonstrate certain safety features or that had certain design elements the
FAA deemed safe, such as non-exposed rotors, may fly over people without
prior authorization.412 The new rules do not seek to regulate privacy, which
the FAA considers outside its mission.413
Proposed additional federal legislation seeks to clarify and preserve the
authority of state and local governments to regulate drones. The Drone
Federalism Act of 2017 directs the FAA to “ensure that the authority of a
State, local, or tribal government to issue reasonable restrictions on the time,
manner, and place of operation of a civil unmanned aircraft system that is
operated below 200 feet above ground level or within 200 feet of a structure
is not preempted.”414 It also requires the FAA to receive permission from
property owners before authorizing “the operation of a civil unmanned
aircraft in the immediate reaches of the airspace above property.”415
Congress has taken, or at least considered, a much more collaborative
approach with states and cities for drones than for AVs.
Statements by the FAA and a recent federal district court case indicate
that federal drone rules operate under conflict preemption, leaving room for
states and cities to regulate so long as they do not conflict with federal law.
In 2015, the FAA’s Office of Chief Counsel issued a document that warned
states and localities against creating a patchwork of rules that would hinder
nationwide UAS safety, but listed examples of where states and localities
would have authority to act.416 Examples include warrant requirements for
409
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police use of drones and peeping Tom laws. The Agency also recently
instituted a program for states, cities, and tribal authorities to partner with
companies to bypass existing regulations more easily and experiment with
advanced UAS applications at the local level.418
A recent court case also concluded that the FAA rules operated under
conflict preemption, not field preemption. Singer v. Newton related to a city
ordinance that sought to impose certain regulations on drone flight within
the city.419 The city of Newton, Massachusetts passed a drone ordinance that
applied to drone flights within the city limits.420 Michael Singer, an
FAA-certified drone pilot who resides in Newton, challenged provisions that
required drone operators to register with the city, banned flights over private
property without the property owner’s permission, banned flights over
Newton city property without permission, and required visual line of sight
flight.421 The ordinance also banned drone surveillance and interference with
manned aircraft, but Singer only challenged the previous four provisions.422
He argued that air safety is normally solely regulated by the FAA, so field
preemption should apply.423 However, Judge Young noted the FAA’s
statements about preserving some authority for state and local governments
to regulate.424 At the same time, he concluded that the FAA had not created
“an express carve-out for state and localities to regulate,” but rather hinted
that “whether parallel regulations are enforceable depends on the principles
of conflict preemption.”425
The judge invalided each of the challenged provisions under conflict
preemption. The FAA expressed its intent to be the “exclusive regulatory
authority” for drones in the navigable airspace, and therefore the city’s
registration provision was invalid.426 The judge concluded that Newton’s
requirement that drone flights over private and public property first obtain
permission was effectively a ban on drone flights over the city, which
frustrated the FAA and Congress’ intent to integrate drones into the
Raley, Local and State UAS Enforcement Authorities, FAA UAS SYMPOSIUM (2017),
https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/events_calendar/archive/2017_uas_symposium/media/Workshop_7
_Local_and_State_UAS_Enforcement_Authorities.pdf (providing examples of local enforcement).
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427

airspace. Finally, the judge ruled that the line of sight rule impermissibly
intervened “in the FAA’s careful regulation of aircraft safety” because the
FAA allows visual observers to augment line of sight flight or outright
waivers of that requirement.428 The court’s ruling makes sense given the
FAA’s policy statements about letting states and localities act in the drone
space. However, it should stand as a warning against regulation that even
seems like a ban on drones in the airspace. State or municipal attempts to
regulate drone safety are especially suspect.429
Many city drone regulations would likely be preempted by either state
or federal law, especially if they do not contain a savings provision. For
instance, some of the Chicago provisions are similar to those overturned in
Newton, namely the ban on flights over private property.430 However, the
Chicago ordinance contains an exception for any flights authorized by
federal or state law.431 It is important to note that this ordinance passed in
2015, before the FAA promulgated its current regulations. The FAA
currently allows waivers for flights outside visual line of sight, at night, or
over populated areas,432 so without an exception allowing for such flights,
the Chicago ordinance would almost certainly be preempted. A report by the
Center for the Study of the Drone concluded that many of these city drone
rules could conflict with federal or state laws.433 The Newton case may
inspire others to challenge local drone ordinances, although the FAA was
not involved in that case and has not yet challenged any such laws itself. The
federal scheme relying on conflict preemption still leaves room for cities to
regulate, however, as many local drone ordinances relate to privacy or
trespass, which the FAA has deemed within the scope of local authority to
act.434
States with blanket prohibitions on city drone laws will naturally be
much more constraining for cities. Cities will only be able to pass generally
applicable laws that happen to include conduct by drones, such as reckless
endangerment. The bounds of this authority are unclear and may need to be
tested in court. For instance, a city might pass an ordinance that does not
mention drones but defines trespass as causing an object to hover up to fifty
feet over private property. Is this a generally applicable law or a back door
into a drone ban?
427
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C. Preemption Can Interfere with Robotic and Environmental Design
The preceding sections have shown how cities are playing an active role
as testbeds of emerging robotics technologies and governance models. They
have also shown that city authority in this area can be limited by both state
and federal law and that the interplay of different levels of regulation can be
complex and unclear. This Section argues that preemption at the state and
federal levels will impact design decisions made about autonomous systems
and the local built environment and may unintentionally foreclose some
design choices, thereby stifling innovation.
The legal rules that govern urban robots will have consequences for
autonomous systems and the urban built environment, and vice versa. For
example, speed limits for automated vehicles or delivery robots will
determine the machine’s top speed. Or zoning laws will influence a
neighborhood’s use and character, including the design of public spaces and
restrictions on the commingling of people with robotics. Laws that set a
particular weight limit for machines enable some designs while foreclosing
others. This very problem has occurred with some state delivery robot laws.
Virginia’s law defines a delivery robot as weighing under fifty pounds, but
Marble, one of the main delivery robot startups, uses a machine that weighs
over eighty pounds.435 Some accused Marble’s competitor of writing the law
to close off competition.436 A law that requires a robot to yield to
pedestrians437 effectively requires the design of sensing and processing
capabilities to achieve this end. On the other hand, laws that require people
yield to robots could dramatically reshape environmental design. Such was
the case with the advent of the automobile and jaywalking laws.438
Urban robotics, environmental design, and legal rules will likely interact
in more indirect or diffuse ways that are nonetheless impactful on the local
level. The placement of any future restricted automated vehicle “hyperlanes”
could have significant opportunity costs by influencing the distribution of
travel modes onto other transportation infrastructure. One major study has
shown that ride-sharing apps increase traffic and reduce public transit
ridership.439 This effect could get worse if the cost of automated vehicle
435
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ride-sharing plummets, and it further introduces the prospect, so evident
today in cities with dockless car and bike share systems, of automated
vehicles occupying streets and utilizing energy without passengers at all. In
terms of long-term planning, it is important to consider that the provision of
transportation infrastructure and services influences where people live in
cities.440 Transportation economists have long advocated for congestion
pricing on roads to offset increases in miles traveled, and while this may be
applied to automated vehicles, the need for increased density, specifically in
public rights-of-way, highlights the need for other pricing structures, such
as occupancy-based pricing for automated vehicles to promote shared
vehicle and transit-scale systems.441 In all, there will likely be many
unforeseen consequences to the proliferation of cheap, diffuse networks of
last-mile logistics and public safety machines in the form of delivery and
security robots, as well as automated vehicles for passengers and cargo.
Changes brought about by new technology often have consequences for
environmental design and therefore need regulation that is sensitive to local
context. Consider the impact of room sharing (Airbnb) on urban housing
markets. While the anticipated death of the hotel business never came to
pass, some research suggests that Airbnb contributes to housing shortages
and drives up rents.442 This effect has been attributed to property owners
permanently shifting their homes from the rental market to “private
accommodations,” and Airbnb has worked with local governments to
combat this practice.443 This is just one example of technology’s impact on
local environmental design and legal rules, and more is in store as the
industrial organization of the transportation sector shifts from the
concentrated ownership of information technologies in today’s sharing
economy to more concentrated ownership of the mobile assets on the street.
State and federal laws that preempt cities on robotics may disrupt the
natural interplay between the design of autonomous systems, urban
environments, and local law, and so state and federal lawmakers should
consider the local impacts of robotics laws and be wary of broad preemption.
The controversy over the weight definition of PDDs locking out some
models of PDDs is one example.444 Right now, the regulation in this space
is still developing, but the chances of future conflict arise as more laws
relating to automated vehicles are enacted. Proposals for exclusive
automated vehicle highway lanes have already been floated to some state
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legislators. A proposed law in Illinois would require infrastructure updates
for networked sensors that would collect vehicle and pedestrian traffic data
and send it to automated vehicles.446 These laws are likely just the beginning.
Further, there is a recent history of cities attempting to regulate these
technologies, only to have states preempt them and reverse those rules.447
Advocates have also expressed concern over proposed federal automated
vehicle laws that preempt “unreasonable restrictions” on these products.448
Not only could the law upset the regulatory balance between the federal
government and states (and localities by extension), but the term
“unreasonable restrictions” is seen as overly vague.449
In addition, legislating to specific verticals of robotics may prevent cities
from planning holistically as technologies converge in robotics platforms.
Consider the state laws enabling PDDs. Eight state laws allow PDDs and
define them as “an electrically powered device that is operated on
sidewalks, shared-use paths, and crosswalks and intended primarily to
transport property” or something similar.450 This definition serves its
purpose of providing explicit permission for delivery robots to operate
within the state. It is written narrowly to cover delivery robots as they
currently exist.451 However, new robots are already being marketed that can
serve more than one function; they can be delivery robots, security robots,
or personal mobility devices.452 What had previously been distinct categories
of robot are beginning to converge into a multifunctional platform. If a
445
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machine can be both a delivery robot and a security device, which law
applies? Does the applicable law change depending on how the robot is
being used? Delivery robots are also defined as machines that operate on the
sidewalk, but it is at least conceivable that engineers could build a robot that
is equally capable of operating on both the sidewalk and the street. In fact,
Bloomberg Philanthropies and the Aspen Institute categorize delivery robots
as a type of automated vehicle.453 The convergence of delivery robots and
automated vehicles could accelerate if cities redesign their streets for mixed
robotic traffic, as some have suggested.454 So far, the states with PDD laws
have left room for cities to act, although some are more permissive than
others. For instance, Idaho allows cities to regulate PDDs for safe
operation,455 but it is not clear how the Idaho law would handle the
technological convergence described. This is another reason to allow cities
the freedom to experiment and regulate accordingly.
There are of course some situations where regulatory certainty and
uniform guidelines are warranted, and preemption may be the appropriate
tool to achieve that policy end. We simply caution that when it comes to
urban robots, preemption is a design issue in addition to a legal question.
D. Federalism for Urban Autonomy
This Section lays out specific recommendations for federal, state, and
local authorities to craft their rules governing robots to avoid preemption
interfering with local design.
Perhaps most pressingly, the preemption provisions of the SELF DRIVE
and AV START Acts should be amended and clarified to preserve local
authority over the built environment even when decisions about the
environmental design have impacts on design or performance. The
definition of “performance” specifications that are subject to preemption
should not include the operational domain, i.e., the built urban environment.
The AV START Act should include a specific exemption so that local
governments are not preempted when regulating their own built
environments that constitute the operational domain of AVs. A sunset
provision for this exemption may be appropriate to reflect the fact that AVs
are still in an experimental stage, but that stage will not last forever. The
SELF DRIVE Act has already passed in the House, but it will likely need to
be amended to resolve the differences with the AV START Act. SELF
DRIVE’s preemption language should be narrowed, and the authority of
cities to act as sites of experimentation expressly recognized.
453
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These changes are the minimum needed to preserve cities as sites of
experimentation. An even better model to follow is the Drone Federalism
Act and the FAA’s own policy statements on preserving state and local
authority in certain spheres. This approach could be combined with the
Massachusetts model, which allows cities to coordinate and cooperate with
state regulators and industry. This would allow cities to experiment to find
the design and operational domain for AVs and the governance structures
that best promote autonomous technology and the public good.
For other forms of urban robots, legislatures should expressly recognize
and carve out authority for cities where the law impacts environmental
design, including the deployment of related sensors and other information
communication systems. States should recognize city home rule authority
over environmental design and over system design to the extent it impacts
environmental design. The state PDD laws that do this, especially Illinois’,
are a good model to follow. Again, FAA policy on state and local authority
and the Massachusetts model for AVs are good approaches. Legislatures
should consider the relative costs for firms and cities that preemption can
create by forcing certain design parameters or precluding market
competition. Robotics laws should work in the public interest and not force
cities to bear socialized costs of system design.
Courts should recognize that local government design choices over their
public rights-of-way are legitimate exercises of police power, not obstacles
to federal rules that are meant to encourage the adoption of robots. They
should define conflict in preemption cases related to robots narrowly.
Choices about whether to offer robot fast lanes, whether to create designated
robot zones, how to structure parking for shared robo-taxi fleets, and even
how to price congestion to reduce traffic, all have a local character. Courts
should only find preemption if it is clear that federal or state legislatures
intended to preempt those design choices. This also means courts should
avoid field preemption because broad readings of legislative intent will
displace city prerogatives in local design.
Cities should not tempt fate by regulating so heavily that they draw a
preemption challenge in court or inspire legislatures to act.456 Robotics
ordinances should work with state and federal laws, not against them.
Chicago was wise to create exceptions to its ordinance to avoid a preemption
conflict.
Altogether, we advocate for true federalism in the system of robotics
law. Cities should serve as the sites of experimentation for robotic system,
environmental, and legal design. States can provide backstop rules that
ensure cities act in the public interest, for example, by setting rules against
456
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privacy harms or discrimination that could be exacerbated by robotics.457
They can also handle intrastate regional issues as they arise. The federal
government can provide technical and regulatory guidance, issue grants,
and, after the technology has had a chance to evolve through
experimentation in cities, create rules for robots in interstate commerce.
States and the federal government should adopt policies that limit or ban the
practices that place cities in a race to the bottom. There are a growing
number of proposals to balance deals between firms and cities in favor of
the public interest, such as curtailing the use of non-disclosure agreements
between cities and firms.458 Other policy tools will likely be relevant as well.
For instance, there is a growing recognition that more vigorous antitrust
enforcement may be necessary for large tech companies.459 As robotics firms
seek to become indispensable service platforms providing everything from
urban mobility to home delivery, state and federal antitrust regulators should
watch carefully for similar antitrust concerns in physical urban spaces as in
online spaces. Through careful, evidence-based policy, each level of
government plays to its relative institutional strengths,460 while preserving
local autonomy. Lawmakers at every level of government should remember
that development of both robotics systems and the built environment can
evolve over time, sometimes in unexpected ways. They should be platform
agnostic to avoid early “lock-in” of design or the built environment.
Robotics technologies are also likely to converge, which may render some
rules out of date.
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V. COUNTERARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF BROAD PREEMPTION OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS
This Part concerns counterarguments, such as the need for regulatory
clarity and consistency, the idea that state and national regulators are in a
better position to negotiate with firms than cities, and the notion that cities
do not necessarily act in the best interest of the region.
A. Firms Require Regulatory Clarity/Consistent Rules
Proponents of preemption might cite the need for regulatory clarity or
consistent rules to ease the way for firms. Automated vehicle manufacturers
have made such arguments in favor of the federal SELF DRIVE Act.461
Having to plan for and comply with fifty state-automated vehicle laws is
more complicated, and therefore costlier, than just dealing with one federal
law. In addition, being cars, automated vehicles are highly mobile and will
eventually cross state lines. For the legal requirements to differ between
states such that an automated vehicle from California cannot cross the border
into Nevada without violating the law would be troublesome, to say the least.
Overcoming such obstacles to interstate commerce is one of the reasons the
federal government exists in the first place. Put another way, scale matters
with technology.
We are sympathetic to these arguments and even grant that regulatory
uncertainty can be a burden on firms, but the burden to firms is only part of
the overall story. First, uncertainty creates a cost, and costs can either be
internalized by firms or socialized to the public. Avoiding preemption allows
for cities to be sites of experimentation and true partners in the system and
environmental design for urban robots. Preemption may cut off that process
too early. There will be a time when nationwide standards make sense, but
it should be after cities have had a chance to experiment. In the meantime,
the principle of permissionless innovation, which likely applies to automated
vehicles and many other robots,462 should insulate firms from the worst
regulatory excesses. Second, innovation proceeds unevenly, so regulatory
standardization should as well. Certain safety standards may make sense to
implement on a statewide or national level now.463 But there will be other
areas where cities require room to experiment, especially as it impacts
environmental design. There are situations with technology where scale can
have undesirable consequences. For example, possible concern with creating
a national health database is fear of a massive data breach that compromises
the personal health data of every American, and as the integration of
461
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surveillance technology expands in service to the transportation industry,
these issues will be compounded. Scaling a system of unsafe or inefficient
AVs by acting too early is not a desirable outcome.
It is also possible to achieve some harmony and an environment that
favors innovation without imposing a nationwide standard with broad
preemption of local governments. The system of federalism for which we
advocate recognizes roles for state and federal regulators. It merely
preserves the design space for cities.
B. State/National Agencies Are in Better Bargaining Position vis a vis
Firms
Another critique that is somewhat related to the first one is that scale
matters in regulation. State legislatures and attorneys general may have more
bargaining power as negotiators of the public interest. National regulators
have even more bargaining power. Cities may become caught in a race to
the bottom by attempting to lure firms, or they may get captured by special
interests.464
Concerns that cities will race to the bottom by giving away public goods
to robotics firms are warranted; we raised them ourselves above. For that
reason, we think state rules that guard against socialized costs are a good
idea. This is part of the reason that we hold up Massachusetts as a model; it
allows cities to experiment while the state acts as a backstop to preserve the
public interest. Still, any preemption provision for urban robots should
weigh the potential regulatory economies of scale against the benefits of
innovation with cities as distributed sites of experimentation. Further, cities
have their own power as market makers when they are able to deal directly
with firms.465 We also reiterate our support for backstop rules such as bans
on non-disclosure agreements in public-private partnerships to help guard
against such problems.
C. Cities Do Not Act in the Best Interest of the Region (NIMBY)
One might argue that cities will not plan in the best interest of the region
or state as a whole, but instead regulate for narrow interests defined by
NIMBY-ism (Not In My Back Yard). NIMBY-ism has been a problem in
other intractable urban and regional planning issues like housing466 and
transportation.467 The Competitive Enterprise Institute, a libertarian think
464
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tank, worries that ride-sharing companies will pressure cities to outlaw
private ownership of automated vehicles by touting the environmental
benefits of shared fleets.468 The group praised states that preempt cities in
their laws to avoid just this outcome.469
We are sensitive to this concern as well. Cities are not and should not be
the only stakeholders in regional planning. For cities to succeed in our
model, they must operate within a patchwork of federal and state regulation
and cooperate with private companies and regional stakeholders. We agree
with Sarah Fox that regional tools like environmental impact reports or
statements can support density or other positive regional planning goals.470
We also envision a possible role for Metropolitan Planning Organizations
that can coordinate the needs of multiple cities in a given region; this is a
common tool in regional transportation planning.471 Still, giving cities the
tools to regulate robots means that some cities may abuse those tools.
Further, the notion of experimentation implies that some failure will occur.
But if cities are the site of experimentation, at least those failures won’t
proliferate across the entire state or country by fiat. Cities are not the only
actors who can err in urban planning. For instance, some scholars believe
that federal policy has contributed to suburban sprawl and low-density
housing.472
To the specific concern that cities will ban individual car ownership, it
is also possible that states could use preemption and enact policies that favor
individual ownership to benefit entrenched interests, such as car
manufacturers. 473 Without taking a specific position on individual ownership
of automated vehicles, we note that almost any policy choice will favor some
interests over others. The question is which level of policymakers will make
those choices. We argue in favor of local political bodies, as they must deal
most directly with the consequences of those choices and are the most
politically accountable for those choices.
CONCLUSION
Widespread deployment of robots in cities has the potential to drastically
alter the way cities organize their public spaces and built environments. As
the testbeds for this emerging technology, cities must have room to regulate
468

Scribner, supra note 309.
Id.
470
Fox, supra note 356, at 174–82.
471
What Is a COG or MPO?, NAT’L ASS’N REG’L COUNCILS, http://narc.org/about/what-is-a-cogor-mpo/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2019).
472
GERRIT KNAPP ET AL., DEP’T URB. & REGIONAL PLAN., U. ILL., GOVERNMENT POLICY AND
URBAN SPRAWL 1–5 (2014), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.505.9245&rep
=rep1&type=pdf.
473
Marina Lao et al., Direct-to-Consumer Auto Sales: It’s Not Just About Tesla, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (May 11, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2015/05/directconsumer-auto-sales-its-not-just-about-tesla.
469

408

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

these technologies in ways that fit the realities of the local built environment
and local constituencies. While this technology is in the experimental stage,
state and federal lawmakers should avoid broad field preemption to preserve
a regulatory space for cities to design public spaces in a way that best serves
the public interest. Rather than rushing prematurely to a state or nationwide
standard, state and federal lawmakers should implement regulatory floors
and backstops against a race to the bottom. Issues that do not implicate the
design of the local built environment, such as vehicle safety or cybersecurity,
may be ripe for such intervention. State and federal governments can also
serve as conveners and disseminate experimental results and best practices
in order to build consensus toward nationwide standards. The potential of
robotics technology to deliver convenience, efficiency, and other benefits is
exciting, and the urge to standardize in the name of promoting innovation is
understandable. But that urge is misguided when the impacts of the
technology are likely to be consequential yet unknown.
For their part, cities must ensure that robots promote the public interest
rather than socialize costs that ought to be borne by firms. They should
recognize their power as market makers when dealing with companies
seeking to test their technologies in urban spaces. Local policymakers have
both a civic and moral duty to do so. More work is needed to explore the
possibility of a fiduciary duty or standard of care for cities that implement
pilot programs or procure new technologies.474 City policymakers should be
able to demonstrate their careful consideration of the impacts to privacy,
safety, public finances, and public spaces. The implementation of citizen
review committees for surveillance technologies may be one step toward this
goal.
Urban robots are likely to reorganize not just the built environment but
the social fabric of cities as well. Challenges to traditional notions of privacy
(or lack thereof) in public spaces are just one manifestation of the social
impact of urban robotics. For instance, marginalized communities of color
could experience urban robots differently than more affluent communities,
especially as a tool of law enforcement. There are also concerns that AVs
could be used as a tool of social control by governments or for companies to
exert undue influence on their passengers.475
Preempting a city’s ability to regulate “performance,” as AV START
and SELF DRIVE do, could have far reaching implications beyond the
technical specifications of the autonomous system. Robotics technologies
such as AVs are envisioned as key components in the creation of a cutting
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edge “smart transportation” system. However, if preemption prevents
cities from directing these new transportation services, then local
governments may struggle to ensure equity and access. A city that wishes to
direct AV services to poor or minority areas might be prevented from doing
so if a court finds this to be an “unreasonable” restriction on the AV’s
performance or operational domain. Or, preemption could remove a city’s
leverage to push companies toward more equitable services because local
governments are forced to allow AVs on their public rights-of-way. This
problem is not merely academic: a ride-sharing company called Via was
found to have discriminated against poor and minority communities for
years by confining its services to affluent areas of Washington, D.C. in
violation of local law.477
The importance of design in local preemption debates should have
application beyond robotics. As cities flex their power as economic and
cultural engines in American society, they have repeatedly come into
conflict with state and federal lawmakers. Preemption has been central to
issues ranging from ride-sharing to short term rentals. Considerations of
design and the built environment may not be the principal factor in deciding
how to allocate authority over policymaking in these spheres, but they may
still prove a useful facet through which to understand these problems.
More broadly, this Paper urges regulators at all levels to think carefully
about the nature of robotics and the role of cities as sites of experimentation.
For the sake of simplicity and organization, we have treated AVs, PDDs,
security robots, entertainment robots, and drones as distinct devices. This is
in part because the law has applied different rules as well. However, these
devices share some common technical features and may have similar
impacts as emerging technologies. Right now, governments apply different
regulatory regimes based on the device classification and the nature of the
right-of-way in which they operate: sidewalks versus streets versus airways.
But as the technology converges, this regulatory separation may not be
appropriate. Rather, from a designer’s perspective, the sensible approach
could be to treat cities as a single operating domain for this family of
technologies we call robots. Doing so will require a paradigm shift in
regulatory approaches and an emphasis on the city as the site of
experimentation for new governance models. Cities, for their part, must
learn to navigate the minefield of preemption and environmental design
476
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issues to foster experimentation with new technologies and new governance
models for the sake of the public good. Cities are on the forefront of other
important policy debates, such as how to implement a universal basic
income.478 This Paper has attempted to help cities understand all of the tools
that are available to them and the limits and contours of their authority to
accomplish this task. The robotic future will be made in cities and will be
felt most directly by the people who live there, so cities must take an active
role in shaping it.
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